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INTRODUCTION 
W OMEN'S quest for equality faces many obstacles. Perhaps the most important is conceptual. What do we mean by 
"equality for women?" How will we know when women have 
achieved equality with men? 
This Article examines the issue of equality for women within an 
institution that is central to their fate and crucial to their prospects: 
marriage . As marriage rates decline and divorce rates rise ,1 the in-
stitution of marriage has become the focus of a polarized debate 
1 The divorce rate stands at about 50 % of marriages, but has declined slightly in the 
past decade. See A rthur J. Norton & Louisa F. Miller. U .S. Dep't of Commerce, 
Marriage , Divorce, and Remarriage in the 1990's, at 1 (1992). Marriage rates have 
declined steadily over the past 25 years, and both men and women are marrying later. 
For example, in 1970,88.4 men per 1000 over the age of 15 were married , but by 1988 
that number had dropped to 57.4 men per 1000. See 3 U.S. Dep' t of H ealth & Hu-
man Servs., Vital Statistics of the United States 1988: Marriage and Divorce 8, 9 tbl.l-
7 (1996). Likewise, in 1975, 62.5% of 20- to 24-year-old women were married , but by 
1990 that figure had dropped to 38.5%. See Norton & Miller, supra, at 3. For 25- to 
29-year-old women, 87.2% were married in 1975, but only 69% were in 1990. See id. 
Between 1970 and 1988, the average age of first marriage for women rose fro m 20.6 
to 23.7, and for men from 22.5 to 25.5. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
supra, at 12 tbl.l -8. As matters stand, however, 90% of wo men are expected to 
marry during thei r lifetimes. See Norton & Miller, supra, at 4. 
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between, on the one hand, social conservatives who regard tradi-
tionai marriage as an unalloyed boon and social good,2 ;nd, on the 
other, feminist critics who view marriage as a patriarchal strait-
jacket that is antagonistic to women's interests.3 This Article aims 
to mediate betvveen these extremes, arguing that both camps are 
right, but for different reasons. Marriage presents women with a 
paradox. Women greatly value marriage because it significantly 
increases their well-being within society. But the fundament al 
structure of the institution of marriage makes it almost impossible 
for women to reap its benefits while maintaining their social 
equality with men. 
A review of the literature on the institution of marriage re veals a 
striking imbalance: There is an enormous body of work on divorce 
and marital failure, but relatively little on the anatomy of success-
ful relationships. Some divorce scholars delve into marital dy-
namics in considering how some aspects of marital relations-
especially the division of labor, responsibility, and rev.rarcl-may 
affect the positions of the partners when marriage fails. 4 But there 
is remarkably little sustained or systematic discussion of the re-
verse of that relationship: how extramarital prospects, or other 
preexisting factors and partner attributes, might affect the alloca-
tion of effort and reward between spouses who are not contem-
plating divorce. 
2 See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our lviost Urgent 
Social Problem (1995); Maggie Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage: How We De-
stroy Lasting Love (1996); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture ( 1997); 
Karl Zinsmeister, Why the Traditional Family Will Never Become Obsolete, Am. 
Enterprise, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 28; Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage 
in America (David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blankenhorn eds., 1996). 
3 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family 
and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization 
of ~.;farital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. 
L.J. 2127 (1994); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Ali-
mony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2227 (1994). 
"See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, ''I Gave Him the 
Best Years of My Life," 16 J. Legal Stud. 267 (1987); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory 
of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem 
of Divorce, 2 Roundtable 517 (1995); Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, 
The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 
U. Toronto L.J. 533 (1991). See generally Symposium on Divorce and Feminist Le-
gal Theory, 82 Geo. L.J. 2119 (1994). 
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The lack of a comprehensive framework for understanding day-
to-day relations within marriage has also led to serious blind spots 
in the analysis of women's fate within society as a whole. 5 A black 
box lies at the center of the elaborate explanatory structure that 
commentators and legal scholars have struggled to erect in the 
quest to understand the sources of women's predicament and to 
fashion policies that might improve their lot. By taking women's 
marital position-most notably, their weight of domestic responsi-
bility-for granted in analyzing women's social standing and eco-
nomic status, scholars have avoided the need to provide a fully sat-
isfying or searching theory of why families operate as they do.6 
This Article aims to lift the lid on the black box of marital rela-
tions and take a sustained look inside. It argues that there are 
good reasons-both empirical and theoretical-to believe that, on 
average, men and women share unequally in the benefits of mar-
riage. What precisely does it mean to say that men and women are 
unequal within marriage? And what evidence supports this con-
clusion, once defined? This Article takes on these difficult ques-
tions using the tools and concepts of economic analysis. Part I ex-
amines the empirical literature that compares some aspects of the 
benefits and burdens of marriage for men and women and con-
cludes that men typically gain a larger share of what marriage has 
to offer. Part II draws on game theory to model marriage as a bi-
lateral, monopolistic bargaining relationship between rational ac-
5 Sociologists have been most active in attempting to formul ate theories to expl ain 
obse rved marital roles and deci sionmaking, but they have failed to put forward a uni-
fied and comprehensive paradigm that fully accounts for existing patterns. See , e.g., 
Juli e Brines, Econom ic Depende ncy , Gender, a nd the Division of Labor at Home, 
100 Am . J . Soc. 652 (1994) [he re inafter Brines, Economic Dependency] ; Julie Brines, 
The Exchange Value of Housework, 5 Rationality & Soc'y 302 (1993); Paula Eng-
land , A Feminist Crit ique of Rational-Choice Theories: Implications for Sociology, 
20 Am. Sociologist 14 (1989); Paula England & George Farkas, Households, Em-
ployment, and Gender: A Social , Economic, a nd Demographic View (1986); Paula 
England & Barbara Stanek Kilbourne, Markets, Marriages, and Other Mates: The 
Problem of Power, in Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society 163 
(Roger Friedland & A.F. Robertson eds., 1990); George Farkas, Educati on, Wage 
Rates, and the Division of Labor between Husband and Wife , 38 J. Marriage & Fam. 
473 (1976). 
6 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals a nd Insti-
tutiona l Choices, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2001,2002 (1996) (observing, without trying fully 
to explain, that women take on a greater burde n of domestic responsibilities) ; Cohen, 
supra note 4, at 285; Williams, supra note 3, at 2229. 
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tors in which husbands and wives engage in a process of allocating 
the benefits and burdens of married life under conditions of con-
flict-that is, where spouses' interests do not perfectly coincide and 
one partner's welfare can sometimes come at the other's expense. 
After proposing various possible standards for egali tarian mari tal 
relationships, Part II then adopts a working definition of egalitar-
ian marriage. The analysis predicts that, although egalitarian mar-
riage is possible in some cases, it will be the exception rather than 
the rule. Bargaining principles suggest that the deep structure of 
marriage is indeed "patriarchal" in the following sense: Although 
both partners benefit from marriage, men on average have more 
power in the relationship. That is, men are in a position to "get 
their way" more often and to achieve a higher degree of satisfac-
tion of their preferences. 
Parts II and III explore the sources of this power imbalance, ex-
amining both the structural features of the institution and the man-
ner in which those features interact with the traits and preferences 
that men and women bring to marriage so as to strengthen men's 
bargaining position. Part IV reviews how the imbalance is wors-
ened by a feedback process that parlays small and morally neutral 
differences between men and women into more pronounced mari-
tal and social disparities. It also discusses how the failure to see 
marriage as a paradigmatic bargaining relationship and to under-
stand the dynamics of marital bargaining leads to fundamental mis-
conceptions about the choices men and women make in marriage 
and in life. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates how, contrary to 
common wisdom, women's supposedly greater "taste" and ski ll for 
domestic and nurturing activities cannot fully explain observed pat-
terns of behavior m divisions of labor and rewards of family life . 
Rather, a complete understanding of marital dynamics must take 
into account the inevitable conflicts that arise in any bargaining 
relationship between distinct , albeit loving, individuals and the role 
of power in resolving those conflicts. And, any explanation of 
men 's and women's "choices" must confront women's relative lack 
of power to bargain for a different or a better deal. 
Finally, Part V discusses possible solutions for bargaining imbal-
ance between men and women in marriage. It discusses a number 
of devices that might help to mitigate the degree of imbalance, but 
concludes that all have their limitations and their price. Measures 
514. Virginia Law Revie;,v [Vol. 84:509 
to chan
0
ae the balance of Dower encounter formidable practical ob-' . 
stacles grounded in the nature of marriage as an exclusive, rela-
tional contract between parties who stand in different positions at 
the outset. Many measures will not work well in the current legal 
cl imate of no-fault divorce, and introducing fault creates as many 
problems for women's bargaining position as it solves. And some 
correc tives may have problematic consequences because bargain-
ing takes place in the shadow of markets-specifically, the labor 
market and the marriage market. Attempts to change the balance 
of power by regulating the marital relat ionship directly may have 
the effect of deterring or delaying men's decision to marry or may 
change the quality of mates women can obtain. These side-effects 
may undermine or partially offset efforts to achieve marital balance. 
This Article also asks what the future holds for egalitarian mar-
riage, fo r families, and especially for children within marriages in 
·which men hold the balance of power and women fill multiple 
roles. The number of married women with children entering the 
workforce is rising steadily.i This trend has many positive effects 
7 See Barbara R. Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women 22-24 & tbl.2-3 
(1986); Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality 77 (paperback ed. 
1990); Daphne Spain & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Balancing Act: Motherhood, Marriage, 
and Employment Among American Women 147 fig .6.2 (1996); Claudia D. Goldin, 
The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women's E mployme nt, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 
741 (1 991). 
!\lost marriages now have two worke rs, and most married women work just to pre-
vent an erosion of the ir family 's sta nd ard of li ving. T he economists Barry B lues ton e 
and Stephen Rose, using data from the Panel Stud y of Income Dynamics' examina-
tion of Michigan famili es between 1967 and 1989, have calculated that husband-wife 
couples have increased their combined annual market work time a n average of a bout 
684 hours, or four months, of full-time work for that period. Barry Bluestone & Ste-
phen Rose, Overworked a nd Une mployed, Am. Prospect, Mar.- Apr. 1997, a t 58, 66. 
That means that " [t)h e typical du al-ea rne r couple a t the end of the 1980s was spe nd-
ing an additional day and [a] half on the job every week." Id. 
Most families did not gain economically from the increased e ffort, which came 
largely in the form of wives' time devoted to paid work. Indeed, most lost ground on 
the measure of wage per hour of market labor during that 20 year period. Families 
with spouses without a college degree gained no more than 4% in real earnings from 
the extra effort, even though they put in between 11 % and 18% more family hours of 
paid work. See id. at 67 tbl. Those fa milies actua ll y experie nced b e tween a n 11% 
and 18% decrease in the "family" hourly wage. See id. Only college educated cou-
ples, who worked 16.6% more hours during that period, saw a gain of 13.6 % in family 
ilou!iy wage, and a 32.5% increase in total real earn ings . See id ; see also Lawre nce 
iAishel , Jared Bernste in & John Schmitt, The State of Working America 1996-97, at 
80-83 (1997) (noting wives' increasing contributi on to family income from 1970-1992); 
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for women: It increases their security outside of marriage (i.e., af ter 
divorce) and adds to their leverage within that relationship. T he 
evidence indicates, however, that the salutary effects of \Vomen 's 
greater earning power are outweighed by other factors that impede 
women 's ability to obtain a better deal within marriage. The result , 
paradoxically , may be tha t married women 's increased workforce 
participation exacerbates the inequality in marital bargains. 
\\/omen might bear the burdens of both family life and breadwin-
ning, while obtaining fewer of the benefits than were sometimes 
forthcoming within more traditional relationships. Moreover, be-
cause women have generally served as children's principal champi-
ons within marriage and have been their main source of at tention, 
the increased burdens placed on working women due to their bar-
gaining weakness may well redound to children 's detriment. Fi-
nally , this Article suggests that the structural persistence of rnari tal 
inequality despite progress in other arenas poses an increasingly 
important threat to marriage as a social institution. A s women be-
come more disillusioned with their position within marriage, in-
creasing numbers are seeking to end their relationships and are 
making fewer investments in them. This is also an unfortunate de-
velopment for children and for society as a whole. 
I. EGALITARIAN MARRIAGE: WHAT DOES 
THE EVIDENCE TELL Us? 
A. From Choices to Preferences 
Any attempt to come up with a concept of equality within mar-
riage must confront many of the same puzzles that plague attempts 
to define social equality in general. The central dilemma can be 
summarized: "equality of what?" 8 For the purpose of assessing 
marital equality, this Article employs a rational actor model and 
adopts a utility metric for measuring equality of welfare. 9 A l-
though a utility-based concept might make some sense in theory, it 
is quite a different matter to detect deviations from the ideal in 
id. at 93 (marshaling data to show that "in the 1980s famili es worked longer for less" 
and that "husbands' earnings declines were offset by wives' increases in both hours 
and earnings"). 
8 Am artya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 1, 12 (1992); Ronald Dvvorkin, What is 
Equality? (pts. 1-2), 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 185, 283 (1981). 
9 See infra Part II . 
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practice . According to economic theory, individual preferences 
can only be inferre d by reasoning backward from what individuals 
agree to do for a price or fro m the exchanges they are willing to ac-
cept. In the case of marri age, it is tempting to explain away any 
voluntary arrangements th at do not appear to comport with one 
spouse's best interests with "fudge factors" of the necessary magni-
tude, such as altruism; interdependent utility functions; disparate 
spousal preferences, tas tes , or skills; and other sources of intrinsic 
"psychic income." 10 T he same rationalizations are available to ex-
plain general patterns that are systematically sex-skewed. If 
women usuall y specialize in housework and men in wagework, or if 
women agree to move for the husband's job more often th an vice 
versa , these patterns can be attributed to some combination of 
economic and noneconomic satisfaction of each partner's self-
interest, where those elements are assumed to differ systematically 
by sex in the population at large. What seems unequal can be ren-
dered equal by positing hidden costs or benefits, or adjusting the 
subjective value of the apparent terms of the exchange. The bur-
den of proving inequality is on the observer. 11 
10 See Thomas F. Cotter, Lega l Pragmatism a nd the Law and Economics Move-
ment , 84 Geo. L.J. 207 1, 2118-19 (1996) (" [V]irtu ally any behavior-no matter how 
ostensibly altruistic o r irration a l--can be viewed as consistent with the model of ra-
tional utility maximiza tion."); J effrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superio rity: Real 
People and the Obliga tions of Legal Theory, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that 
"' psychic income,' o f which th ere is ev idently a n unlimited supply " is needed to ex-
plain those ci rcumstances " in which no rms a nd principles push people to do things 
th at see m to make no sense if se lf-i nterest is the only goal") ; Amartya K. Sen, Ra-
tion al Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Found ations of Economics Theory , 6 Phil. 
& Pub. Aff. 317 , 335-36 (1977) (obse rving that rational actor models tha t can be 
adapted to try to take into acco unt unsel fish mot ives and altruistic impulses run the 
risk of explaining no thing by expla ining all observed behavior as a manifes ta tion of 
se lf-interes t). 
11 While economists have shi ed away from analyzing marital allocation both be-
cause of the theore ti cal and me thodological obs tacles and because of their dominant 
interest in efficie ncy, sociologists ha ve not harbored similar rese rvations . In testing 
the assumption tha t marri age sho rt-changes women, researchers have examined , 
a mong o ther things , marital decisionmaking; control over wealth, income, and fi-
nan ces; and priority a tt ached to each spouse 's job or career goals. See Robert 0 . 
Blood, Jr. & Don a ld M. Wolfe, Husbands & Wives: The Dynamics of Married Liv-
ing (1960); see a lso Belinda Feh lberg, Sexua lly Transmitted Debt 77-85 (1997) 
(rev iewing the ex ten t of sharing of a wide varie ty of resources and privileges between 
married couples across cultures a nd finding th at " [i]nvariabl y, sociologists have con-
cluded that wome n receive th e lesser share"); Monica Biernat & Camille B. Wort-
man, Sharing of Home Responsibilities Between Professionally Employed Women 
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B. The Work-Leisure Gap 
The divorce literature suggests that one place to look for women 
who are unequal within marriage might be the traditional role-
divided relationship. Women who have invested in traditional do-
mestic roles come away from divorce with far fewer resources than 
their husbands, and they suffer a decline in economic well-being 
and standard of living. 12 One might simply conclude that these 
and Their Husbands, 60 J. Personality & Soc. Psycho!. 844 (1991) (noting the tradi-
tionally unequal distribution of childcarc responsibilities among professional couples 
and wives' greater self-criticism of their own domestic performance); Philip Blum-
stein & Pepper Schwartz, Money and Ideology: Their Impact on Power and th e Divi-
sion of Household Labor, in Gender, Family, and Economy: The Triple Overlap 261, 
264-66 (Rae Lesser Blumberg ed., 1991) [hereinafter Gender, Family, and Economy] 
(attempting to measure spouses' "decision-making power," "leadership power," and 
"conciliation power," and to correlate these with spouses' market income); England, 
supra note 5, at 24 (reporting on studies determining that husbands on balance more 
often get their way); England & Kilbourne, supra note 5, at 165 (citing surveys con-
cluding that husbands have more power than wives); Dair L. Gillespie, Who Has the 
Power? The Marital Struggle, 33 J. Marriage & Fam. 445 (1971) (examining multiple 
areas of marital decisionmaking and resolution of conflict); Gerald W. McDonald, 
Family Power: The Assessment of a Decade of Theory and Research, 1970-79, 42 J. 
Marriage & Fam. 841 (1980) (examining the sources of power in marital decision-
making); Janice M. Steil & Karen Weltman, Marital Inequality: The Importance of 
Resources, Personal Attributes, and Social Norms on Career Valuing and the Alloca-
tion of Domestic Responsibilities, 24 Sex Roles 161 (1991) (determining that men 
overall have more say at home and less responsibility for children and the house-
hold). For a recent summary of studies relating to marital resource division, see 
Janice M. Steil, Marital Equality: Its Relationship to the Well-Being of Husbands and 
Wives 43-61 (1997). 
Studies of financial arrangements among married couples suggest patterns of un-
equal control over spending, with men having greater unilateral discretion and deci-
sionmaking power. For example, in one study in which most men were the primary, 
although not the exclusive wage-earners, the majority of husbands had "an appar-
ently unquestioned right to personal spending money," whereas wives rarely made 
personal expenditures, and then not without consultation or consent. Carole B. Bur-
goyne, Money in Marriage: How Patterns of Allocation Both Reflect and Conceal 
Power, 38 Soc. Rev. 634, 648 (1990). Another study of family finances reveals that 
wives tend to be responsible for budgeting and spending only when "money is short 
[and] managing and budgeting become chores rather than a source of power within 
the household." Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequal-
ity Within Marriage, 31 Soc. Rev. 237, 257 (1983). In both studies, the wife's marital 
contribution did not generally translate into an equal control over spending or an 
equal allocation of monetary resources to personal needs. 
12 See Ellman, supra note 4, at 5. See generally Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce 
Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and 
Children in America (1985) (examining the impact of economic decisions on spouses 
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wives were getting less from marriage than their husbands because 
when their marriages dissolve, they take away less. The post-
divorce situation, however, does not necessarily imply an overall 
inequality of welfare during the course of the marriage. The factor 
of timing has to be taken into account: T he conventional wife 's in-
vestments (intensive domestic and chi ldcare services) tend to be 
made early in the relationship, with the payoff (in economic secu-
rity provided by her husband) expected late. 13 The extreme first 
performer element of this type of relationship gives rise to the po-
tenti al for opportunistic defe ction but does not necessarily show 
that, in the absence of such defection, a traditional wife m a sue-
r 1 • J r 1 • 11 14 cessru1 marnage gets ess out or tne marnage overa . 
and children involved in a divorce). Although Weitzman's groundbreaking study has 
come under a ttack and he r data have bee n rean a lyzed, subsequent studies support 
her basic conclusions. See G reg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of 
the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 Demography 485, 489 tbl.2 
(1985) (finding that women 's post-divorce inco me is 70 % of the ir pre-divorce income 
while men 's post-divorce income is 93% of the ir pre-divorce income); Ross Finnie, 
Women, Men, and the Economic Consequ ences of Divorce: Evidence from Canadian 
Longitudinal Data, 30 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anthropology 205, 218 (1993) (finding that 
women have post-divorce incomes that are 57% of their pre-divorce incomes while 
men have post-divorce incomes that are 82% of their pre-divorce incomes); Richard 
R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluatio n of the Economic Conseq uences of Divorce, 61 Am. 
Soc. Rev. 528, 532 (1996) (finding that women 's standard of living fell 27% after di-
vorce while men's standard of living increased 10%). 
13 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 287; Ellman, supra note 4, at 25-29; Trebilcock & 
Keshvani, supra note 4, at 552-53. 
"For a discussion of the first performer problem, see infra Section IV.C. An alter-
native way to see the traditional wife's greate r vulnerability after divorce as revealing 
something about her compara tive well-being during marriage is to view her as bear-
ing a d isproportionate risk of loss during the life of the marriage. A tradition a l wife 
lacks the quality and type of " insurance" against the consequences of marital breakup 
that her husband typically enjoys. T his relative lack of insurance may detract from 
her share of marital we ll-being. But the perception of imbalance in marital shares 
that stems from fewer hedges against insecurity depends crucially on assumptions 
about subjective preferences for ri sk and perceptions of probability of divorce, which 
vary from person to person . Looking at the ove rall risk of divorce will not do , be-
cause husbands and wives may not (and probably do not) judge their own risk of di-
vorce as equ iva lent to that of the overall population. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert 
E. Emery , W hen Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expecta-
tions of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 439, 443 (1993) 
(indicating that 100% of individua ls about to marry reject the likelihood of their own 
divorce). Also, women may believe (not without justification) that their risk of di-
vorce is at least partly within their own control so that they can take steps to reduce 
or minimize their own risk. T he fact that many women may be wrong in their pro-
spective assessment of thei r divorce risk suggests that many are in fact underinsured, 
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In fact, the traditional marriage is probably the least likely to 
provide persuasive evidence of marital inequality. The data on 
marital use of time, for example , indicate that men and women in 
traditional marriages, in which the division of labor is sharp, work 
similar hours and enjoy roughly similar amounts of leisure time. 15 
This information provides li ttle basis for asserting that the spouses 
in such relationships are not work ing equally hard on average, or 
that they do not enjoy equivalent well -being from the relationships 
overall. There is , of course , considerable individual variation from 
couple to couple. But the aggregate pattern makes it difficult ro 
argue persuasively th at the division of labor in such families is sys·· 
tematically unfair to one spouse, in the sense that one partner un-
ceasingly gains at the expense of the other. 
In contrast, the dual-earner couple 16 presents a more convincing 
story of marital inequality. There is good evidence of a systematic 
difference in the total number of hours worked-in both the paid 
and unpaid sectors- by each dual-earner spouse for the benefit of 
the household unit. 17 The average wife in a dual-earner couple de-
but this is perhaps better conceptualized as a form of market failure or information 
deficit rather than as evidence of a lopsided allocation of marital well-being. 
15 See Joseph H. Pleck, Working Wives!Working Husbands 30 tbl.2.1 (1985) (presenting 
data showing that husbands and housewives do similar amounts of work) ; Maximil-
iane E . Szinovacz, Changing Family Roles and Inte ractions , in Women and the Fa m-
ily: Two Decades of Change 163, 175 (Beth B. Hess & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1984) 
(same). 
16 E mpirical studies of working spouses have different criteria for inclusion of 
working couples into various ca tegori es for purposes of comparison. See infra note 
18. For the purposes of thi s Article , a "dual-earner couple" is rather arbitrarily de-
fin ed as one in which each spouse works for pay at least half-time (about 20 hours per 
week or more). This cutoff is unlike iy to leave out many couples in which both part-
ners do some work for pay: Because of discontinuities in the labor market's demand 
for part-time work (i.e., th e paucity of jobs requiring less than a half-time commit-
ment), it is not unreasonable to assume that most dual-earne r families consist of 
spouses working at least half-time. See Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, The 
Economics of Women, Men, and Work 223-24 (1986) (discussing problems with part-
time employment opportunities); Rhona Mahony, Kidding Ourselves: Breadwinning, 
Babies, and Bargaining Power 210-11 (1995) (discussing reasons why part-time em-
ployment is rare); Spain & Bianchi, supra note 7, at 84 fig.4.2, 88 tbl.4.4, 151 fig. 6.4, 
152 tb1.6.4 (citing data indicating a steady increase in the number of employed 
women, especially women employed full-time); Maureen Perry-Jenkins & Karen 
Folk, Class, Couples, and Conflict: E ffects of the Division of Labor on Assessments 
of Marriage in Dual-Earne r Families, 56 J. Marriage & Fam. 165 (1994) (reporting 
that the majority of employed women are employed full-tim e). 
17 Work can be distinguished from leisure by a " third-party" criterion, which defines 
';work" as the production of goods or services that could be provided by another pe r-
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votes significantly more time to work of one form or another 
(domestic or wage work) than does her husband. The diffe rence in 
the number of hours spent working by members of dual-earner 
couples has been dubbed by sociologists the "work-leisure gap. " 18 
so n or economic unit with out a ny ut ility loss to th e co nsume r of those goods a nd 
services. See Katharine Sil baugh, T urni ng La bor into Love : Housewo rk a nd the Law, 
91 Nw. U . L. Re v. 1, 11 ("A n acti vity is leisure ra ther th an work if a perso n must do it 
he rself to e nj oy it s benefits." ). So "a perso n can eat a meal and e nj oy its ben efits 
whe th er she cooks it or whe the r so meone e lse cooks it fo r he r. A pe rson ca nn o t e n-
joy the benefits o f reading a book unl ess she reads it he rse lf. T hus coo king is work , 
a nd read ing is le isure ." Id . It should be appa rent th a t some acti viti es (e .g., childcare) 
mi x work with le isure in suppl ying bo th fungible productive va lue a nd pe rforme r-
specific consumption value . See discuss ion of childcare, infra no te 117. 
18 Th ere is a large body of empirical work tha t documents spouses' participation in 
domes ti c labor. For some of the most care ful findings in th e soc io logica l literature, 
see Pleck , supra no te 15. T he data clearl y show tha t " wome n pe rfo rm more hours of 
work tha n me n whe n paid a nd unpa id work is combined. " Silbaugh, supra no te 17, a t 
12; see Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, T he Gend er Factory : T he Apportionment of Work 
in American Households (1 985); Marion T olbe rt Cole man, The Divisio n of House-
hold Labor: Suggestions for Future E mpirica l Conside ra tion and Theore tica l Deve l-
opment , in Gender, Family, and Economy, supra no te 11 , a t 245, 248-49; Sh elley 
Coverma n, Explaining Husbands ' Participation in Domestic Labor, 26 Soc. Q. 81, 93 
(1985); Myra Marx Ferree, T he G e nde r Division of Labor in T wo-Earne r Marriages, 
12 J . Fam. Issues 158, 158 (1 991 ); He idi I. H artmann, The Family as the Locus o f 
G end er, Class , a nd Politica l Struggle: The Example of Housework , 6 J. Women Cul-
ture & Soc'y 366, 379 (1981 ); Suzanne Mode l, Housework by Husbands: Determi-
nants a nd Implications , in Two Paychecks: Li fe in Dua l-Earner Families 193 (Joan 
A ld ous ed ., 1982); Cathe rine E . Ross, T he Divisio n of La bor a t Home, 65 Soc. Forces 
816, 830 (1987); Beth Ann e Shelto n, Wome n, Me n a nd T ime: Ge nder Diffe rences in 
Paid Work , Housework and Leisure 112 (1992); Joann Vane k, Household Work , 
Wage Work , and Sexual Equality, in Wome n a nd H ouse hold Labo r 275, 277 (Sara h 
Fenstermaker Be rk ed ., 1980) ; Sara Yogev, Do Professional Wome n H ave Egalitar-
ia n Marital Rel a ti onships? , 43 J. Marri age & Fam. 865, 868 (1981 ). 
The work-leisure gap va ri es wid e ly ( from a bout 7-30 hours per week) from study to 
stud y, and depe nds on the size and type of popula tion exa min ed a nd th e me thods fo r 
measuring ho usehold responsibility. B ut the gap is uniforml y observed a nd always 
favors the husband. See Berk, supra, a t 8 (me n do only 15% of housework); Pleck, 
supra no te 15, at 56 (wives spend 3 more hours per day on "fa mily work "); Shelton, 
supra , a t 99 (15 hours pe r week on house hold la bo r); Susan M. Shaw, Gender a nd 
Leisure: Inequa lity in th e D istr ibuti on o f Leisure Time, 17 J . Leisure R es. 266, 274 (9 
hours per week less leisure time for women); Szinovacz, supra no te 15, a t 175 (3llz 
hours pe r day) ; Yogev, supra, at 867 tbl.l (11 hours per wee k fo r wome n without 
childre n a nd 30 ho urs per week fo r wome n with children). Most studies show tha t 
men and wome n generally perform different types of tasks , with wome n do ing more 
routine, everyday, " low-control" work that ca nnot be put off; me n tak e more spo-
radic, discre tion ary , or " high-contro l" jobs. See Rosa lind C. Barne tt & Caryl Rivers, 
She Works/He Works: How Two-I ncome Families A re Happie r, Healthi er, and Bet-
ter-Off 179-82 (1996). In th e area of childcare, women do more routine physica l 
work and care while men do more play and education. See Scott Coltrane, Family 
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Man 79 (1996). E ven whe n husbands· part icipat io n is re la ti ve ly high, women te nd to 
re tain both cont ro l over and responsibility for mak ing domestic decisions and insur-
ing tha t ho use ho ld tasks are perfo rme d. See H e le n J. Mederer, Division of Labor in 
Two-Earne r Homes: Task Accomplishme nt Ve rsus Ho use ho ld Manage me nt as Cri t i-
ca l Variab les in Percept io ns Abo ut Fam il y Work, 55 J. Marriage & Fam. 133 ( 1993). 
Although the trend over th e past 25 years or so has been in the direction of husbands· 
takin g o n a greater sha re of domestic respo nsibility , thi s is large ly explained by are-
duction in the total number of ho urs wo me n and familie s devote to children and do-
mestic tasks rather than by an in crease in the absolute a mo unt of time men devote to 
th ese pursuits. See Fleck, supra note 15, at 31; Shelton, supra, a t 145; Silbaugh , supra 
no te 17, at 9; see a lso Jo hn P . Rob inson & Geoffrey Godbey, Time for Life: The Sur-
prising Ways Americans Use Their Time ( 1997) (a rguing th a t male a nd fem a le uses 
of time a re conve rging, but basing thi s conclusion o n data th at do no t focus precise ly 
o n mari ta l sta tus, employment of spouses o utside the home, or the presence of children). 
There a re substantia l methodologica l diffi culti es in ga the ring housework data . See 
Joanne Miller & Howard H. Garrison, Sex Roles: The Division of Labor at H o me 
and in the Workplace, 8 Ann. Rev. Soc. 237, 239 (1982) , o n the methodological diffi-
culties with research. For a rev iew of methodological techniques for data collection 
and th e ir problems, see Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 8 n.18 . Studies of household labor 
have collected principally two types o f data: time budgets (a form of diary kept by the 
subject) and survey questionn aires on the distribution of responsibility for various 
household and childcare tasks. See Glenna Spitze, Women 's Employment and Fam-
ily R ela tions: A Review, 50 J. Marriage & Fam. 595 ,600 (1 988) . 
Some studies either include childcare time or conside r it separately, while some ex-
clude it altogether. A rev iew o f studies of child-rearing practices reveals that " fath ers 
on average are considerably less in vo lved [with children] even when mothers are 
working." Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnook in, Dividing the Child: Social 
a nd Lega l Dilemmas of C ustody 26 ( 1992) (citing Michae l E. Lamb et a!., A Biosocia l 
Perspective on Paternal Behavio r and Involvement , in Parenting Across the 
Lifespan-Biosocial Dimensio ns 111 (Jane B. Lancaster et a l. e els., 1987)). 
Even when childcare time is excluded , employed women spend considerably more 
time on domestic tasks than men do, with time in housework outside of childcare cor-
related with number of children in th e household. See Shelton, supra, at 100 (each 
additio nal child costs women o n ave rage six more hours pe r wee k of housework, and 
me n o ne more hour) . For exce ll e nt data on time in ho usework , as correlated wi th 
pa id labor time , marital sta tus, a nd number of childre n, showing that even women 
e mployed full-time (more than 40 ho urs per week) do about twice as much house-
work as men, see id . at 63-88; see a lso id. at 96-99 (showing thro ugh regression an a ly-
sis that gender is an independe nt variable determining time spent doing housewo rk , 
even afte r controlling fo r numbe r of children , marital status , time in paid labor, edu-
cation, and occupational status, though earnings were no t included in the regressi on 
analysis). The gap carries thro ugh in the amount of time working men and women 
spe nd caring for children. Even controlling for total hours of pa id work and unpaid 
ho usework (minus childcare), wome n ha ve less leisure time than men. See id. at 139. 
Shelton attributes this gap to the extra time women spe nd on childcare. Id.; see Berk, 
supra, a t 7; Pleck, supra no te 15, a t 50-5 1; Biernat & Wortman , supra note 11 , at 855-
58; Yogev, supra, at 867 tbl.l. 
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Although women on average engage in fewer hours of employment 
and earn less than their husbands, '') many married wom en have 
achieved parity in num ber of hours and earnings from market la-
bor.2,; But the '.;vork--leisure gap does not close significantly as 
·,.vomen work more hours or earn more money.2 i Nor is it avoided 
by women m any social cl ass. "= T his difference in the total work 
1" See Barnett & Rivers, supra note l8. at 178: Vc.nek , su pra note 18, at 280. In 
1993 , a lmost half of moth ers with children Lmckr 17 worked iess than fu ll-time, wi th 
28% of women wi th children undr;r six workin g fu ll -time and ye a r round. See Spain 
& Bian chi, supra no te 7, at 147 . 
"' Although women on average earn less than th e ~r husbands , worki ng coupl es in 
which the wife makes an equal mone tary contr ib uti on are increasingly common. In 
1993, in a survey conducted by the Bureau o f Labor Sta ti stics, 48% of married 
•,vomen provided hal f or more of the family iucome, and fuli y 23% earned more than 
their husbands. See Tamar Lewin, Women Are Becoming Equal Providers , N.Y. 
T imes, May 11, 1995, at A27. Married women who worked full-time contributed an 
average of 41% of fa mily income. See id. Nine of ten women , whether employed or 
not, said that care of people in their fa mili es was their responsibi lity. See id. 
:' Studies on thi s issue consistently genera ted data showing that women do most of 
the domestic work even when the wife 'NOrks for pay , and the gap does not disappear 
(although it narrows) when the wife ·s hou rs of paid work and amount of wage income 
approach or equal that of her husband. See G le nna Spitze, The Division of Task Re-
sponsibi lity in U.S. Households: Longitudinal A djustments to Change, 64 Soc. Forces 
689, 692-95 (reporting data from the Na tiona l Longitudinal Surveys of the Labor 
Market Experiences of Young and Mature Women, compiled in the 1970s, showing 
that "women who earn 20 to 40 percent of couple income have the same decrease in 
tasks as those who earn over 40 percent" ); see also Pleck, supra no te 15, at 55-57 
(questi oning the empirica l re lationship be twe en men's paid work time and domes tic 
work time) ; Shelton, supra note 18, at 107 (showing that time in domestic labor is not 
significantly re lated to the ratio of spouses' ea rnings); Brines, Economic Depend-
ency, supra note 5, at 682 ("[D]ependent husbands do less ho usework the more they 
depend on their wives for income ."); Coverman, supra note 18, at 93 (surveying 
stud ies that found that wives' employment status had no e ffect on husbands' domes tic 
participation) ; Farkas, supra note 5, at 482 (finding that wag-=s were not a sa tisfactory 
explanation of the division of labor); Ferree, supra note 18, at 178-79 (noting that a 
one-to-one tradeoff of wages earned does no t expi::lin why women continue to do 
most of the housework); Mary Clare Lennon & Sarah Rosenfield, Re lative Fairness 
and the Division of Housework: The Importance of O ptions, 100 Am. J. Soc. 506, 
511 -17 (1 994) (finding in a sample survey of 13,000 couples that , a lthough the women 
in dual-worker couples earned an average of 43% of the family income, they per-
fo rmed an average of about 68% of the domestic work) ; Model, supra note 18, at 202 
(finding only slightly higher husband part icipa tio n in co uples with equal wages) ; 
Ross, supra note 18, at 821 (reporting on studies finding that "the ratio of husbands' 
[to wives '] ea rnings does not significantiy affect the household division of labor"). 
21 In fact, there is evidence that women with the most time-consuming and de-
manding jobs work the longest hour~; overa ll. Because husbands' hours of domestic 
labor appear consistently insensiti ve to wives' hours of work across the social spec-
trum, the hardest-working women tend to endure the largest work-leisure gap. Three 
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time of spouses 1n dual-earner couples gives nse to the notorious 
"double day" or "second shift" for women wage-earners. 23 Thus, 
the data indicate that in many homes there are periods when hus-
bands are at leisure while wives work. The husband devotes the 
time freed up by the wife 's efforts at home not to a form of produc-
stud ies show iopsided patterns among professional coupies . Donna Hodgkins Ber-
ardo, Consta nce L. Sh c;han &. Gerald Leslie, A Residue of T raditio n: J•:;bs, Caret:rs, 
and Scouses' Tirne in Housework, ~~ 9 J. Marriage & f am. 381 IJ987); Biernat & 
Wortr;,an, supra note 11; Rebecca B. Bryson et aL, Th e ? rofess i·:::- ~ a l P~ir: Husband 
and Wife Psychoiogists, 31 J. Am. Psychoi. 10 (1976). 
Donna Hodgkins Berardo and co-authors de fine "d ua i-career' ' fa!Tlilies as those in 
which " both spouses have high as pirations to achieve in the ">vori cl o f work" and ta ke 
on de manding professiona l or manage ri a l jobs in which they are ca ll e d upon to per-
form tas ks that " a re high ly productive or that carry great respo nsibility." Berardo, 
Shehan & Leslie , supra, at 382. In non -career dual -worker fami li es, the jobs held by 
the spo uses te nd to be ro utin e, demand fixed hours of work, or entail less ind epend-
en t responsibility. See Ja ne C. Hood, Becoming a Two-Job Family 183 (1 983) 
(discussing the differences between '· 'dual-career" and " dual-worker" families, and 
finding that only about 10% of dual-earner families fall into the forme r category). 
Equality of earnings is more common among low-income, dual-worker families 
than a mong high-income families: Women's percentage of to tal household earnings 
generally increases as household income declines. See Spain & Bia nch i, supra note 7, 
at 154 tbl.6. 5. Most couples with equai earnings or job prestige are at the low-earni ng 
end o f the sca le. See Spitze, supra no te 21, at 695 ("[W]ives who are the primary 
earner te nd to have low-earning h usbands ra ther tha n to be unusua!iy high earners 
themselves ." ); rv!ode !, supra no te 18, a t 201-02 (finding that most equal-i ncome fami-
lies were in the low-income ra nge). Nonetheless, higher-earn ing ("d ual-career") 
wives spend somewhat kss time in domestic pursuits than lower-earn ing women who 
work full-time ("dual-wo rke r" wives). Th at pattern genera ll y retlects dual-career 
wives· spend ing less time in domestic work than others, not their husbands' spending 
more. High-earning and well-educated wives still spend sign ificant ly more time doing 
ho usework than their husbands. See Shelton, supra note 18, at 70-72, 99, 107, 116. 
Thus, "[t]here is no evidence . .. that higher relative earnings lead increme ntall y to 
higher levels of interpersonal power" as measured by the abi li ty to sh ift responsibilit y 
for domesti c labor to the male partner in the marriage . Spitze , supra note 21, at 695 . 
R athe r, exis ting evidence quite decisively indicates that wo me n rare ly succeed in 
" buying their way o ut " of an unequal share of domes ti c responsibility by increas ing. 
the ir work commitment or earning power. See Berardo , Sh ehan & Lesiie, supra, at 
387; Biernat & Wortman, supra note 11, at 855-56; see a lso Yogev, supra note 18, at 
868 (finding that work wee ks of profess ional women with ch il dren were 29.7 ho urs 
longer than their husbands'). 
23 See Arlie Hochschild, T he Second Shift: Working Pa rents a nd the Revoluti o n at 
Home (1989); Shelton, supra note 18, at 108. Women with chi ldren experience the 
greatest burden in the second shift, since they perform the majmity of childcare and 
housework, and their housework burden increases with each additional child. See 
She lton, supra note 18, at 104. 
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tion that benefits both parties ,21 but to leisure, a form of consump-
tion that benefits mainly (if not solely) the consumer. 
The work-leisure gap offers promise in the search for real-world 
evidence of inequalities in the distribution of marital welfare. Lei-
sure, or discretionary time, is one marital resource available for 
distribution to individuals within the marital unit. Although leisure 
may sometimes have productivity-enhancing side-effects, 25 it func-
tions primarily as a pure consumption good. As such, it carries 
positive utility for the person who enjoys it. Individuals surely vary 
in the degree to which they value leisure, but leisure is almost al-
ways considered valuable after a significant amount of paid work, 
which is the context in which the work-leisure gap among dual-
earner couples appears. 26 Moreover, leisure is not a public good. 
Although couples can enjoy their leisure together (which can gen-
erate some extra joint utility in excess of each person's consump-
tion value), each individual 's period of leisure is enjoyed separately 
by that individual and can be enjoyed alone. 27 Because it is possi-
ble to exclude others from the enjoyment of one's discretionary 
time, leisure can be unevenly distributed within families and 
"hogged" by one or more family members. Furthermore, periods 
of leisure can be measured and compared by applying an objective 
metric (time). More leisure has greater value than less, although 
the law of diminishing returns applies. 28 Finally, there is no reason 
to believe that men's taste for leisure differs systematically from 
women's. Although men and women might differ in their prefer-
ences for different types of work and individuals might differ in 
their energy level and thus the intensity of their preferences for lei-
"See supra notes 18, 21, 22. 
25 See infra note 186 for a discussion of the "rejuvenation" and "tlexibility" effects. 
26 Most people derive some "consumption value" or intrinsic satisfaction from paid 
work, with some-especially professionals with interesting or prestigious jobs-
enjoying a considerable amount. Th ese persons experience no sharp division be-
tween leisure and work because "free " time is often used for work-related activities. 
See supra note 17. That pattern is almost certainly the exception rather than the rule 
in the general population; the subjects in the work-leisure studies seemed to have lit-
tle trouble distinguishing leisure time from work. 
27 There may be a small vicarious component in the enjoyment of leisure, but, as-
suming equal love between the spouses, that component should be shared equally by 
husbands and wives. 
28 See infra note 188. 
• 
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sure, there is littl e evidence that either sex has a stronger desire for 
leisure as such. 
The existence of the work-leisure imbalance in dual-earner 
families gives rise to two distinct questions. First, is the gap good 
evidence of marital inequality? The gap certainly seems to suggest 
sharp inequality, at least wi th respect to certain measurable com-
ponents of intramarital effort and reward. T he persistence of the 
gap over the past severa l decades has prompted one prominent 
scholar of family time use to comment that current arrangements 
assign "the cost of increased economic benefits the whole family 
enjoys thanks to the wife's employment to her alone."29 Is there 
reason to believe that thi:::> scholar is correct-that women are 
bearing more of the costs and enj oying fewer of the rewards of the 
family's collective efforts? Second, if the imbalance in the alloca-
tion of effort and reward within families is real, why does it occur 
and why does it persist? Vv'hy do women acquiesce in arrange-
ments that entail absolute sacrifice for them compared to other 
"deals" the family might adopt? 
A number of stories can be told about the work-leisure gap that 
are consistent with more or less equality between spouses and that 
provide some explanation for women's voluntary acquiescence in 
this arrangement.3° For example, it is commonly supposed that the 
wife will perform unpaid domestic services more efficiently-that 
is , at least cost per unit of output. If that were the case, allocating 
domestic responsibility mostly to the working wife might be Pa-
reto-superior to a more even split, so long as the wife receives side-
29 Jose ph H. Pleck, Husbands' Pa id Work and Family Roles: Current Research Issues, 
in 3 Research in the Interweave of Social Roles: Families and Jobs 25 1, 284 (Hele na 
Z . Lopata & Joseph H . Pleck eds., 1983). If the base line for comparison is the single 
breadwinner famil y of 25 yea rs ago, the evidence indica tes tha t the wife 's employ-
ment often does not issue in " increased economic benefits" for the family. See supra 
note 7 (explaining tha t mos t famili es have not ga ined rea l income through increased 
ex tra hours of paid work , which have come in the form of wives' paid employment). 
Women's "break even " contribution to family earnings, however, must be offset by 
the cost of decreased time fo r domestic work, whi ch must still be performed by 
someone despite wome n's paid e mployment. The evidence shows that it is wom en 
who are bearing a disproport ionate amount of the costs of maintaining household 
services, with other family me mbers enjoying the benefits of the maintenance o f 
prior-or higher-income leve ls through women's pa id e mployment. For furth er di s-
cuss ion, see infra Section IY.A.2. 
30 See infra Section IV.A .l. 
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payments from the extra surplus her efforts generate that are large 
enough both to cover her "extra" costs and to make her better off 
than under an arrangement of more equal sharing of responsibil-
ity.31 But the bargaining model discussed in this Article shows that 
this is not the only, nor indeed even the best , explanation for these 
observed patterns. It is more likely that women go along with this 
regime because they lack the power to alter family life in their fa-
vor and to capture more of the gains of the ir efforts for themselves. 
By this account, observed patterns are consistent wi th a marked 
degree of inequality in the welfare of members of intact families. 
II. A MODEL Of MARRI AGE : THE UNION OF 
RATIONAL UTILIT Y MAXIMIZE RS 
A. The Generation and A llocation of Resources in lvlarriage 
Marriage can be modeled as a relationship between two people 
that generates a series of inputs and outputs. The process of gen-
erating those elements is bound up with allocation of burdens and 
rewards between mates and other family members. The model as-
sumes that, in deciding how to allocate costs and benefits, house-
hold members behave as rational utility maximizers. They seek to 
increase their own individual well-being or satisfaction-their 
"psychic utility."32 
31 See infra Section IY.A.1 (discussion o f side-payme nts) . 
31 The concept of utility makes use of a subject ive measure of overa ll well-being, in 
which each party 's interests are de fin ed in terms o f psychological sta tes : " pleasure, 
happiness, desire, prefe rence sat isfaction, and the like ." Ala n Wertheimer, E xploita-
tion 207 (1 996) . On the rational utility maximize r model, see Cotter, supra note 10, 
at 2115 ; Harrison , supra note 10, a t 2; Jere my Waldron, Criticizing the Economic 
Ana lysis of Law, 99 Yale L.J . 1441, 1441-42 ( 1990) (distinguishing the " rational 
choice approach," which postulates " a type of human agent who seeks rationally to 
maximize the sa tisfaction of his own wants in a contex t where othe rs are engaged in a 
similar enterprise, against a finite stock of resources" from the "economic analysis of law'' 
which "seeks to characterize certain areas of law in terms of the pursuit of efficiency"). 
Much of the analysis in this Article takes men 's and wome n's prefe rences as exoge-
nous, or gi ven. It also equa tes welfare o r well-be ing with th e maximization of utility , 
which in turn is understood as the satisfaction of " revealed prefere nces," while de-
voting little attention to the large body of research indica tin g tha t choice is subject to 
cognitive distortions that deviate from ra ti onality. See, e .g. , Judgm e nt Unde r Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahncma n, Paul Slov ic & Amos Tvcrsky eds., 
1982). T he concept of utility used here is quite capacious, and can include the satisfaction 
of second-order preferences such as the desi re to ad he re to moral ideals and principles. 
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Applying the principie of rational utility maximization to inch-
victuals operating within the family, although a commonplace in the 
economics literature, meets resistance from those who believe that 
family life is not premised on self-regarding motives and that the 
principles governing family and market are, or at least should be, 
radically distinct. 33 But rational self-interest does not entail abso-
lute selfishness: The model does not exclude altruism, love, or con-
cern for other familv members. 34 It is not inconsistent with the oar-
" ' 
tial dependence of each spouse's individual well-being upon the 
well-being of other family members nor does it rule out a spouse 's 
The adoption of a strcam!ined model of rational cho ice is not meant to affirm its 
validity. For example, the analysis acknowledges that prefe rences bearing o n the 
conduct of marriage appea r to interact with social conventions and expectati ons in 
complex ways, see infra notes 161- 163 and accompanying text, but does not seck to 
resolve th e question of whether those preferences are the product o f socia l experi -
ence or wheth er they are socially manipulable. The validity of the Article's main the-
sis-that women have less power to act on their preferences than me n in marriage, 
whatever those preferences may be and however th ey are formed-does not depend 
critically on how welfare is defined or on whether preferences can be changed. Nor is 
it undermined by taking a very broad view of utility or "psychic income." See infra 
note 35. 
For further di scuss ion, see Susan Moller Okin, Justice , Gender, and the Famil y 165 
(1989) (sugges ting that the difference be twee n men 's and women's remarriage pros-
pects are "socially constructed " and hence malleabl e; Amartya K. Sen, Gender and 
Cooperative Conflicts, in Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development 
123, 148 (Irene Tinkered., 1990) (suggesting that women's greater invo lvement in the 
outside world may shape their expectations of ho usehold divisions) ; L.W. Sumner, 
Welfare, H appiness , and Ethics 66 ( 1996) (restating Sen's argument as the view that 
"[w]e lfare cannot consist in utility .. . because an individua l's tastes, ambitions, a nd 
aspirations are too malleable by processes of indoctrination , manipulation, and so-
cialization"); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitutio n, 84 Co lum. 
L. Rev. 1689 (1984) (suggesting a preference-shaping function for law) ; Cass R Sun-
stein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 Co lum. L. Rev. 903 (1996) [hereinafter Sun-
stein, Social Norms] (same); see a lso Heidi Li Fe ldman, H a rm and Money: Against 
the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 1580-94 (1997) 
(criticizing the notion that well-be ing or welfare is nothing more than subjective , ex-
periential preference sa ti sfaction) ; Robe rt A. Poll ak, For Better or Worse: The Roles 
of Power in Models of Distribution within Marriage, 84 Am. Econ . Rev. 148, 151 
(1994) (discuss ing prefe rences as endogenous or exogenous to distributiona l bar-
gaining mod els) . 
33 See infra Section IV.B.l.d; infra note 228. 
J.l Nor does the concept of utility maximiza tion rule out pursuit of the full range of 
nonmonetary and intangible goods that give marri age so much of its value. It a lso 
allows consideration of the various motives and sentiments that operate within the 
marital sphere. See Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes 151 (1996) ("The interac-
tions between husbands, wives, parents, and children are more likely to be motivated by 
love, obligation, guilt, and a sense of duty than by self-interest narrowly interpreted .") . 
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taking vicarious pleasure in the other's happiness or satisfaction.35 
But the model does assume less than perfect altruism and, hence, a 
less than perfect coincidence between family members' interests. 
This means that there will be conflict wi thin the relationship, not 
necessarily in the active sense of harsh words and recrimination, 
but in the sense that one spouse's well-being may sometimes come 
at the other 's expense.36 
;s Another way to look at motivation within marri age is to posit that spouses a lways 
ac t o ut of se lf-interest, but that se lf-interest is somc:t imes adva nced by the we ll-being 
of the partner. because spo uses take vicarious rleasurc in the others' satisfaction. 
T hat is, spo uses' utility functions are partiall y in te rdepe nde nt , a lthough th e degree of 
interde pendence may vary wide ly a nd in complex ways, depe nding o n th e characte r-
isti cs of the indi vidua ls and the d istribution of ma rita l surplus goods. See Cotte r, su-
pra no te 10; Sen, supra no te 10. 
" T hus , the model rejects Gary Becker's construct o f the "a ltruis tic head of ho use-
ho ld ," which assumes away tradeoffs in well-being o f family membe rs by positing a 
household leader who a utomatically transfers resources to othe r family members to 
induce th em to maximize th e family's net utility. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on 
th e Family (1981) [hereinafter Becker, Treatise ]. In Becker's model, the family acts 
as a single decisionmaker, with the collective utility function e ffectively replacing the 
individual members' utility calculus as the determin ants of be havior. See, e .g. , Mar-
ilyn Ma nser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Ho use ho ld Decision-Making: A Bar-
ga ining Analysis, 21 Int ' l Econ. Rev. 31, 31 (1980) (stating tha t a model such as 
Becker 's "assumes that the two individuals who have formed, or are contemplating 
forming a household , pool the ir incomes and maximize a neoclassical household util-
ity function " ). 
Becker 's " altruistic head" has been ro undl y crit icized in the economics lite rature 
fo r failing to retl ect actua l fami ly dynamics, for papering over real -life conflicts 
among fa mily members, and for ignoring the differe nces be tween men's and women 's 
fates within marriage. See Edward P. Lazear & Robe rt T. Michael, Allocation of In-
come within the Household 12 (1988) (noting that economi c models that concentrate 
on the family unit, not the individual, divert atte ntion away from the distributional 
issues of "what happe ns within the family"); see also Ann Laq uer Estin , Love and 
Obliga tion: Family Law a nd the Romance of Eco nomics, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
989, 996 (1995) (noting the tend e ncy among econ o mi s t~, in th e " abse nce of e mpirical 
knowledge about distributions within the fa mily," to " assume that a family 's re-
sources are equally distributed among its members" ). See gene rall y Estin, supra 
(exploring the limits of economic theory as applied to fa mily law); Beyond Economic 
Man: Feminist Th eory and Economics (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A . Nelson eds., 
1993) (same); Marianne A. Ferber & Bonnie G. Birnbaum, The " New Home Eco-
nomics": Retrospects and Prospects, 4 J. Con sume r Res. 19 (1977) (discussing prob-
le ms with Becker's model of household economi cs); Lazear & Michael, supra, a t 1 
("[F]rom casual and personal observation, one kn ows th a t th e household does not 
always distribute income or o ther resources eve nl y a mong its members .. .. Ye t the 
myth persists in economic mode ling of well-being a nd in ma ny social policy contexts 
that once we know the leve l of resources ava ilable to the ho use hold , that is all we 
need to know."). By sides te pping house ho ld a lloca ti ona l issues, Becker's model does 
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B. Positive-Sum Marriage 
A bedrock principle that can be derived from the rational self-
interest assumption is that couples will initially decide to marry 
only when the marriage is a posit ive-sum or potentially Pareto-
superior arrangement: Each spouse expects to be bet ter off mar-
ried than he or she would be single" or married to another avail-
able person. 38 Moreover, each spouse must receive something over 
and above the value of any positive in vestmen t that_the person ex-
pends in maintaining the marriage-that is, each spouse in a viable 
marriage must receive some form of compensation for his or her 
contribution to the relationship. Finally, couples stay married as long 
as each partner is better off than he or she would be if divorced . 3~ 
It foll ows that spouses will sti ck with a m arriage on ly if it pro-
duces a marital surplus-in the form of potentially utility-enhancing 
gains for each party-and only if each spouse receives some share 
of the surplus. 40 H ow much and what kind of marital surplus will 
have the virtue o f avoiding the difficult co nceptua l exe rcise of compa ring the we ll-
be ing of fa mily members, which he lps account fo r th e paucity o f a tte ntio n to a ll oca-
tio na l issues in the economics lite rature . See supra notes 32-35 and accompa nying tex t. 
37 See Becker, supra note 34, at 149 ("T he point of departure of my work on the 
family is th e assumptio n th at when men a nd women decide to marry, o r have chil-
dren, or divorce, they attempt to rai se th eir welfare by comparing be ne fits and cos ts. 
So they marry when th ey expect to be bet te r off th an if they re mai ned single, a nd 
they divo rce if tha t is expected to increase the ir we lfa re."); Gary S. Becke r, A T heory 
of Marri age (pt. 1) , 80 J. Po l. Econ. 813, 8 14 (1972) ("(S]ince ma rriage is practica ll y 
a lways voluntary, ... the th eory of preferences can be readily app lied , and persons 
marrying . . . can be assumed to expect to raise their utility level above what it wo ul d 
be were they to remain single.") . 
'" Since the decision to ma rry ta kes pl ace o n a marriage marke t, people wi ll a lso 
consider prospects fo r a lte rna ti ve ma tches , including the search cos ts and di sco un ted 
probabil ity of making a comparable or superior marriage, in deciding when and whet her 
to marry. See, e.g., G ary S. Becker, E lisabe th M. La ndes & Robert T. Mich ae l, A n 
Economic A nalysis of Marita l Instability, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 1141, 1147-52 (1977). 
39 More specifically , each spo use 's willingness to re ma in married is contingent upon 
the marriage's o fferin g more utility th an the a ltern a ti ves ava il able upon givin g up the 
re lationship , ne t of any losses and tra nsactio n cos ts occas io ned by di vorce. 
In ord er not to complica te further a n alread y complica ted an alys is o f th e bas ic e le-
ments of marita l bargaining, this Article la rgely ignores informati o n pro blems and 
informatio n costs, which fi gure promine ntly in actual decisions to marry or divorce, a nd 
must be ta ken in to account in any trul y co mple te a nalysis o f be hav ior in thi s a rea. 
J
0 The te rm " marita l surplus" e ncompasses a ll utilit y-e nh ancing e ffec ts that wo uld 
no t ex ist in the abse nce of the re latio nship. See A lla n M. Park ma n, No-Fau lt Di -
vo rce: W ha t We nt Wrong? 27 (1 992) (" (T ]h e economi c anal ys is of the decisio n 
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be produced? Decisions about the production side of marriage are 
inextricably bound up with the consumption patterns of the unit. 
That is because most marital decisions have implications for the 
distribution of both rewards and burdens to rnembers of the house-
hold. The payoffs that result from the division of the marital assets 
are determined by the allocation of productive responsibilities as 
v:eil as by the assignment to family members of resources for con-
S'.nrption.41 Because inputs have costs, th e costs will be borne by 
: ]~ ,-,. ._·-; p-.-"r)n '' "111 0 m~ 1Ke'" a pa·-+-l'r11]a·~ nnqi·-r;hl]tion tr· ihP UDl't Al-"...l..i.>,,.... l_,..,. .... .lJ\.... _1,. t !1 o ...... ..J - t. i  - ...... . 1 \...-,__. __ ... _ .. ....... \.,. ~l..- - v ... ___ . 
th::;ugh some of the outputs available to the marriage (such as mar-
1-::e t income generated during the life of ~ he re lationship) are liquid 
and easily divisible, outputs in the fon n of unpaid a:nd in-kind 
services are not so easily transferable, but tend to redound to the 
fixed benefit of the family members for ~whom the services are per-
formed. Thus, decisions concerning the specific contributions made 
by real-life marital partners can carry important distributional con-
to marry focuses on the parties ' expectation that. __ marriage will expand the 
'commodities' available to them compared with those available if they remained sin-
gle."); see also Becker, Treatise, supra note 36, at 15-21 (discussing surplus generated 
by specialization in the household). Marital partners invest resources in the form of 
material and intangible asse ts (such as previously accumulated wealth and talent) and 
productive labor at home and work. They reap gains in the form of increased utility 
fro m public goods, "own" children, economies of scale , and a host of intangible bene~ 
fi ts (such as love, emotional support, companionship, and vicarious pleasure in the 
mher's well~being) that are available for enjoyment and consumption within the unit. 
See Blau & Ferber, supra note 16, at 45~46 (discussing advantages of joint production 
and consumption, including economies of scale, public goods, externalities-or inter-
dependent utiiity functions-and economic benefits of fa milies); Becker, su pra note 
37, at 816 (noting that marriage produces marke t and nonmarket products, including 
o;uch elements as "the quality and quantity of chiidren , prestige, recreation, compan-
ionship, love, and health status"). Moreover, marriage appears to induce behavioral 
changes (harder work, sobriety, savings and in vestment, risk-averse strategies) and 
specialized activities and efforts that would not otherwise be expended. See Linda J. 
Waite, Social Science Finds: "Marriage Matters," Responsive Community, Summer 
1996, at 26. Finally, there is added utility from coord ination and cooperative effort in 
activities of daily life. 
";The " total utility" that a marriage can generate- the sum of the utilities for the 
partners-is not a fixed quantity, but is a function of the actions and decisions of the 
par tners, which can vary over a wide range. So the size of the marital surp lus varies 
with the decisions as to its distribution. See Yoram We iss , Th e Formati on and Dis-
solution of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom'~ And What Happens Upon 
Marriage and Divorce? 15 (Aug. 1993) (unpublished man uscript, on file with the Vir-
gin ia Law Review Association) ("In general, associated with each marriage, there is a 
set of feasible actions. Each action yields an outcome which is the utility values 
(payoffs) of the two partners."). 
.. gnQ, 
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seq uences fo r fam ily m embers , because they go a long way towards 
de te rmining the allocation of in-kind costs and benefi ts.'12 
C. vVhat Is Egalitarian Marriage ? 
1. Urility as the A1etric for Egalitarian lVIarriage 
VV ithin the frarnework of th e rat ional actor model , wh at counts 
as an egali tarian marriage? The popular conception of an egali -
tarian marriage seems to conform most clm ely to a partne <:"ship in 
which the spouses pl ay quite sim ilar ro les. ;' I would te rm this type 
of role-sharing relationship an "equali t arian '' marriage (as opposed 
,. . \ B . + . , , . , . 
to em egantanan one J. u t a notiOn 01 manta! cqual1ty tnat see.ks 
more or less to m atch roles and extern a lly observable contribu.tions 
without regard to talents, preferences, or desi res , is too rigid-- and 
too narrow- to be usefu L If a couple "shares everything, " one 
partner may stiil feel (quite sensibly) tha t he or she is getting less 
than a truly equal share. A more theoretically useful way to meas-
ure input and output-and one that respects individual diffe rences 
" 2 T he utility derived by a fa mily member from a productive contribution is the net 
sum of the separable costs and benefits to that person from engaging in production 
and consuming what is produced (which includes the pleasure of producing it) . For 
example , if someone prepares a meal shared by everyone in th e fa mily, the cook 
bears the costs of cooking it alone whil e enjoying some of the benefits, wh ereas the 
others enj oy the rewards of a good meal with out beari ng the costs . To be sure , 
costs and benefits can be rearranged so mewhat by means o f "side-pay ments" : the 
real location of other resources-inciudi ng cont ributions in kind and money- to 
''compensate" for a contributi on. See infra notes 135-1 36 and accompanyi ng text 
(no ting, among other things , that the possibili ty fo r side-payments wiil be limited by 
practica l considerations in many re lationships) . 
"-' One th inks of the family in which the husban d and wife make similar in vestmen ts 
in their human market capital and in " marriage-specific capital": Both husband and 
wife work at jobs of roughly similar status and deman ds , and bo th share in unpaid 
work and responsibilit y at home in roughly equal measure. See H ood, supra no te 22, 
at 9 (defining the egalitarian marriage as one in which the " husband and wife share 
household, income-producing, and decision-making ro les in rough ly equal propm-
tions"); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on 
Play in g with Dolls, Partnershi p Buyouts and Dissocia tion under No-Faul t, 60 U . Chi . 
L Rev. 67, 126-27 (1993) (" In an egalitarian marriage, both spouses work full -time 
and each performs fifty percent of the household chores and childcare. ") ; see also 
Lin da Haas, Role-Sharing Couples: A Study of Egalitari an Marriages, 29 Fam. Re i. 
289 (1980) (s tudying 31 role-sharing coupl es in Madison, Wisconsi n). 
fo r a di scussion of a range of conceptions of marital equa lity , in part re fiect ing 
studies of couples ' own ide as of "equality," see Steil , supra note 11 , at 59-71 . 
532 Virginia Law Review (Vol. 84:509 
in utility functions for various assets and resources.w-makes use of 
the concept of psychic utility, both negative and positive, that lies 
at the heart of the rational actor model. The strength of this ap-
proach is that it is quite latitudinarian. It does not rule out the pos-
sibility that a quite even balance of psychic utility can prevail in 
highly role-divided marriages-including those with a conventional 
male breadwinner and female homemaker-as we ll as in relation-
ships that conform more closely to the "equalitarian" model. 
One problem with using utility as the currency for comparing 
spouses' positions is that utility is difficult to compare intersubjec-
tively, especially in situations, such as marriage, in which utility 
funct ions can be expected to diverge. 45 It is possible to avoid 
""See Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 223 ("Given differently shaped utility functions 
for different goods, the utility derived from transactions will vary considerably .... "). 
"'See supra note 10. The welfare of family members-either absolute or relative-
cannot be known without calculating utilities, but utilities are functions of prefer-
ences, and preferences are revealed only through "voluntary" choices. But choices 
only tell us whether a person believes that his or her welfare will be improved by the 
transition from one state to another among a limited range of options, and not 
whether her welfare compares favorably or unfavorably with another person's. Put 
another way, the fact that two people engage in an exchange that makes both better 
off tells us nothing about whether one is better off than the other. See Lazear & Mi-
chael, supra note 36, at 5 ("The value to the recipient of a transfer may not be the 
same as its value to the giver."); see also Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Jus-
tice 79 (1981) ("The 'interpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to the modern 
economist, and rightly so, because there is no metric for making such a compari-
son."); Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 222 (discussing the incommensurability of wel-
fare); Harrison, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing the methodological limitations on in-
terpersonal comparisons of utility); Sen, supra note 10, at 133, 14 7 (discussing 
interpersonal comparisons); Waldron, supra note 32, at 1456-57 (distinguishing be-
tween two objections to interpersonal comparisons of utility: "ontological"-which 
relates to the difficulty of finding a conceptual basis for expressing the difference be-
tween one person's well-being and another's-and "epistemic"-which concerns the 
problem of being "sure that we have chosen the right convention of comparability" 
and determining how "such a standard [is] to be applied in practice"). But see Rob-
ert A. Pollak, Welfare Comparisons and Situation Comparisons, 50 J. Econometrics 
31 (1991) (suggesting that interpersonal utility comparisons are not incoherent and 
are a useful construct in some areas of welfare economics). 
Marriage presents perhaps the most difficult case for interpersonal utility compari-
sons. The economic aspect of marital exchange is only one facet of a relationship 
with considerable noneconomic or intangible elements. Also, much of what family 
members "consume" or enjoy consists of public goods or of goods and services (both 
market and nonmarket) that generate consumption value for the producer. Family 
members also experience considerable "vicarious" utility from other members' well-
being. These factors contribute to the difficulty of measuring and comparing the ef-
forts and rewards of each partner to the marital exchange. See Lazear & Michael, 
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some-although not all-of the awkwardness of comparing utilities 
by introducing a normalized concept that does not directly require 
comparisons between persons: the utility each person would enjoy 
within a rela tionship relative to the maximum potential welfare 
avail able if all marital resources were allocated, and arrangements 
made, according to that partner's wishes. The benchmark notion 
of maxi mum potential welfare or utility would correspond roughly 
to the idea of each person consistently "getting his or her way" 
within the relati onship. The concept of "percentage relative util-
ity" can be defined as the ratio of each spouse's actual utility rela-
tive to that person's maximum potential utili ty. Each person's per-
centage relative utility can then be compared without wor:rymg 
about differing utility functions. 
2. Rival Conceptions of Marital Equality 
Assuming that utility is the basic metric, and making use when 
appropriate of the concept of percentage relative utility to ease the 
problem of interpersonal comparisons, is it possible to describe 
marital arrangements that comport with an intuitive notion of what 
an egalitarian marital relationship would look like? Some alterna-
tive conceptions follow. 
a. A "Substantive" Concept of Equal Division of the Marital 
Surplus 
Each person's costs or inputs, measured as negative utility, are 
returned to him or her out of resources available to the marriage. 
Beyond that, resources (tangible and intangible) are divided so that 
each spouse achieves an equal net share of utility relative to that 
person's maximal utility. That is, each spouse enjoys an equal per-
centage rel ative utility. 46 
supra note 36, a t 19-21 (noting difficulties in measur ing intrafamily distribution of in-
come and resources). 
" 6 If there is a simple one-for-one tradeoff, or linear relat ionship, then the egalitar-
ian point will li e where each person receives half of his or he r personal max imum 
possible utility- which corresponds to a 50 percent share of maximal utility for each. 
Where the rela tionship is not strictly linear-where, as in most viable marriages, 
th e re are public goods for sharing, or where the spouses experience vicarious utility 
due to al truism or caring-each spouse can simultaneously satisfy a greater percent-
age of his or her desires consistent with th e o ther spouse receiving a similar 
" normalized" amount of utility . The greater the vicarious component (the more love 
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b. A "Procedural" Concept of Equality 
The metri c here is the input/payoff deal that would be negoti-
ated if two people started from a hypothetical initial position of 
equal premarital baseline utility and identical negotiating skills,47 
with equal, and infe rior, outside alternatives available to each 
(either no marriage at all, or an equal probability of an equally in-
ferior alternative marriage for each). Unde r those conditions, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that the couple would agree to make 
equal contributions or efforts on behalf of the marriage (as meas-
ured in th eir own negative subj ective utility) and to take equal 
shares of the output relative to each person 's "best deal''-which 
once again amounts to equal percentage shares. Even if the 
spouses agreed to unequal inputs, they might still agree to an equal 
split once costs are covered (i.e., after costs are compensated to 
each contributor) which is equivalent to arrangement (a). 48 
and sharing), the happier each person can be, and the more each wi ll ge t of what he 
or she wants. T he hi gher will be each pe rson's percentage re la tive utility consistent 
with sa tisfying the egalitarian condition. 
The definition of an egalitarian relationship advanced here is similar to that pro-
posed by H. Peyton Young in his recent book, in which he defines an egalitarian bar-
gain as one in which th ere is an "allocati on of divisible property [such tha t] every 
claiman t is in diffe re nt between his portion and the same fraction of the entire prop-
erty. " H. Peyton Young, Equity: In Theory and Practice 148 (1994). Since the va lue 
of resources in our definition has already been translated into the metric of subjective 
utility , an ega litarian bargain would be one in which each person has gained the 
"same fraction" of the entire amount of utility available to him within the relation-
ship. T his would appear to satisfy Young's indifference principle. This definition 
also bears some resemblance to David Gauthier's " minimax rel a ti ve concess ion" 
principle, which also seeks to equalize the gains of persons engaging in a bargaini ng 
re lationship relative to the most favorable o utcome available to each. David Gauth-
ier , Morals by Agreement 136-56 (1986). 
" 7 See infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text. 
-IS For why the ideal rational couple could be predicted to agree to an equal split 
once cos ts are covered , see infra notes 140-143 and accompanying tex t; see also 
Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Rand al C. Picker, Game Theory and the 
Law 224 (1994) (suggesting that bargainers will spl it profits equally abse nt compli-
cating factors) . 
• ..... I 
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c. An "Equal Gain" Concept of Equality 
Each spouse gains the same utility (as a percentage of the maxi-
mum net utility) over premarital (i.e., unmarried) baseline utilities, 
where that baseline might be equal or unequal. 49 
'vVhich of these rival suggestions-which may 'Nell fail to exhaust 
the possible list-best comports with our idea of egalitarian mar-
riage? There is no need to make a definitive choice among the 
suggested options, because the major conclusions of this Art icle 
appiy to all : By whatever measure we select, most marriages are 
inegalitarian. 
This conclusion derives from applying bargaining theory princi-
ples to egalitarian conceptions of marriage as outlined above . The 
egalitarian models gauge marital equality on the basis of each 
spouse's utility inputs and outputs within a closed and private 
world of marital relations. They attempt to capture an ideal of 
reciprocity in which spouses match (subjective) effort with effort 
and (subjective) reward with reward. But bargaining theory 
teaches that the allocation of marital contribution and benefit will 
often deviate from equality as we define it. Distributions will be 
influenced in large part by factors other than and external to those 
that inform our intuitive concept of an egalitarian relationship, 
which looks to the value spouses give to and take from one another. 
vVhat are the factors that determine allocation and why do they 
matter? One is markets, which cast a shadow in which couples live 
and interact. This Article shows how markets for work and mar-
kets for mates put pressure on spouses to deviate from egalitarian 
conditions within marriage. The other key element is the deep 
structure of marriage. As explained below, marriage can be viewed 
as a bilateral and monopolistic bargaining game in which parties 
are relegated to self-help for the enforcement of any agreements 
within the ongoing relationship. External markets interact with 
that structure to constrain the deals struck by spouses with differ-
ent preferences, tastes, and desires. Those constraints operate to 
undermine marital equality. 
To illuminate these points, this Article adopts concept (a) above 
as a working definition of an egalitarian marriage. 50 Although this 
' 9 See infra Section JI.D.3.a (discussing baseline premarital well-being). 
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definition has its flaws ,5' it nevertheless provides a useful basis for 
unpacking, identifying, and examining the host of forces that cause 
intramarital arrangements to deviate from the chosen, egalitarian 
baseline in directions that favor men or women, and what the social 
consequences of th e devi ati ons might be. 
In applying th e working definition, this Article will also adopt, 
for the purpose of exposition, the simplifying assumption that the 
utility inputs expended prior to marriage by the spouses to gener-
ate their initi al contributions to married life are roughly similar, at 
least at the point of entering the rel ationship.52 Although that as-
sumption will obviously not apply to some real marriages (in that, 
for example , one person may have put more "psychic" effort into 
self-development or into the accumulation of assets brought to the 
marriage than the other) , it is probably a safe one for th e great 
majority of middle-class marriages in which personal, financi al, and 
educational endowments more or less match at the outset. 53 Thus, 
the paradigmatic marriage is the marriage of persons who are 
roughly equally-and also moderately-endowed in attractiveness, 
education, wealth, property, and other resources and attributes that 
50 This concept-equal perce ntage shares net of effort expended-allows for tran-
siently lopsided ga ins and inves tments. Tra nsient imbalances often represent the 
most efficient strategy and should no t be conside red inegalita rian as long as the allo-
cations balance o ut during the life o f the relatio nship , whatever its duration . 
51 The mode l is overly simple because it fa il s to take account of the fact that each 
spouse's well-being is a functi on of changes in marginal utility that result from par-
ticula r allocational shifts. But the marginal utility gains or losses from a particular 
allocational choice cannot be considered in iso lat ion. Rather, utility effects are con-
textual and path depe ndent. The value of marita l decisions for each spouse depends 
on the way things currently are, which in turn depe nds on prior decisions. For exam-
ple, the effect on each partne r of the birth of a child depends on the presence of other 
children and how their care has been arranged. 
52 As noted, compensation to each spouse for his or her effort expended on behalf 
of the union is tak e n into account in defining egalitarian marriage. The equa lity-of-
inputs assumption means that, as a practical matter, spouses have expe nded roughly 
equal premarital effort (generating equal nega tive utility) in accumulating assets or 
cultivating end owments that are put to work to create value within the marriage. 
Those elements would include, for example, effo rts expended on developing earning 
powe r through education or on accumulating ta ngible assets a nd property. See infra 
Section IV.B.2 (discussing proble ms that arise from the calcula tion of inputs and out-
puts to marriage, and the puzzle of how to treat " pre marita l endowments"). 
53 This is especia ll y true recently , due to the ri se of educational assortative mating. 
See infra note 286. 
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are important within marriage .54 Our mode l is Jane and Jim-the 
secretary married to the telephone lineman, the nurse married to 
the middle manager, or the computer repairman m arried to the 
college-educated housewife . How will these couples work out their 
marital relations? 
D. Marriage as a Bargaining Carne 
T he idea that marriage can be modeled as a bargaining game is 
not new. Scholars from various fields have recognized th at game 
the ory potentially provides an intellectually satisfying fram ework 
for addressing the problems of allocation with in marriage, although 
none have undertaken a sustained and systematic analysis of the 
implications of the model for various aspects of domestic life, law, 
or public policy. 55 In addition, economists have created a number 
of theoretical and quantitative models of marital or familial rela-
tions as a form of bargaining game. 56 Those models provide the ba-
sic framework for the discussion here. 
).1 This would appear to be a dubious assumption , given the sa lience in the popular 
imagi nation o f the well-heeled, powerful older man marrying the toothsome younger 
woma n of more modest means . But marriages in this mode are almost certainly a 
small minority of a ll unions in the population as a whole. Leaving aside the far right 
tail of th e curve, where very wealthy or high status marriageable men are to be 
found , the differences in resources, attributes, a nd inves tments as be tween the sexes 
at the time of the typ ical marriage are probably not pronounced. There is, however, 
one caveat: A potential source of a small but perhaps no t insignificant differe ntial in 
endowments in th e popula tion as a whole is the age gap between husbands and wives. 
The fact tha t o ld er persons tend to be better educa ted and to have accumulated more 
market and other types of capital may give husbands a slight edge. See infra note 104. 
55 T he most sustai ned effort to take the mode l seriously as appli ed to ma rriage is 
Rho na Mahony's popul ar book. Mahony, supra note 16. A few legal scholars have 
also brought game-theoretic insights to bear on some aspects of family relations. 
Most notably, see Caro l M. Rose, W o men and Pro pe rty: Gaining and Losing 
Ground, 78 Ya. L. Rev . 421 (1 992); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Mar-
riage and Opportunism, 23 J. Legal Stud. 869 (1994); June Carbon e & Margaret F. 
Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Cha nge, a nd Divorce Re-
form , 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 (1991); Cohe n, supra note 4; Gilli an K. Hadfield , House-
holds at Work: Beyo nd Labor Market Policies to Remedy th e Gender Gap, 82 G eo. 
L.J . 89 (1993). Commentators in o ther disciplines have also made some use of bar-
gaining principles in the context of broade r discussion s of family and gender issues. 
See, e.g., Okin, supra note 32; Bergmann, supra note 7, a t 266-74; England & Farkas, 
supra note 5, at 53-54; J . Richard Udry, Marital Alternatives and Marital Disruptio n, 
43 J. Marri age & Fam. 889 (1981 ). 
56 See, e.g., Theodore C. Bergstrom, Eco nomics in a Famil y Way, 34 J . Eco n. Lite ra-
ture 1903 (1996); PaulS. Carlin , Intra-Family Bargaining and Time Allocation, 7 R es. 
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1. The Exclusivity and Pooling Conditions: Marriage as 
Bilateral Monopoly 
[Vol. 8.::1. :509 
The bargaining model views a marital relationship as a bilateral 
monopoly that defines an arena of exclusive contribution as well as 
exclusive dealing. vVith respect to contribution and reward, it is 
necessary to define what the spouses bargain over. This Article as-
sumes a "worldly goods"57 or "pooling" condition under which each 
partner brings into the relationship, and places on the table for 
bargaining, everything each possesses at the time of marriage and 
eve rything generated through that person's presence or efforts 
during the life of the marriage. Nothing of value is initially he ld 
back or earmarked for exclusive use. 58 T he parties' contri butions 
Population Econ. 215 (1991): Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and 
Distribution in Marriage, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1996, at 139 [hereinafter Lundberg & 
Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution]; Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Poll ak, Nonco-
operative Bargaining Models of Marriage, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 132 (1994) [hereinafter 
Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models]; Shelly Lundberg & Robert 
A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 
988 (1993) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak, Separate Spheres]; Manser & Brown, su-
pra note 36; Marjorie B. McElroy, The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained 
House hold Behavior, 25 J. Hum. Resources 559 (1990); Marjorie B. McElroy & Mary 
Jean Horney, Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the 
Theory of Demand, 22 Int'l. Econ. Rev. 333 (1981); Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction 
Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23 J. Econ. Literature 581 (1985); 
Sharon C. Rochford, Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained Allocations in an Assign-
ment Market, 34 J. Econ. Theory 262 (1984); Sen, supra note 32, at 134-40. 
57 The "nothing held back" idea is neatly captured in this phrase, which appears in 
the Church of England marriage vows: "With this ring I thee wed, with my body I 
thee worship, and with all my worldly goods I thee endow .... " Book of Common 
Prayer (1886). 
58 Although strong conventions ordinarily create the expectation that members of a 
couple will throw all preexisting assets in the marital pot and make available all pre-
marital as well as intramarital fruits of each partner's efforts for potential allocation 
within the family unit, this initial "pooling" or "worldly goods" condition does not 
always obtain in every marriage. For example, wealthy persons may sequester or 
otherwise set aside assets or wealth in a manner that makes those resources effec-
tively unavailable to the other spouse and thus takes them permanently out of the 
pool of marital resources available for bargaining and allocation. For simplicity, 
however, this discussion adopts the pooling condition as a normative baseline. 
The pooling condition should not be confused with household members' enjoying 
any particular share of resources including resources the other partner brings in. As 
discussed below, the share that each household member actually enjoys is the product 
of the outcome of a bargaining process that may allocate marital value in ways that 
increase welfare quite unevenly. For example, there is good evidence that men, 
women, and children do not always share equally in the wages that a breadwinner 
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include various resources and endowments th at would exist re-
gardless of the marriage (such as monetary income or mech anical 
ability)'9 as weli as elements that are generated by virtue of the re-
lationship. T he latter elements comprise the marital surp lus. Each 
spouse's income, for example, is not surplus to the partner who 
earns it. But maritai surplus can be generated when each spouse 
enjoys public goods purchased with the other's income. or provides 
services or em otional satisfaction in exchange for a share of the 
other~s income. 60 
T hese resources, and the costs of generating them, must be allo-
cated among spouses during the life of the marriage. 61 T he couple 
bargains over an array of choices concerning the balance of costs 
and payoffs for each spouse, deciding together who will make par-
ticul ar kinds of effort and who \vi ll enjoy certain rewards. The size 
and composition of the pool, and the payoffs to each spouse, are 
obviously not fixed, but depend on each partner's individual and 
brings into the household , and that sharing patte rns vary among couples. See, e.g., 
Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 44 & n.l62; see also supra note 11 (citing findings by Pahl 
and Burgoyne that a wife's control over spending and allocation of monetary re-
sources to personal needs is not dictated by her marital contribution). 
59 Tangible resources are not all that spouses may contribute to the rel ationship. 
They may also bring along such (initially) intangible asse ts as their de ve loped human 
capi ta l, ea rning power, fin a ncial acume n, capacity to love, tale nt for childrearing, 
fa mily conn ections, ex tended family 's security and conviviality, bea uty, and win-
someness. T hose personal attributes or ab ilities are the n put to work within the rela-
tionship to genera te more va lue, which includes but is not limited to " ma rital surplus" 
(which comprises the enhanced value th a t exists solely by virtue of the marriage) . 
T hose resources are then available fo r rea llocation among famil y me mbers. For fur-
ther di scussion of initi al attributes of end owments, see infra Section IY.B.2. 
wIt should be apparent that the total "marital pool" as defin ed here is large r than 
the marital surplus, since th e pool ex ists prior to any compensation for costs and in-
clud es some elements that partners would generate or enjoy whether they were mar-
ried or not. Marital assets in the pool are available for surplus-generating investment 
(such as, for example, investing in a family business or in profess iona l activiti es), for 
the creation of common goods, or for direct redistribution among famil y members. 
61 A llocations are assumed to be mad e between married couples. The in terests o f 
othe r famil y me mbers (most importantly, children) are assumed to be represented by 
their parents within this model (although that representa tion is not perfect, si nce th e 
overlap between pare nts' a nd children's interests-as with the interests of spouses-
is not comple te). In economic modeling of the famil y, children are often seen as 
adding to the marital surplus: They generate value as a "productive" ou tput or, alte r-
na tively, add to the "consumption " value of the ir parents. See Becker, Treati se, su-
pra note 36, at 7-8. 
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coordinated choices and actions. 6~ There may be many different 
ways to arrange a family 's affairs to effect a division-including an 
egalitarian division-with only some being the most efficient (i.e. , 
generating the greatest possible total utility for all). In effect , there 
is always the possibility of expanding or contracting the pool of to-
tal resources available for distribution. 
The marital bargaining process covers all sorts of issues and 
choices that extend well beyond the balance of productive effort 
and leisure, and the couple's use of time. Decisions relating to 
where to live; where and how much to work; what to buy; how 
much to spend, save, or invest; the priority given to the husband's 
and wife's careers; the conduct of sexual rel ations; the choice of 
fri ends; interactions with extended family ; disciplining children ; 
and myriad other matters are up for grabs within a relationship and 
are resolved on a daily basis in a continuous process of adjustment 
and readjustment , negotiation and compromise.63 The resolution of 
those issues determines both the scope and composition of the 
marital pool and the marital surplus, as well as the well-being of 
each spouse. 
The marital bargain also includes an exclusivity condition: Part-
ners agree to go only to one another for certain types of resources 
and services. For the life of the marriage, certain "market" oppor-
tunities will necessarily be forsaken. The couple must decide on an 
allocation of most marital resources without direct recourse to a 
market pricing mechanism. These exchanges take place "off-
market" ; there is one buyer and one seller for a host of services and 
commodities. In deciding, for example, who shall get to take the 
children to the grocery store on Saturday and who shall play golf, 
o: For example, one partner may, through unila te;al action-such as sexual infidel-
ity-dramatically decrease th e size of the marital surplus by simultaneously destroy-
ing marital capital and depriving the other spouse of much of the value of the mar-
riage. See infra Section IV .A.3 (discussing sexual and fidelity issues). 
63 See Ira Mark Ellman , Should The Theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial 
Losses and Motivations?, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 259, 292-302 (giving examples of com-
plex marital compromises and " exchanges "); Carl E. Schneid er, Rethinking Alimony: 
Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 197, 207, 211-13 (same). 
Caution is also in order because th e marital balance has a significant temporal com-
ponent, which makes it difficult to keep accounts by taking a snapshot of some finite 
period. As suggested, see supra no tes 12-14 and accompanying text, the relationship 
must be assessed over its e ntire duration before it can be sa id with confidence that 
there is a shortfall for one spouse or the other. 
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partners do not ordin ari ly go out on the general or "spot" market 
and suggest "'purch ase prices" to strangers to procure famil y serv-
ices. 6~ Rather , the un derstanding is that the tasks and rewards will 
be allocated within the fa mily circle. In such circumstances, "price 
determin ation [i s] ill -described by standard economic theory."65 
E ach person must bargain with the other to decide who gets what. 
Finally, the en forcement of such a bargain is left to the parties. 
Courts will not enforce agreements between spouses intramari-
tally ,66 so there is no standing legal mechanism for remedying a 
breach of such an agreement so long as the partnership remains a 
going concern. Ra ther, recourse is had only to informal enforce-
ment mechanisms, such as reta liation or other forms of self-help, 
which are largely-al though not exclusivell 7- confined within the 
family unit. 
2. Marriage as a Split-the-Pie Game 
U nder the rational choice paradigm, a couple marries if mar-
riage offers a Pareto-superior result: Both parties must be no worse 
off by virtue of the union. But "embedded in all institutional ar-
rangements that provide the opportunity for mutual gain is a bar-
gaining game over relative shares."68 The allocational possibi lities 
that characterize marriage can be modeled as a two-person bar-
gaining game of "split-the-pie." The key to the game is that a fail-
ure to settle on a mutually agreeable allocation will result in a re-
duction in welfare (a reduced payoff) for each bargainer. Without 
wAs noted, see in fra notes 129 & 188, some families have recourse to the "cash so-
lutio n" (that is, hiring househo ld help) for a portion of fa mily se rvices, but those 
fami lies are q uite unusual. There are many key marital functions for which no mar-
ke t substitute can be fo und or where such a substitution (e .g., sexual serv ices) would 
defy the core cond itio ns of the re lationship or be inimical to it. 
65 Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 227 (1989). 
66 See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules , Liability Rules , a nd Ex-
clusivity of Remedi es in Partn ership and Marriage , 58 Law & Conte mp. Probs. 221 , 
225 (1995) ; Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 29 (discussing the legal taboo against intra-
marital enforce ment of antenuptia l agreements); see also Cha rl es J. Goetz & Robert 
E. Scott, Principles of Relatio nal Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981) (discussing 
relational contracts generally). 
67 Social disapprova l and other informal sanctions may p lay some, a lbeit a now di-
minishing, role. For a discuss ion of informal socia l norms, see infra Sectio ns V.C, 
V.F. 
1>8 Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law 272 (1988). 
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agreement , both partners lose . T his risk creates an incentive to 
come to a mutually satisfying agr,::e ment \Vithin the relationship ."') 
The condit ion that both partners must gain by agreement estab-
lishes the central const rain t for a fe asible bargain: T he possible set 
of rational allocations 1:vithin the bargaining relatio nship is limi ted 
by the alternat ives availab le to each participant in the bargained-
for agreement. Although proposed gc:u-ne-theoretic bargaining mod-
els of m arriage differ in some parti culars , they sh are the fe ature 
th at the bargain struck will be ~; orne function of the consequences 
for each party of failing to reach &.greement. 70 T he a lte rn atives 
await ing the parties in the a bsence of a bargained-for agreement 
are variously knovv·n in game theDry parlance as the "fallback a l-
ternative ," "threat point," " threat advantage ,"71 "next best al terna-
.LL;'J"" "
72 o~ "b"'st a lt e-· r· -j· ? ~l·; .,e i· o q f""· "1 1J-· ti'' ted~aar"' em"'-r1 ·r "73 T he n"'vt 1 ' \..I ' l ,...,.. ~- .· J. _t _:._ '! I,. Ci l'vb • .__(J._ b '-' \..~_.. L. '-~ · \.....~· ·\. 
best alternative is determined by the situation each par ty confronts 
in the absence of a negotiated agreement, and can include the op-
tion of forgoing any transaction at all or of transacting with anothe r 
party. T he value of each party's "threat point" (as determined by 
the next best alternative ) teflects the potential value o f an agree-
ment for each party, which in turn determines each p arty 's 
" reservation p rice ." T ha t price is equal to "the minimum threshold 
value that he or sh e is prepared to accept fo r entering into an 
agreement. A party gains from a transaction when he or she re-
6
' Baird, Gertner & Picker, supra note 48, at 220; Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 228 . 
The analogy between marriage and "spli t-the-pie" is no t perfect, because the latter 
assumes fungible, con tinuo us, and infini te!y divisible shares, an d in marriage the re 
may be some discontin uit ies of d ivision. Such disconti nuities , and o ther features o f 
marriage such as the dominance of publ ic goods, may sometimes make it quite di ffi-
cult to bargain freely over "side-payments" to recti fy imbal ances of sh ares that may 
result , fo r example, from adopting a more efficient but lopsided a llocatio n of produc-
tive effort. See infr a Section IV.A .l. 
' 0 See Poilak, supra note 56, at 600 (reviewing proposed bargaining models of marriage) . 
71 Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 67. 
"See Pollak, supra note 56, at 600. There is some semantic confusion in th e li tera-
ture over whether the person with the better set of a lternatives to an agreement has a 
"high threat point" or a " low th reat poin t. " I have chosen, as more intuitively sound, 
to describe the party with better outs ide a lternatives as having a "high threat point." 
But see tv1ahony, supra note 16, a t 44 (sugges ting that the party to a marriage who 
has more alternatives-usually the man-has a lower th rea t point). 
n See, e.g., Mahony, supra note 16, at 43; Hmvard Raiffa, The Art and Science of 
Nego tiation 45 (1982); Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 211. 
,. j 
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price in turn fixes the magnitude of the bargaining surplus, which 
consists of the resources available for allocation between the par-
ties through bargaining once each party's reservation price is met. 
Each party's bes! alternative to an agreement is one of the 
factors that bear on each party's bargaining power. The term 
"bargaining power," although often used, is rarely understood or 
precisely defined.75 In barga ining among rational, self-interested 
utility maximizers, bargaining povJez· has a fo rmal aspect and a be-
havioral one. Formally, threat points de termine the limits of the 
negotiation set-the range of ut ili ty payoffs that each bargainer 
could rationally accept 'Nithin th•:: bargaining :relationship. 7" That 
range is governed by a simple principie: If a party can do better 
outside the bargain than by striking a deal, he or she will not agree 
to a deal. A lthough the threat points se t limits, they do not, in 
themselves, uniquely determine the precise arrangement within the 
negotiation set that will be selected by the parties. That selection is 
a matter for the two parties to work out, and a division will be ar-
rived at through some kind of negotiating process for dividing up 
the bargaining surplus. Therefore, predicting or specifying the 
likely marital bargain and the respective payoffs to the players 
would require knowing something about the spouses' individual al-
ternatives to striking a deal (the threat points), as well as some-
thing about their bargaining abilities and the determinants of the 
bargaining process. 
7" Wertheimer, supra note 32 , at 211 (footnote omi tted); see a lso Ra iffa, supra note 
73, a t 45 (applying the reservation price). 
:; See Wertheimer, supra note 32, a t 64-68 (d iscussi ng confusion surrounding 
"bargaining power") . The rerm is genuinely useful in the context of off-market , mo-
nopolistic bargaining games. Its meaning is far more ambiguous in the context of 
marke t transactions, where the terms of exchange and price are more closely fi xed by 
aggrega te supply and demand. See . e .g., Daniel J. Ch epaitis, T he National Labor 
Relations Act, Non-Parall eled Competition, and ~vlark et Power, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 769 
(1997) (attempting to explore the concept of ''market power" in the labor market). 
76 See Pollak, supra note 56, at 600. That negotiat ion se t can include both Pareto-
optimal and non-Pareto-op tima l arrangeme nts be tween the parties. See Mahony, 
supra note 16, at 38-48 (discussing suboptimal o r " inefficient" marital deals). 
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3. "Threat Points" in !Vlarriage 
What determines the threat point of the partners to a marriage? 
The two competing game-theoretic models in the literature assume 
two different fallback positions that confront the couple if they fail 
to acquiesce in a mutually agreeable arrangement for the conduct 
of the marriage. Both fallback positi ons represent a loss of poten-
tial marital surplus and a reduction in the size of the pie or the pool 
available for distribution. 
One possible fallback option for nonagreement is the breakup of 
the relationship--divorce. 77 That outcome risks loss for both par-
ties of all benefits of the marriage. Another possibie outcome is an 
uncoordinated or discordant living arrangement in which the part-
ners are at odds, but remain married and continue to live to-
gether-the "harsh words and burnt toast" alternative. 78 The par-
ties are worse off than if they agreed on how to coordinate their 
efforts, but may be better off than if they divorced. If they would 
be better off "at war" than apart, the threat points that effectively 
determine the parties' conduct are intramari tal. 
Since both partners to a potentially positive-sum marriage will 
lose if the marriage either dissolves through divorce, or degener-
ates into domestic strife, the partners have some incentive to come 
to an allocational agreement. Their incentives may not be the 
same, however. There is reason to believe that, on average, the 
fallback positions may differ significantly for husband and wife . 
Specifically, there is evidence suggesting that men will on average 
have better alternatives to a marital agreement-both inside and 
outside of marriage-than women. 
a. Exit Options 
The alternatives to getting married to a particular person are to 
remain single or to marry someone else. The alternatives to re-
maining married are to become single or marry again. In the words 
of one economist of family bargaining, the value of these alterna-
tives is determined by the "extrahousehold environmental parame-
ters" encompassing "every variable that affects how well each fam-
77 See Bergstrom, supra no te 56, at 1924. 
78 Id . at 1926; see also Lundberg & Pollak, Separate Sphe res, supra note 56, at 1007 
(discussing intramarital and extramarital threat point models). 
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ily member could do in the next best alternative outside of the 
family."n Variables include subjective preferences for being mar-
ried or unmarried; the resources each member controls individually 
(most notably, market earnings and wealth); social and community 
ties and support; the sexual consequences of being unmarried; the 
costs or harms to third parties-most notably children-from di-
vorce and how concerned the partner is about these harms; the 
amount of sunk cost or lost investment entailed by divorce; the so-
cial stigma and status consequences attached to being single or di-
vorced; the legal rules that determine property divisions, alimony, 
and child support following the termination of marriage; and taxes 
and transfers conditioned on marital status (such as Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") and other welfare payments). 
Related to all these elements is how a person who contemplates di-
vorce would fare in the remarriage market . 
Many of these variables operate in favor of men. Setting aside 
remarriage prospects, there is reason to suppose that single women 
may be less happy than single men within the unmarried state. 
That is, single women's baseline level of well-being may, on aver-
age, be lower than single men's. First, assuming an otherwise 
similar intensity of desire to marry, even young women at the peak 
of marriageability cannot afford to wait as long to get married, be-
cause their marriageability declines more rapidly than men's. 80 
Thus, the cost of each additional period of being single is greater 
for women than men. This temporal factor alone introduces a dif-
ference in men's and women 's average demand for marriage. 
There are yet other reasons why women may, on average, be less 
satisfied being single than men. l\1any of the services that men 
once sought within marriage-"everything from sex to food prepa-
ration to old-age insurance"81 as well as, in some cases, the produc-
tion of "own" offspring82-are readily available outside of marriage 
or can be purchased on the open market. On the other hand, what 
79 McElroy, supra note 56, at 578. 
~o See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
81 Shirley P. Burggraf, The Feminine Economy and Economic Man: Reviving the 
Rol e of Family in the Post-Industrial Age 4 (1997). 
82 See Becker, Treatise, supra note 36, at 28-29 (di sc ussing the importance of pro-
ducing one's "own children" as a benefit of marriage); see also infra note 338 
(discussing the demographics of out-of-wedlock birth rates and their relationship to 
men 's extramarital well-being and willingness to marry). 
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women traditionally seek within marriage-emotional security, fi-
nancial support, prestige, power, and a fa ther's authori tative helo 
and financial "sponsorship" for their children-are hard for wome~ 
to obtain outside of marriage and generally cannot be purchased."3 
Moreover, factors like sex-specific differences in the costs and 
benefits of sexual variety or exclusivity may elevate men 's baseline 
well-being relative to women's outside of marri age, at least under 
current social conditions. 8.j Women's distaste for being single may 
also stem from women's need for a "protector": Single women may 
feel more threatened, vulnerable, lonely, or socially despised than 
single men.'' Finally, labor market factors are influential. Women 
generally make less money than men , although there is evidence 
that the gap is closing rapidly for unmarried childless -.,vomen as 
compared to men in comparable jobs.86 'Women's occupational 
choices differ from men's, which can result in somewhat lower 
earnings. Finally, discrimination against women in the job market 
may place important limits on women's earnings and career pros-
pects compared to men's. Thus, women may start out less well off 
on the primary marriage market. 
Women, notoriously, also do less well by divorce. Their labor 
market value is often impaired by marriage. Women generally make 
greater idiosyncratic, marriage-specific investments than men, and 
those investments often come at the expense of labor market op-
portunity costs. 87 Women also face direct loss of their marital in-
vestments, which function as sunk costs if a marriage dissolves."8 
Their preference for the custody of children imposes additional fi -
51 Bu t see infra Sec tion V.E.3 for a discussion of the role AFDC plays in substitut-
ing for a husband 's income and services. 
""See infra Section IV.A.3 (discussing men 's a nd women's a ttitud es and tastes with 
respect to fidelity a nd sex) ; infra note 338 (discussing rece nt cha nges in the a vai lab il-
ity of " respectable" premarital sex) . 
' 5 See, e.g., Roberta S. Sigel, Ambition and Accommodation: How Women View 
Gender Relations 43-89 (1996) (surveying wome n 's feelings of second-cl ass cit ize n-
ship , which so me women may believe marriage will a ll eviate). 
" See June Ellenoff O 'Neill , The Cause and Significance of the Declining Gender 
Gap in Pay, in Neith er Victim Nor Enemy 1, 7-8 (Rita J . Simon ed. , 1995 ). 
87 See Cohen, supra note 4; Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 4; see also infra note 
186 (discussing why women tend to start out making greater investments in domesticity). 
ss Women tend to specialize in nurturing and family work , whereas ·'men typically 
make fewer relationship-specific investments tha n women , accumu iating in stead re-
sources which are as useful outside as within the ir current relationship. " England & 
Farkas, supra note 5, a t 55. 
,. " 1 
r 
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nancial burdens_sv l'v1en, in contrast, customarily make a grea.ter in-· 
vestment in labor market capital, which is portable in the event of 
divorce. But, even if the sex differential in active marriage-specific 
investment could be completely eliminated-which is unl ikely in 
the face of other sources of men's superior bargaining power911-
men would still come out ahead. Given their relatively short re-
productive lives, women bear a sex-specific "passive" opportunity 
cost that their husbands do not. 
This leads us to perhaps the most significant difference in men's 
and women's fate outside of marriage, which lies in their currency 
on the remarriage market. On the assumption that marriage to a 
suitable partner generates surplus value for the pair to share over 
and above what each spouse can generate alone, remarriage to 
such a partner is by definition a more desirable option than re-
maining single. Indeed, the ability to remarry confers a bargaining 
advantage precisely because the opportunity to remarry can be 
very valuable. Remarriage has the potential to be a positive-sum 
game-that is, to produce a surplus for distribution to the partici-
pants. When there is a positive-sum game, everyone wants to play. 
But not everyone gets to play. A woman's attractiveness and 
appeal to the opposite sex declines rapidly with age, causing a pre-
cipitous falling off of her remarriageability. 91 If her investment of 
her youth in her husband fails to yield future payoffs (because, for 
example , a marriage fails), that resource is effectively depleted. 92 
' 9 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 979 (1979). 
"''See infra Sections III. C-D for a discussion of the interaction of roles ar;d bar-
gaining power. 
91 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 278-87. Divorce scholars have noted that "women 
lose value in the marriage market more rapidly than do men." Id. at 284. Ira Ellman 
notes that "[t]he more precipitous decline in the woman's sexual appeal" with age is 
exace rbated by its corollary, which is the age differential in marital partnerships. 
Ellman, supra note 4, at 43. He further observes that this "relatively universal and 
apparently intractable" male preference for marrying younger women is an important 
''noneconomic factor" (which nevertheless has economic consequences) that tends to 
exacerbate women's preexisting disadvantage upon divorce. Id. That factor operates 
to deprive many women of the benefits of remarriage. 
" As Lloyd Cohen puts it, the wife experiences a "stochastic fall in value" during 
the life of the marriage, both because much of her active investment typically takes 
place during the early years of a relationship and because her passive currency on the 
remarriage market declines more rapidly. Cohen, supra note 4, at 288; Mahony, su-
pra note 16, at 19-22. 
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In contrast, her husband's appeal is re latively unaffected by age, 
and is even enhanced somewhat by the human capital and earning 
power he accumulates during marriage.~3 
The loss of value of women on the marriage market as a function 
of age is driven by the social customs of male hypogamy (that is, 
men marrying down in age, education, and earnings) and femal e 
hypergamy (marrying up). These practices seem to be fueled by 
observed male preferences for marriage to young or younger 
women, and their aversion to partners of greater status, education, 
and ambition. ~~ Female preferences may also play a role. Women 
seem not to mind marrying older men, and may positively prefer 
men of higher status and earnings. 
But perhaps the most important factor driving remarriage pat-
terns is the rel atively shorter reproductive life of women compared 
to men. As women age, their capacity to bear additional children 
declines rapidly, whereas men can become fathers well into old 
age. Many prospective husbands, regardless of age , greatly value a 
woman's fertility. ~5 This tends to diminish women 's value on the 
remarriage market relative to similarly aged men's, and goes a long 
way towards explaining observed patterns of male hypogamy. The 
importance to the creation of unequal marital bargaining power of 
the difference in remarriage prospects grounded in the short re-
productive life of women should not be underestimated. This pat-
tern is ultimately driven by ineluctable biological facts. 
Since the factors that disadvantage women all correlate with age, 
the end result is that divorced women on average find it harder 
than men to replace their mates, and these difficulties increase 
o; See Cohen, supra note 4, a t 286-87; Ellman, supra note 4, at 43 . 
" See Cohen , supra note 4 , at 281 (citing Jessie Bernard , The F uture of Marriage 
158 (1972)). 
95 Ind eed, it is possible to construct an econo mic model that derives observed divi-
sions o f househo ld labor so lely from male -femal e differences in reproducti ve 
lifespan. The model posits a marriage market of fecund wome n and fe rtil e men , a nd 
a post-divorce remarriage market in which a ll men and all previously unmarried 
women (but no divorced women), can remarry and have children. The model pre-
dicts th at rational men and wome n wi ll in ves t differentially in market a nd domesti c 
human capital, respective ly, based on the constraints introduced by these marri age-
mark et ass umpti ons alone. See Aloysius Siow, Differential Fecundity, Markets and 
Gender Roles, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 334 (1998). 
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sharply with advancing age.% Finding a replacement is made even 
more difficult by the likelihood that a woman will bring another 
man 's children into her new family. 97 In contrast, the man's legacy 
from his first marriage-his earning capacity-is valuable "both in 
the marriage market and the commercial world. " A man can "take 
much of the gain realized from his first marriage into a second and 
he can more easily find a replacement mate. ,~s 
Prospects for men and women outside of marriage are important 
to marital bargaining because the dissolution of the entire marital 
bargain as a going concern (i.e., divorce) always looms as a possible 
consequence of failure to agree. The relative importance of the di-
vorce threat alternative to coming to mutual agreement, as com-
pared to what partners face under conditions of marita l discord, is 
difficult to assess, but surely depends in part on the costs of di-
vorce. The current social and legal climate creates few external 
barriers to divorce, and provides for minimal redistribution among 
spouses following a marriage's dissolution. 99 The stigma of divorce 
96 Although remarriage is popular among both sexes, data gathered in the late 1980s 
indicate that the remarriage rate for women aged 35-44 is about two-thirds the rate 
for men, with the ratio dropping to less than one-half for women over 45. Barbara 
Foley Wilson & Sally Cuningham Clarke, Remarriages: A Demographic Profile, 13 J. 
Fam. Issues 123, 126 tbl.2 (1992); see also Weitzman, supra note 12, at 204 (reporting 
that divorced women under 30 have a 75% chance of remarriage, but women over 40 
have only a 28% chance of remarriage). 
Two other factors also affect the remarriage prospects of women. First, women 
with children remarry at a lower rate than women without children, regardless of age 
of divorce. Children have no effect on remarriage for men. See Larry Bumpass, 
James Sweet & Teresa Castro Martin, Changing Patterns of Remarriage, 52 J. Mar-
riage & f am. 747, 751-52 (1990); Helen P. Koo, C.M. Suchindran & Janet D. Griffith, 
The Effects of Children on Divorce and Re-Marriage: A Multivariate Analysis of 
Life Table Probabilities, 38 Population Stud. 451 (1984 ). Second, education is in-
versely correlated with the incidence of remarriage among divorced women. This 
relationship of education to remarriage does not obtain for men. See 3 National Ctr. 
for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Vital Statistics of the 
United States, Marriage and Divorce, 1988, at 41 tbl.l-32 ( 1996). 
97 See England & Farkas, supra note 5, at 57-58; see also supra note 96 (noting evi-
dence that children depress a divorced woman's chance of remarriage). 
"'Ellman, supra note 4, at 44. 
"
9 Only two states require both spouses' consent to obtain divorce for breakdown of 
the marriage, and in 40 states one spouse may obtain a divorce over the other's objec-
tion after a separation of one year or less. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Deci-
sionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Ya. L. Rev. 9, 17 n.23 (1990). The role 
of fault, if any, in the award of alimony and the division of property is more complex 
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has all but disappeared, at least insofar as it carries concrete occu-
pational or fin ancial consequences. 100 To be sure, there are lost 
sunk costs ancl uansaction costs from divorce for both parties, 
which operate as internal restraints on divorce for many couples.10 1 
But if staying married loses its intrinsic value to one partner- if 
one partner faces an intramarital payoff that lies below his or her 
reservation price- the law itself imposes few additional costs on 
exiting the marriage. Thus, marital bargaining is informed by the 
substantial possibili ty tha t the marriage will not last. 
Because the ease or difficulty of obtaining a divorce is in large 
part (although not exclusively) a function of the law of domestic 
relations, all marit al bargaining can be said to take place " in the 
shadow of the law. " 102 But because the law creates a right of easy 
exit, and in many cases leaves both partners more or iess where 
they stood at the time the marriage dissolved, the law is perhaps 
better described as a window. Through that window, two markets 
cast their shadows upon bargainers: the labor market (which de-
termines who can earn how much on his or her own) and the mar-
and varied. See Ira Mark E llman, The Place of Fault in a Mode rn Divorce Law, 28 
Ariz. S t. L.J. 773,781 -82 (1996). 
Although the law of do mestic re la tions does effec t some red istributi on of marita l 
assets, it does no t generally adopt the conventional contract measures- such as res ti-
tution , expecta ncy, or re li ance damages-that govern the a llocat io n of assets fo llow-
ing an ordinary contrac t breach. T hus, post-divorce redi stributi ve meas ures are 
modest, at be; t, and routinely fall short of eq ualizing the parties' welfare following 
divorce. See E llman, supra note 4, a t 49-53; Est in , supra note 4, at 559-60; T rebilcock 
& Kevshan i, supra note 4, at 551-60. Alimony is uncommo n a nd temporary, see 
Scott, supra, at 18, and although the law provides for th e divi sion o f marit a l property, 
there is little tangible property in most marriages. The most important ma rital assets 
(such as human capital) are rarely rea llocated. See T rebilcock & Keshvani, supra 
note 4, at 552-53; Wei tzman , supra note 12, at 269-78, 289-309; W illi ams, supra no te 
3, at. 2250; see a lso Jana B. Singer, A limon y and Effici ency: Th e Gend ered Costs a nd 
Benefits of th e Economi c Justification for Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2423, 2454-56 (1 994) 
(proposing inco me sharing alternatives) . 
lLXl See infra Sec tio n V .F (d iscussi ng the soc ial stigma surrounding divorce). 
10 1 T hese include accumulated marriage-specific investments, harm to children, costs 
from liquidation , re location, reordering of affairs, the psychological distress of breakup, 
insecurity, search for a new spo use , and the violation o f re ligio us or other be liefs 
about the permanence of marriage. 
102 Cf. Mnookin & Kornh a user, supra note 89 (sugges ting how bargaining a t div orce 
takes place "in the shadow of the law") . 
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riage market (1.vhich determines who will have the benefits of a 
new spouse) . 111 , 
Because men generally have better options in these markets 
than women, the value of the right to exit from a marriage is on av-
,. ' f 104 T' . h . erage greater ror men tncm or women. ms means t .at where 
failure to agree increases the probability of divorce, men stand to 
lose less from disagreement than v.;omen. Not only is men 's extra-
marital exit threat generally higher than women's, but the differ-
ence grmvs over t[m:::. A nd such would be the case even if men and 
women equalized patterns of wage and non-w age human capital 
investment and earning power, even if they di d not have different 
preferences for children, and even if they did not have different ab-
solute or comparative advantages (whether natural or acquired) in 
domestic and nondomestic pursuits. Because remarriage is quite 
valuable both financially and emotionally, all that would be re-
quired to generate a quite significant inequality in exit options is a 
difference in men 's and women's currency on the marriage market 
with advancing age. That difference is a longstanding feature of 
the social landscape. 
103 With respect to the marriage market, the American marriage system has been 
described as involving an individual's " permanent availability" as a spouse, a system 
in which "every adult can be thought of as permanently available as a marital part-
ner, regardless of the fact that the individual is presently married ." Udry, supra note 
55 , at 889 (citing the work of Bernard Farber). Thus, each person 
I d. 
con tinuous iy compar[es] his or her marital bargain with other marital bargains 
which he or she might be able to negotiate with other persons, and with his or 
her potential benefits from not being married at all. If an individual's present 
marital partnership is strikingly less favorable than the a lternatives, he or she 
will opt for one of the a lternatives if the cost of the exchange (barrier) does not 
obliterate the advantage to be obtained. 
'[).1 Patterns of hyper- and hypogamy, which are more pronounced on the remarriage 
market, can give rise to systematic differentials in the labor market position of hus-
bands and wives even in the absence of population-wide differences in men's and 
women 's labor market prospects. T he dual tendencies of women to marry somewh at 
old er men and men to marry somewhat younger women leads to a systematic average 
gap in the ages of husbands and wives, a gap that can create a systematic differential 
in couples' earning power. See E llman, supra note 4, at 43-44 . As a general ru le, 
persons with longer job marke t experience earn more, and older persons tend to have 
longer te nure on the job. T his means that the combination of male hypogamy and 
female hypergamy carries with it a chronic initial gap in earning power as between 
couples, which would persist even if the average differences in wages and earnings for 
men and women in the economy were wiped out. This intracouple gap, even if mod-
est , exacerba tes the effect of the remarriage differential. See supra note 54. 
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b. Intramarital Oprions 
Ultimately, the difference in men's and women's exit options is 
always relevant to bargaining because divorce defines the absolute 
outer limits of the scope for bargaining within an ongoing mar-
Iiage.1115 Nevertheless, the immediate importance of "divorce bounds" 
to the actual bargaining process and the parties' bargaining power 
is minimized in the case where both parties anticipate that even 
forced togetherness is better than divorce. In that case, the threat 
point that actually matters to the couple and that vvill most imme-
diately influence thei r conduct, is an intramarital one. 
Just as with the exit threat, men's intramarital threat point can 
be expected to exceed women's. The "burnt toast and harsh words" 
model of marital interaction recognizes that there are times in 
every marriage when spouses will both be better off if they agree 
on a coordinated course of action. 106 In many cases, failure to agree 
105 Sec Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56, at 154 
("Individual rationality ensures that no individual will accept less than he or she 
would receive in the next best alternative and implies that the divorce bounds apply 
to all bargaining models, both cooperative and noncooperative."). 
106 This situation corresponds to a game-theoretic model of marriage created by 
Lundberg and Pollak, which they term the "separate spheres" model. Lundberg & 
Pollak, Separate Spheres, supra note 56. In that model, the threat point for an 
agreed-upon bargain-that is, the situation that would prevail in the absence of an 
agreed-upon allocation-is not divorce but a "noncooperative ... equilibrium within 
marriage." Id. at 992-93. The choices available to the spouses in the absence of 
agreement are given the game-theoretic designation of "noncooperative" situations. 
Id. The stable arrangements within this set-of which there are many-are desig-
nated "noncooperative equilibria." The bargain that is struck within the negotiation 
set created by the noncooperative equilibria (which function as threat points) is 
termed a "cooperative" agreement, and the model is designated a "cooperative 
model." Id. at 1007. The same authors have also created an alternative and so-called 
"noncooperative" model of marriage, which is a dynamic model predicting the out-
come of repeated, costly offers and counteroffers by husband and wife who control 
different resources within marriage. See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distri-
bution, supra note 56, at 150; Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Mod-
els, supra note 56; see also Baird, Gertner & Picker, supra note 48, at 221 (describing 
dynamic or Rubinstein bargaining games). 
The terminology that Lundberg and Pollak employ in their papers is unfortunate. 
The designations "cooperative" and "noncooperative" as they apply to game-
theoretic agreements are terms of art referring to agreements that are, respectively, 
binding (i.e. externally enforceable) or nonbinding. See Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 
29. As Lundberg and Pollak themselves acknowledge, however, it is probably inac-
curate to refer to marital agreements as "cooperative" agreements in this sense, be-
cause there are no legal or other formal mechanisms for enforcing agreements during 
r . 
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will result in a less efficient arrangement than could otherwise be 
achieved by coordination of effort, as when failure to settle on one 
family dinnertime results in cold food for some family members. 
In other cases, failure to achi eve a "meeting of the minds" on a 
mutual course of action will lead to a breakdown in the trust neces-
sary to coordinate a sequence of contributions. That trust would 
ordinarily lead each party to put fo rward optimizing " best efforts" 
in anticipation of agreed- upon reciprocation. w' Without coordina-
tion, some lesser degree of effort will be forthcoming, which will 
shrink the size of total output available to share. 
In the absence of agreement, the intram arital threat point model 
assumes that one spouse decides how to go about his or her busi-
ness without the other's consent , with each spouse independently 
choosing a "level of her private good and the public good that she 
supplies to maximize her own utility, subject to her budget con-
straint."108 In this discordant or "uncoordinated" state, each spouse 
strategizes to inflict the most misery on the partner (as a spur to 
reaching agreement of some type) while doing the least damage to 
himself or herself in the process. The game-theoretic models sug-
the life of the marriage. There are only informal social sanctions and self-help. Lund-
berg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models, supra note 56, at 133 (recognizing 
that marriage is best model ed as a noncooperative bargaining game). To reduce ter-
minological confusion, the situation that prevails in the absence of mutual agree-
ment-the "harsh words and burnt toas t" situation-will be termed in this paper the 
" uncoordinated" or di sharmonious marriage, and the bargain that would be struck 
against the background threat of such possible disagreeme nt is termed the "coordinated 
agreement." Coordinated agreements, even though technically noncooperative 
(because externally unenforceable) nevertheless may be more efficient than uncoor-
dinated behaviors, because they bring gains from mutually orchestra ted actions. 
107 See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 66, at 1116-19 (discussing a " best efforts" 
convention as an informal way to optimize output in a long-term re lational contract) . 
108 Lundberg & Pollak , Bargaining and Distribution , supra note 56, at 148. As 
Lundberg and Pollak write: 
Within an existing marriage, a noncooperative [that is, uncoordinated) equilib-
rium corresponds to a utility-maximizing strategy in which each spouse takes 
the other spouse's strategy as given . . . . What di stinguishes a noncooperative 
marriage from a pair of independe ntly optimizing individuals? Joint consump-
tion economies are an important source of gains to marriage, and even nonco-
operative family members enjoy the benefits of household public goods .... As 
one might expect, public goods are undersupplied in this noncooperative equi-
librium, and there are potential gains to cooperation. Additional gains can be 
expected if coordination of individual contributions is req uired for efficient 
household production . 
Lundberg & Pollak, Separa te Spheres, supra note 56, at 993. 
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gest that there are many ways that spouses can arrange their affairs 
in the absence of marital harmony (that is, there are "multiple 
equilibria" for marital discord), depending on initial conditions or 
conventions. 109 Since many marital activities involve public goods 
and have secondary effects on the other spouse , each spouse inevi-
tably benefits (or suffe rs) to a certain degree from the other's 
choices during the period of marital di scord. As the examples 
above and discussion belmv shmv, however, the surplus loss from 
failure to coordinate may not fall equali y on each partner. 
Where both spouses are better off within the range of "un-
coordinated equilibri a" 110 th::m they would be if the marriage fell 
apart, then marital bargaining towards agreement ·will take place in 
the shadow of noncoordination or "marital warfare." The best al-
ternative to agreement, which determines the negotiation set and 
the actual bargaining surplus, \vi ll not be divorce, but how miser-
able or well off each person wi ll be in the uncoordinated state. 
That in turn , will depend on how much deprivation and distress 
each spouse can inflict on the other without hurting himself or her-
self too much. 
Do women suffer more from marital incoordination? The an-
swer is not as clearcut as in the simple divorce threat-point model. 
As an initial matter, the spouse with more domestic responsibility 
stands to lose more because that party cannot withdraw his or her 
10" Lundberg and Pollak suggest that the range of intramarital threat points presented 
by the specter of an uncoordinated or warring house hold may be heavily affected by 
social conventions regarding appropriate sex ro les. When family cooperation, coor-
dination, and communication break down, people may fall back on well-worn roles in 
determining how to conduct themseives. See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargai ning and 
Distribution, supra no te 56, at 150-52. As the authors state, " [t]he existence of multi-
ple equilibria in repeated no ncoopera ti ve games and the need to choose among them 
suggest how history and culture might affect distribution within marriage." Id. at 151. 
Because there may be a "self-evident way to play" that is dictated by socia l conven-
tions regarding " the rights and responsibiliti es o f husbands and wives," what will of-
ten emerge without explici t bargaining or agreemen t is a division of labor based on 
traditional rol es. Id. One glaring variation on marital disharmony is, of course, do-
mestic violence, which can drastically lower the threat point of a woman's fail ure to 
acq uiesce in her husband 's wishes. 
110 The effect on actual bargaining of the uncoordi nated equilibria represented by 
the potential for marital disharmony is complicated by the fac t that there are multiple 
uncoordinated equilibrium conditions poss ib le. T hus, whereas there is only one-or 
theoretically onl y one-divorce threat point , there are multiple intramarital equilib-
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services (which generally produce public goods) without hurting 
himself or herself along with the other partner. The person who 
contributes cash or other tangible assets is in a better position to 
withhold benefits from the marital pool than the person who per-
forms in-kind labor for the unit. 111 The difference, of course, is a 
matter of degree: Some domest ic work is severable, just as "some 
rnone tary wealth must be shared in the form of housing" and other 
h.. ' 112 p LL l1c goods. 
But these observations are not completely satisfying because 
they require assuming a division of labor as a starting point or 
background condition for deciding which bargainer stands to lose 
rnore . Ideally, the bargain ing analysis should te ll us how duties and 
benefits will be split. Its goal is to explain observed patterns of al-
iocation, not to assume them. 'What determines the level of goods 
and services that each spouse wi ll supply within the context of 
forced togetherness? Specifically, is there reason to believe that 
one party (the wife) might spontaneously supply the greater 
amount of public-goods producing domestic service, which then 
redounds to the benefit of her partner? Although the person who 
does more domestic work is less likely to withdraw that contribu-
tion in an uncoordinated situation than the person who contributes 
other resources, we still do not know why, in the absence of a bar-
gained-for assignment, the wife will be performing the majority of 
those tasks. The answer could lie in a different preference struc-
ture concerning the costs and benefits of domestic labor for men 
and women. 
c. The Parable of Neat and Slob 
To explain how observed patterns come about, assume there are 
two lav,r students-Neat and Slob-who are assigned as room-
mates. Suppose each would incur extreme financial liability for 
breaking the lease; it is so costly for each to get rid of the other 
(i. e., "divorce") that neither considers it. Neat cares more about 
cleanliness than Slob. Neat either is less averse to (that is, experi-
'''As one scholar of housework has observed, the benefits of whatever housework 
is performed will, as a practical matter, be shared. That is because it often is not fea-
sible to perform housework for oneself without providing a be nefit to all members of 
the household. See Silbaugh , supra note 17, at 34. 
1 1 ~ See id. at 35 . 
556 Virgin ia Law Review (Vol. 84:509 
ences less negative utility from) cleaning the apartment , or derives 
greater posit ive utility from having a clean place to live , or both. 
Slob hates cleaning more-or cares less about having a clean 
apartment-than Neat. H e nevertheless prefers a clean apartment 
to a dirty one and will clean it himself if it gets sufficiently dirty. 
The apartment is cleaned by an outsider on the weekend, but it 
gets progressively dirtier as the week wears on. Their respective 
preferences are such that Neat will clean the apartment on Tues-
day, but Slob will not clean until Thursday. Neat and Slob neither 
coordi nate the ir efforts nor bargain over allocation of labor. As a 
result , Neat cleans the apartment every Tuesday, and Slob, who 
studies whi le Neat cleans, reaps the benefits of the publ ic good of 
the clean apartment. 
If Neat and Slob are "forced" to live together and share public 
goods, their strictly rational and individually optimizing behavior 
will result in very lopsided costs and benefits to each member of 
the pair. If Neat gets fed up and decides to try bargaining with 
Slob-that is, tries to get Slob to take a larger share of the responsi-
bility-the bargain he can hope to strike will be a function of how 
badly off Slob anticipates being if no agreement is reached. If they 
do manage to forge a compromise that shifts some work to Slob, 
Neat will be better off than before, and Slob will be worse off. 
Since Slob does not realistically anticipate being worse off in the 
absence of agreement than with one (because it is unlikely that 
Neat will make good on a threat to underperform), Neat will 
probably not get very far in his attempt to shift some responsibility 
to Slob. 
The Parable of Neat and Slob shows how the marital game of 
"split-the-pie" can be transformed into a variation on the game of 
"chicken. " 113 H ere, each player is worst off if the task (cleaning) is 
not performed at all. A nd each is best off if the other player, and 
not he, performs it. Each prefers a compromise to doing all the 
work himself, but each prefers not doing it to a compromise. Slob's 
advantage can be attributed to the asymmetry of the hypothetical 
payoffs, which results from different costs and benefits to the par-
ties either from performing the task or from enjoying the fruits of 
' 13 See Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 73-74 (describing the chicken game). 
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labor. 11 ~ As the game is played out, the person with the most to 
lose from mutual nonperformance will more ofte n end up per-
forming the task , and the other person will free ride on the other's 
willi ngness to bear the costs. 
O f course, this example is oversimplifie d, for it assumes rational 
actors who will not make good on threats that prove costly in a sin-
gle round of a game. In reality, if Slob were a spouse he would 
have a somewhat greater incentive to agree on a compromise, be-
cause in marriage partners usually suffer addi tional costs from 
prolonged discord and lack of coordination , and intransigence on 
one issue can spill over in to negotiations on others. A lso, as dis-
cussed beiow, real -life bargainers might make good on disadvanta-
geo us threats because there might be plausible long-term strategic 
reasons for doing so.11 ) Nevertheless, the basic principle illustrated 
by the example is quite pertinent: Where divorce is not a credible 
threat on the part of either spouse, the one who stands to lose more 
from the loss of a public good will suffer more in the absence of an 
express agreement. The spouse who can better tolerate an under-
supply of a public good has less to lose from refusing to compromise. 
It is quite possible that women care more about the sorts of pub-
lic goods that are supplied to a marriage through unpaid domestic 
labor. For example, women may place a higher value on order and 
quality in domestic matters, may find domestic disorder more irk-
some, or may find the effort needed to bring about a high level of 
domestic order less onerous (because they mind doing housework 
less, they are more accustomed to doing it , or it carries less of a 
stigma for thern). 11 6 Women's standards of childcare may also dif-
'" A possible array of asymmetr ic payoffs to Neat and Slob is: 
SLOB: 
STU DY WORK 
NE AT: WORK 3, 8 8, 4 
STUDY -3, 0 12, 2 
For each roommate , the payoff is lowest whe n both study a nd no one works . It 
rises for each person to the maximum through the sequence of (1) doing the work 
alone, (2) sharing the work , and (3) having the other person do it. Neat gets a smaller 
payoff than Slob if the work is undone, but a larger payoff in a ll other situations. 
" 5 See infra note 153 (discussing failure to cooperate despite poten ti al mutual ga ins) . 
11 ' A number of fem inist commentators have recogn ized the critical roie of a marital 
dynamic that corresponds to a chicken game in the allocati on of famil y responsibility. 
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fer from men's-for example, in their views of hmv much parental 
care children ::.hould get. The wish for children to have parental 
care is analogous to the desire for a clean apartment: The desire is 
to have it done, preferably at least cost to oneseif. A bsent that 
condition, hmve·-,;er, it still proves worthwhile to do it oneself and 
bear th<: cost. 117 This is not inconsistent 'Nith the fact that men en-
---- - ------ ---- - -- - ---------
Sec, e.g .. Pat PA ai~l ctr di , "The Politics of House \vork , in Sisterhood {s Po\verful: An 
Anthology of VJriti ngs from the Women's Liberation i'vfovement 447, 449 (Robin 
Morgan c d., 1970). J oan \Vi ilian1s describes a ty pical marital sce nario in the fo llow-
ing te rms: 
ls it iE> portc:n[ to you to have a clean house? It's no :_ ~o me : you clea n it if it' s 
import<wt t c: yu~J . ''{011 think it's importan t to pick the chddren up from schooi , 
go to th e H alloween parade , be home before 7:00 p.m., spend e xtra time with 
the child;·c;-, duri ng vaca tions, be a room pare nt, get invo lved witl1 rhe PTA 7 1 
don' t . But if yc•u fee l yo u must, then by all means do so . 
Wilii ams , supra no te 3, at 2240 (footnotes om itted) . Williams also quotes one male 
commentator who points out that "[o]verinvol vement with chi ldren may ope rate to 
d iscourage many husbands from fully sharing because they do not accept the ideol-
ogy of cl ose at tention to children." ld. at 2240 n.56 (quoting S.M. Mi ll er, The Making 
of a Confuse d Mi dd le-Aged Husband , in Men & Masculinity 44, 50 (Joseph H . Pleck 
& Jack Sawyer eds., 1974)). 
117 The issue of how women in particular and parents in general regard unpaid do--
mestic responsibi li ties is far more complex for chi ldcare than fo r other domestic 
tasks. Most people would not ordinarily perform routine housework for its own sake, 
but only for its productive payoff. In contrast, the care of children has significant 
components of both work a nd leisure or, a lternatively, of production a nd consump-
tion value . See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 12. 
Women may diffe r o n av erage from me n both in the degree to which they regard 
childcare as intrinsically enjoyable and in the degree to which they want their chil-
dren to have more time wit h a parent as opposed to a nonparent (without necessarily 
wanting to prov ide it personally-as in , "I wish you would spend more time with the 
children, dear") . Both pre ferences-which are quite distinct, but are often con-
flated-will affect women's choices within a circumscribed set of options, but the 
choices that depend on the consumption value of childcare wi ll not be influenced by 
bargaining st;·ength or by the bargaining partner's choices. Childcare will be willingly 
supplied by the consume r as long as its consumption value holds out, compared to the 
benefits of other uses o f time . 
The component that predominates in chi ldcare-whether work or le isure-can de-
pend both on the circumstances in which childcare is performed, the specific ch ildcare 
tasks at issue , and the peculiar preferences and tastes of the person caring for chil-
dren . On the first o f these, it has been noted that women and m en care for children 
in different contexts, with women tending "to overlap the time during which they su-
pervise children with shopping, laundry, or fo od prepara tion, while men te nd to su-
pervise chi ld ren as the ir sole use of time." ld. at 12. T here is evidence that men 's 
childcare time is predominateiy spent in play, while women ta ke on a disproportion-
ate share of routine care . See P led: , supra no te 29, at 261. Entertaining, teaching, 
and playing with chi ldre n wo uld appear to have more "consumptio n" value than 
d ressing, bathing, feeding, and changing them, although it is unclear whethe r the 
, ., 
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for child. Nor is it inconsistent vvith viOmen experiencing most 
housework and much childcare as work- '.;vhere "work " is defined 
as an activity that, despite producing valuable benefits, one would 
orefer, if given a choice, to have performed bv someone else. Nev-, . " 
ertheless, the prediction that women will do more of the vvork that 
generates significant "positive" externalities for the fami ly effec-
tively creates divergent intramari.tal threat points, which will neces-
smil ;v influence the aQ.reements that couvles will strike .1:s 
'-' ·' 
HI. THE BARGAINING Iv10DEL AND EGAUTA P. IAN IVLI\RRU\GE 
This Article has identified several vvays in which \VOlTJ.en ' s threat 
Do ints 'vvithin marriage might differ on averag:e from men's. In • . 0 ~ 
short, men are generally better off premaritally, extramarital ly , and 
intramaritally. In light of the general observation that men tend to 
have better alternati•;es to mari tal agreement t han women, what 
does bargaining theory have to say about the prospects for egali-
tarian marriage? 
To answer this question, one must return to the observation that 
the marital bargain is a function both of threat points (which fix the 
negotiation set and the size of the bargaining surplus) and the 
process of negotiation (which de termines the allocation of the bar-
gaining surplus) . The most fundamental insight of the bargaining 
model is that the alternatives to agreement that are available to 
each partner limit how good a bargain the other partner can obtain; 
sexes differ in their assessments of these activities . F inally, it may be the case th at 
men on average get less intrinsic satisfactio n (or consumption value) fro m caring for 
child ren, or that the pos itive margina l utility of the activity drops off more rapidly for 
men than for women, so that the crossover from leisure to work happens sooner for 
men. T hus, men may find a given amount of childcare res ponsibility more onerous 
than women. 
118 T here is yet another reason why women may be more reluctant than me n to 
withdraw the ir contribution to the marriage under conditions of •n arital discord, re-
gardless of the nature o f that contribution. When both spouses are be tter off at odds 
than divorced, the wife is li ke ly to be more cautio us in choosing her strategy because 
the husband 's di vorce utility wi ll li e closer to his disharmonious intramari ta! utility 
than will the wife's . That is because the husband 's exit threat poi nt will on average 
be hi gher than the wife's, and this higher ex tramarital utility might tend to "crowd," 
or more close ly shadow, the husband's int ramarital utilit y in the event marital rela-
tions break down . If that is the case, the wife might be more wary abou t adopting a 
strategy that infli cts too much unhapp in ess on her husband, because she might 
"overshoot" and drive him away. 
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those alternatives set a lower limit on the share each spouse will ra-
tionally accept. This conclusion follows from the simple assump-
tion that each bargainer seeks to maximize his or her own utility. 11 9 
If we make the further assumption that the marriages that are con-
tracted will run the full gamut of potential mutually advantageous 
relationships, then we can show that there will be some number of 
marital deals that wil l be inegalitari an. There will be some, how-
ever, that have at least the potential for equal division. Among 
those in which equal ity is at least a possibili ty, we can identify the 
conditions that tend to be conducive to equal, or more equal, allo-
cations of well-being within marriage. Finally, we can apply addi-
tional princip les that govern the actual conduct of bargaining to 
predict that , even among those relationships with the potential for 
equality, egalitarian deals will probably be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
A. Is Egalitarian Marriage Possible? 
To derive these conclusions, it is helpful to consider a more fa -
miliar commercial analogy of a typical long-term bargaining rela-
tionship. Imagine an agreement between a firm (say, IBIYI) and a 
supplier (designated S). After initially shopping around on the 
market, IBM and S agree to deal with each other because each 
considers the arrangement the best presently available. T he units 
invested or brought to the relationship by each partner represent, 
in effect, all its worldly goods. All holdings and efforts are plowed 
back and made available for dividing between the partners. As-
sume that, as in marriage, there are no legal means for enforcing 
any deal for a division of proceeds, and assume that each unit of 
output brings an identical amount of utility to each party when dis-
tributed as a payoff to that party. Thus, units of output (utility) in-
119 lt should be obvious that if most marital partners can do as we ll or be tte r, a ft er 
accounting for transaction costs and sunk costs , by switching partners-that is, wh en 
"divorce bounds" are tight , see Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining a nd Distribution , su-
pra note 56, at 153-54-then there is little scope for ba rga ining within ma rriage. But 
bargaining mode ls of marriage " are motivated by the assumpti on that , in at leas t 
some marriages, surpluses are large enough that their distribution is worth mod el-
ing." Id. at 154. 
~.• 
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crease each partner 's welfare to the same degree . (This assumption 
effectively makes util ity payoffs equivalent to percentage shares. t o 
Assume IBM and S have similar pre-deal "endowments ," and 
both agree to invest 30 units of effort and/or assets in the relation-
ship- so th eir initi al negotia ted inputs are the same. The deal is 
expected to generate a profi t net of the 60 unit investment of 300 
units (from 360 units tota l output). The parties enter the re lation-
ship with the knowledge that IBM has the potentia l to enter into an 
alternative de al with another company, S-1, which offers IBM a net 
payoff (in excess of input) of 200 units . S, on the other hand , faces 
a maximum anticipated net payoff of 50 from an alternative deal 
with a company call ed MS. 
Negotiati ons conducted according to our egalitari an working 
definition- where both partners are equally well-off, net of costs, 
relative to a monopoly on the pie-would produce a deal in which 
the partners were left with equal payoffs net of investment. In this 
example, where inputs are equal, those payoffs are equivalent to an 
equal split of the profits from the deal. E ach partner gets 150 uni ts. 
(It is assumed for this discussion that each partner has already re-
couped its 30 unit investment out of total proceeds.) 
The problem with the "egalitarian" solution, however, is that it is 
not a feasibl e one for this relationship. IBM would never rationally 
agree to such a division , because it could do better elsewhere. If 
such a "solution" to any bargaining problem were demanded, IBM 
would seek out the partner from whom it could anticipate a share 
of 200. 121 IBM must receive at least 200+ units net payoff to make 
the deal worthwhile. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, the 
type of bargain in which an egalitarian division is not one to which 
both partners could rationally agree wi ll be designated as a rela-
tionship that is never egalitarian ("NE "). See Figure 1. 
12° For a di scussion o f egal ita ri a n marri age as equal pe rcentage shares, see supra 
Secti ons II. C.2.a , l I. C.2.c. 
121 Similarly, if IBM we re offe red less than 200 units by S as an induce me nt to enter 
into the re lat ionship in the first pl ace, IB M would declin e. Of course , the sha re IB M 
would receive fro m an alternati ve dea l is to some degree specul a tive, since that dea l 
would also presumably be subject to the condition that any all ocation th a t is agreed 
upon be fo re the fac t is unenfo rceable. It is ass umed that IBM has sized up the situ a-
tion-including anticipa ted to tal payo ffs to itself and the quality of S-1 's respective 
o utside opti ons- an d fee ls re la tive ly certa in that the payoff from the o utside deal will 
be grea ter than that produced by an ega lita ri a n di visio n with S. 
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Figure 1. "NE" Bargain 
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The only realistic bargaining options for IBM and S ar~ those 
that take into account the alternatives available to the partners 
outside the relationship-the potential partnerships between IBM 
and S-1, and S and I\t1S. Because IBM and Scan receive outside , 
net of investment, 200 units and 50 units respectively, that is the 
minimum each can be expected to accept from the current bargain. 
Once the two have received their minimum demands, there are 50 
units up for grabs (300 - (200 +50)). That is the bargaining su.rplus. 
Assuming that the units are infinitely divisible, there is theoreti-
cally a limitless number of ways to split the 50 units between the 
parties, each of which would allow the parties to maintain the rela-
tionship consistent with rational self-interest. None of those, how-
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ever, coincide with the egalitarian division, Y.lhich requires each to 
receive 150 units. 
Suppose the bargaining surplus were to be split equally; each 
party would receive 25 additional units. 122 IBM would take away a 
net payoff of 225 (200 + 25), and S would net 75 (50+ 25) . That di-
vision diverges quite markedlv from the egalitarian relationshin 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
described above. That divergence is a function of the size of the 
bargaining surplus-that is, the amount of joint gains available for 
division after each partner has received its reservation payoff. The 
better the outside alternatives for one partner or the other-the 
closer the alternatives approach the maximum possible payoff for 
each within the relationship-the smal ler the bargaining surplus. 
For purposes of the example, however, it is important to see that it 
is not the fact that one partner has invested more in the relat ion-
ship that is driving the inequality (since each partner's investment 
is the same). Rather, it is that something better than an egalitarian 
payoff awaits one partner outside the relationship. That party's su-
perior prospects are the sole obstacle to equality in this relationship. 
But, holding the outside alternatives constant, the bigger the size 
of the pie-corresponding to the pool for allocation-the bigger 
the bargaining surplus. The importance of the size of the pie-
which corresponds here to the partnership proceeds-to the possi-
bility for an egalitarian split is illustrated by modifying the exam-
ple. Assume now that the deal generates a joint net payoff of 600 
units, instead of 300. If the alternatives available to IBM and S on 
the market remain constant, then the egalitarian rule of division 
outlined above would generate a different result. Under an egali-
tarian rule of division, both partners receive total payoffs, net of 
their 30 unit investment, of 300 units. In contrast with the examDle 
l 
above, this egalitarian split might satisfy both partners. Each will 
receive more than its expected alternative payoff (200 for IBM, 
and 50 for S). To be sure, the egalitarian deal described here would 
not coincide with an equal split of the bargaining surplus-the latter 
1" This would correspond to the so-called Nash bargaining solution to "splitting the 
pie" consisting of the 300 unit payoff. See Rasmusen , supra note 65, at 229-31 
(d iscuss ing Nash bargai ning so lutions to the split-the-pie game, in which parties take 
an equal portion of the bargai ning surplus); see also McElroy & Horney, supra note 
56 (calculating a Nash so luti o n to a cooperative bargaining game of household alloca-
tion); infra Section !II.C (discussing Nash ba rgaining solution). 
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arrangement would necessarily be better for IBM, the partner with 
the best outside alternative.123 The important point for now, how-
ever, is that the existence of a large enough profit, which has the 
effect here of generating a bigger bargaining surplus, allows for the 
possibility of conducting an egali tarian rela tionship consistent with 
both partners' ra tional self-interest. Such a rela tionship will be 
designated as potentially egalitarian (" PE"). See Figure 2. 
Figure 2. "PE" Bargain 
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1 ~3 If the bargaining surplus of 350, wh ich is calcu lated by subtracting the sum total 
of the value of each party 's outside a ltern ati ves from the 600 unit tota l proceeds, or 
600- (200 + 50), were to be split equally (y ie ldin g 175), then IBM wo uld enjoy a ne t 
payoff fro m th e deal of 375 (200 + 175) and S would enjoy 225 (50+ 175). 
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B. Factors Affecting the Potential for Equality 
Because maintaining such a relationship would benefit both par-
ties, it can be predicted that there will be a conside ra ble number of 
NE marriages- those within which equality of percentage shares of 
welfare is impossible because inconsistent with one person's (typi-
cally, the husband 's) ra tional consent to continue vvithin the rela-
tionship. But there wi ll also be many PE relationships-those in 
which an egalitarian allocation is possible . 
What can be said about PE marriages? Those are relationships 
in which there are enough resources avai lable fo r sharing between 
the spouses to permit each to receive equal percentage utility, or to 
get the ir way to the same extent, without making the relationship 
less desirable (net of transaction costs) than alternatives available 
to either party. 
A simplified paradigm using parameters relevant to marital divi-
sion suggests that the potential for equality is greatest where the 
woman's or man's contribution (or marriage-specific investment) 
in the present marriage is small, or the man's specific investment in 
any alternative to the marriage is large relative to the investment in 
the current marriage and the man's expected payoff outside the 
marriage is small. 124 
' 2" Assuming units of utility are normalized inte rpersonally , thi s wo uld mean that 
th e marital surplus (MS), which is the sum of payoffs net of costs, must be grea ter 
tha n twice as much as the ne xt bes t altern ative for the spouse with th e best alterna-
tive to an agreeme nt , ass umed he re to be the husba nd . Tha t bes t a lte rnative is des ig-
nated as TH (or husband 's threat point). There fore: MS/2 > TH. 
MS is assum ed to be some function of the wife's income l(W) , th e husband's in-
come I(H ), and a ll o ther resources genera ted within or contributed to the ma rriage 
(R) , ne t of each partner's contributio n, which is the total utility expended to generate 
all monetary a nd nonmonetary resources a nd other potentia l be nefits accruing to the 
unit. Those contributions are designated as C(W) (wife 's contributi on) and C(H) 
(husband's). T he latte r factors are ass umed to have nega tive va lue . For simplicity, 
children 's efforts are ignored , and their va lue and consum pt io n included in R. The 
husband's threa t point is assumed to be a functi o n o f hi s income I( H) and his ex-
pected utility fro m divorce-the best alte rnative awa iting him o utsid e the marri age. 
Tha t a lternative is represented by some cumulative function of the husba nd 's income 
plus a ny additional expected payoff outside the marriage, A(H) (whi ch takes into ac-
count the probability of remarriage, and its attend a nt benefits), minus a term repre-
sent ing the to tal effort the husband must expe nd o utsid e of marriage, CA(H). A PE 
marriage, then, is one in wh ich : 
MS (I(W), I(H) , R, C(H) , C(W)) > 2TH (I(H), A(H), CA (H)). 
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In general , any large divergence in the spouses' p rospects out-
side the marriage, fro111 whatever source, makes equality in mar-
riage less likely. For example, the paradigm reveals tha t the differ-
ence between spouses' earned incomes affects the p ossibility of an 
egalitarian marriage. T he more the husband's income exceeds the 
\-vife 's, the less likely is the possibility of an egali tarian allocation. 
As the husband' s earnings rise relative to the wife's, his extramari-
tal position relative to hers improves. T o be sure , the husband's 
high earnings tends to enlarge the pool of assets to bargain over, 
which favors equality. But that effect .,:vill be offse t by the e leva-
tion of the husband's relative exit thre at , which te nds to move the 
egalitari an point outside of the negotiation set. /~\,S the wife 's in-
come rises to the level of the husband's, the \vife 's exit advantage is 
bolstered, which decreases the size of the bargaining surplus. 125 But 
this reduction makes it more likely that an egalitarian allocation 
\vill fall within the feasible negotiation set. In sum, for a fixed 
amount of total income, and a fixed size of the marital pie, there is 
more room for equality as incomes converge. Concomitantly, the 
more unequal the incomes (in favor of the husband), the smaller 
the possibility, ceteris paribus, of an equal split. 
A ll else, however, is not always equal. In the equation, the size 
of the marital surplus also affects the possibi lity for an egali tarian 
split. The marital surplus includes those resources that owe their 
existence to the marriage. The size of the marital surplus is deter-
mined by the amount of resources available for allocation within 
the marriage, and the amount of resources available for division af-
fects the possibility of equal division, as the IBI'v'1/S example dem-
onstrates. H olding constant the panics' threat points or al terna-
t ives to agreement, a larger mari tal surplus translates into a larger 
bargaining surplus. The larger the pool of resources available for 
division , the greater the possibility of equal division. 
l\1S increases as I(W), I(H) , and R ri se and C(H) a nd C(W) fal l. TH increases as I(H) 
and A (H) rise and CA(H) falls. This ind ica tes tha t th e possibility o f an ega litarian 
ma rriage is more likely when the fo llowing fac tors are large: R, I(W), and CA.(H). It 
is less likely when th e following factors are large: l(H), C( W), C(H) , a nd A(H). 
125 Bargaining theory predicts that eq ual spousal incomes, a ll e lse being equal, wi ll 
desta biiizc marriage by reducing the space for possible bargaining. T his e ffect would 
be independe nt of the absolute level of income for each. See Lundberg & Pollak, 
Bargaining and D istribution, supra note 56, a t 148. 
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In considering the factors that affect the potential for marital 
equality, it is helpful to divide marriages into two types, recogniz-
ing that the latter includes a variety of relationships: traditional 
marriages and dual-earner marriages. Traditional marriages are 
uniform at least insofar as the spouses take on conventional sex 
roles; the husband is the breadwinner, and the wife works solely in 
the domestic sphere. In dual-earner marriages, on the other hand , 
the husband and vvife both \Vork for pay. Dual-earner marriages 
are quite varied, with the continuum anchored by re lationships in 
which both spouses earn roughly comparable income~j and spend 
roug hly commuable amounts of time at oaid work. 
0 -' .! 1 
\-Vhich tvoe of marriaop-e is more likel-y to be corrroatible vvith 
.,.' _l l 
egalitarianism? The answer is not at all obvious. For traditional 
marriages, there are two conflicting sets of factors at ·;vork. The 
sharp disparity in earned income tends to raise the husband's 
threat point relative to the wife's, pushing the negotiation set away 
from equality. Offsetting that asymmetry, however, are factors 
that tend to increase the net marital surplus, or the utility for shar-
ing among family members. 
One important factor determining the size of the surplus is the 
degree of concern that each spouse has for the other and, thus, the 
degree of vicarious utility each spouse gains from the other's satis-
faction. The performance of an unpaid service can generate bene-
fits of various kinds. If the spouse who performs a task (say, 
cooking a meal) gets vicarious satisfaction from the other's enjoy-
ment (which is above and beyond any consumption value from 
eating the food) then the total utility generated by a particular 
quantity of effort will rise, and this will add to the marital surplus. 
Increasing the marital surplus increases the marital pool (or size of 
the pie), which increases the possibility, ceteris paribus, for an equal 
split of relative satisfaction. This indicates that· the possibility for 
equality may be enhanced by active love , caring, and altruism 
within marriage. Moreover, the more the cook enjoys cooking, the 
greater the contribution to the net marital surplus, because the ef-
fort costs the cook less. 126 Either way, the possibility of equality is 
increased. 
1 ~ 6 ln the foregoing calculation, this reduces the value of C(W) for the cook, rather 
than directly adding to the value of R. See supra note 124. 
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Today, women are not forced to adopt th e ro le of traditional 
'>vife. They have a spectrum of choices. It follows that women who 
elect conventional roles may comprise a self-selected and unrepre-
sentative sample of all women. Women who stay home may thus 
have a greater than average taste fo r domestic work or may derive 
.more than average satisfact ion from nurturing or fro m rendering 
direct services to others. At a given level of service provided for 
fam ily members , a woman of this type may experience a higher 
level of well-being, and comparatively less of her well-being wil l 
come at other family members' expense. Putting marit al caring to 
work through domesticity may decrease the degree to which one 
spouse's utility is direct ly traded off with the other's. 127 
'" As the economist Yoram Weiss puts it, altruism can have the e ffect of " red uc[ing] 
the ra nge of di sagree ment. T ha t is, the parties, if they had power to de te rmine th e 
o utco me unilatera ll y, will choose actions which are relative ly close." We iss, supra 
note 41 ,at19. 
It is possible to ove rstate th e difference between women who choose to work for 
pay and those who choose to work exclusively at home. One can specul ate that there 
has bee n an evolution over time in the "utility profile" of women who choose to stay 
home full-time to care for their children. See, e.g., Danielle Crittenden , Turning Back 
the Clock , Women 's Q. , Autumn 1996, at 6, 6-7 (comparing the " old traditionalist"-
who pl aces greater emphasis on housekeeping and catering to husbands-to the " new 
traditi onali st"-who is primarily focused on attentive childrearing). O ne at-home 
moth er, in descri bing her motiva tion for staying home, has asse rted th a t at-home 
moms " look upon housework the same way everyone else does: as a ted io us neces-
sity. O ur real job ... is caring fo r and teaching our children." Paulin e A. Connole, 
Le tte r to the Editor, Mother, Not Housekeeper, Wash . Post, Jan. 29, 1997, at A20. 
T his sugges ts that most var ia tion among women will currentl y be observed , no t in 
utili ty functions for homemakin g tasks, but in preferences for time with children and 
views about the importance of in tensive parental attention . 
T here are other reasons to exercise caution in advancing ge nerali zations about 
working and stay-a t-home wome n. The taste for domesticity is only o ne component 
of the decision whe ther to work for pay. That decision is also influenced by such factors 
as the market wage a woman can command (which is in turn based on educa ti onal , 
geographic, and economic factors) and the direct and opportunity costs of going out 
to work (such as transportation, childcare, taxes, clothing, possib le decreased quality 
of household prod uctio n, and psychic costs of separation from children) . Moreover, 
the so-ca lled "barga ining squeeze," see infra Section IY. C, describes the perpetua tio n 
of ro le d ivisions that does not de pend on pronounced differences in pre fe re nces, but 
req ui res only that th ere be some sma ll initi al in equality in responsibility fo r house-
hold work. As that analysis reveals, women 's choices may be as imperfect a guide to 
the magnitude of their differences with each other as they are to their differences 
with men, because choices are a co mplex functi on of many factors that include the 
power to "ge t one's way." None theless, where economic and socia l facto rs bearing 
on the cos ts and payoffs of work are similar, differe nt women wi ll still make different 
choices. These could turn on variations in the " taste for domes ticity" or fo r caring 
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Of course, a working woman serves her family by earning in-
come and may get considerable consumption value from her work, 
just as the housewife does from hers. This would appear to com-
plicate a comparison between the payoffs different women receive 
from the range of services they provide their families. By defini-
tion, however, some considerable part of the yield from paid work 
is not part of marital surplus. Although marriage makes possible 
the purchase of public goods and enjoyment of economies of scale, 
most of the paid work would presumably be done, and the income 
enjoyed by the earner, regardless of marital status. 128 
Some comparison is possible, however, because even in dual-
earner families domestic services must somehow be performed. 
The foregoing analysis provides reason to believe that domestic 
services provided in dual-earner families generate less utility than 
equivalent services within traditional households. That is not just 
because the dual-earner provider-usually the wife-probably gets 
less consumption value and less vicarious pleasure from providing 
domestic services than a housewife. It is also because the services 
are provided under conditions that may increase their cost of pro-
duction, and probably decrease their quality. 129 The housewife's 
work carried on within a private sphere, as compared to the taste for the kinds of 
work available for pay. 
Finally, to assert that housewives may get greater enjoyment from "doing for others" 
than working women is not to imply that dual-earner marriages lack love or caring. 
Rather, the difference may lie in the choices of how, and to what degree, to "put love 
to work" in direct service to others. Many husbands who do not do any housework 
surely consider themselves "loving." The ways in which they choose to exercise their 
caring tendencies-if at all-will be affected by other tastes and preferences, as these 
play out under bargaining constraints and in the face of more or less material scarcity. 
See infra note 133. 
128 Marriage may induce spouses-especially men-to work harder and earn more. 
That increment in earnings will count as part of the surplus. See Linda J. Waite, 
Does Marriage Matter?, Presidential Address to the Population Association of 
America 6 (Apr. 8, 1995) (transcript on file with the Virginia Law Review Associa-
tion) (discussing the increased earnings of married men); Jane Waldfogel, Under-
standing the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Children, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 
1998, at 137, 143 (describing as "well-established" the fact that married men earn 
more than single men); Waite, supra note 40, at 28-30 (noting, in addition to other 
benefits, the higher household wealth among most married individuals, compared to 
unmarried ones). 
129 Because the housewife spends more time overall on housework, she may be able 
to generate gains from specialization for each additional hour of work and provide a 
higher quality product for a given amount of effort. For dual-earner spouses who 
must perform domestic tasks in off-work hours, the specialization function is far 
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first and last hours of effort go into providing household services. 
Domestic services provided by wage earners require greate r effort, 
and cost more, because that effort is added to many hours of paid 
effort. 110 Moreover, the housewife 's first and last hours of effort go 
into direct service to others, and they bring her vicarious pleasure. 
Even if the working wife enjoys doing for others as much as the 
housewife, fewer of her total working hours are spent in hands-on 
carinbo or nurturinbo activities. Conseouentlv, she g: ets less of the ex-
~ .L ..1 .......... 
t ra vicarious satisfaction from her effor ts (al though t his effect may 
' ~ 
be mitigated somewhat by the housewife 's diminishing returns in 
vicarious satisfaction with each hour of work) . F inally, the pace 
and pressure of domestic work are greater for \vage earners, who 
may attempt to complete each task in a shorter :period of time. 
T he fr antic \Vorking wife's preoaration of dinner, squeezed into 
~ > ' 
half an hour, may come at greater cost (and produce a less tasty 
meal) than the housewife's two hours spent in unhurried prepara-
tion. In sum, a housewife/breadwinner arrangement, other factors 
being equal , may produce a larger marital pie than a comparable 
dual-earner arrangement by wringing larger positive utility gains 
from the sum total of activities (wage plus non-wage production) 
that all households must conduct. 13 1 
shallower, and the quality of the prod uct is probably reduced. This is anothe r way of 
say ing, as Gary Becker has asserted , that housewives are more efficient producers of 
domes tic services than members of working couples. See Becker, Trea tise, su pra 
note 36, at 21-32. 
This docs not exclude the possibility, as a lready discussed, see supra note 64, that 
the most effi cient arrangement for some couples--especi ally the high earne rs-is to 
hire household help. One of the criticisms of Gary Becker's economics of th e ho use-
ho ld is tha t he takes too little acco unt of the ga ins from specializati o n by women 
through the hiring of paid help and contracting o ut of services. See Be rgmann , supra 
note 7, at 260 (d iscussing the "cash-paying" solution); Margaret F . Brinig, Comment 
o n Jan a Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 Geo. L.J. 2461, 2471 (1994) (noting that 
Becker and o thers " assume it is not 'efficie nt' to hire someone e lse to do the wash or 
clean the house") . 
D>j The more that responsibility is exclusive ly placed o n one member of the co uple, 
the steeper the increase in costs for an eq ual amount of work. See infra note 188 
(discussing diminishing returns on work and leisure as each person moves towards 
relative monopoly on each). 
"' The main objection to this conclusion would ste m from the observation that the 
dua l-earner wife's efforts in the market also contr ibute to th e we ll-bei ng of others: 
She earns money that can be invested in public goods or other items for fam il y mem-
bers . But that is just a direct measure of the production value of her work . Work ing 
to provide goods for the enj oyment of o nesel f and others , and gett ing vicarious 
pleasure from others ' e njoyme nt of those goods (or serv ices provided in lieu of them) 
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If traditional role-divided couples do indeed come out somewhat 
ahead, as speculated, in generating utility from comparable effort, 
Gary Becker's "altruistic head of household" model 132 is turned on 
its head. To the extent there may be greater gains to traditional 
households, it is the altruism of the household caretaker-usually a 
woman-that makes those marginal gains possible. 133 That larger 
pie will tend to offset the inequaiity-producing influence of the dis-
parity between incomes. It does not follow, however, that the cause 
of egalitarian marriage would be advanced by moving women back 
into the home since the equalizing effect is only partly dependent 
on the mechanics of division of labor. It is also a function of the 
idiosvncratic oreferences and tastes of those who feel comfortable . ' 
are conceptually distinct. The latter can be added to the former, but need not be. 
Still, a working wife may take "extra" vicarious pride in providing materially for her 
family, in a way that may at least partly offset the loss of vicarious pleasure in forgone 
nurturing work. 
'"See supra note 36 (discussing Becker's model). 
";This discussion does not entail the conclusion, nor does it require the assump-
tion, that women generally are more altruistic than men, or that housewives are more 
altruistic than working women. (It also does not rule out, however, that both propo-
sitions might be true.) See infra Section IV.B.l (discussing lessons of bargaining the-
ory). It is necessary to distinguish here between altruism as a general trait (which is 
the tendency or capacity to enjoy contributing to others' well-being) and the specific 
ways in which altruism is actually brought to bear. The gender role conventions sur-
rounding the conduct of marital relations; women's possibly average greater taste for 
domestic activities and hands-on, unmediated caretaking; and the power balance cre-
ated by the bargaining relationship may ail combine to push women of altruistic bent 
to express their altruism through direct service to family members-what is com-
monly referred to as "nurturing." The point is that nurturing is not the same as al-
truism. Rather, nurturing is one form that altruism can take. 
Performing domestic services and being responsible for caring for others within the 
family is still costly for the caretaker, man or woman. It thus generates some nega-
tive utility. The person with more power in the family (generally the husband) will 
thus do less caretaking, even if that person is more altruistic than the average person 
an d even if more altruistic than his or her spouse. Second, altruistic persons may 
choose very different avenues for expressing their concern for others, depending on 
interests and tastes that have nothing to do with altruism as such. (Ralph Nader 
could be said to be altruistic, but he might not make a very good housewife.) Ex-
pressing altruism through domesticity may carry different appeal for the average man 
and woman, and thus the private domestic realm may in fact provide fewer opportu-
nities to men than to women to act on their altruism in preferred ways. 
Finally, there are strong social conventions that make domestic activity generally 
more costly to men than women. See infra Section IV.A.l. The existence of these 
factors explains why the fact that family caretakers are usually women is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the proposition that men and women are equaliy altruistic. 
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in traditional female roles. Increasing the number of housewives 
who hate domesticity will not generally make marriage more equal. 
The foregoing discussion reveals a broader point: The more love , 
the more the possibility for equality. When spouses care about 
each other, there is more overlap in their utility functions. One 
spouse's satisfaction automatically increases the other's happiness, 
at least to some extent. Where there is little altru ism and little sat-
isfaction in the other person's happiness, the spouses move closer 
to a zero-sum game in which one person 's gain is the other's loss. 
The most effici ent marriages may be those in which there is not 
just caring, but active caring. In such relationships, there is an even 
more pronounced divergence from strict linearity in the tradeoff of 
utilities because one or both spouses find happiness engaging in ac-
tivities that directly increase the well-being of th e other. This in-
creases the effective size of the marital surplus. And the greater 
the surplus, the greater the room for equality as compared to are-
lationship marked by a more linear zero-sum tradeoff. Active 
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Two other factors merit further discussion, as they affect the 
possibility for an equal split of resources between the parties. The 
first is monetary income. As has already been suggested, the greater 
the income, the greater the quantity of marital resources available 
for division between the parties. 134 More income buys more goods, 
1'"' See supra Section lll.B. 
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both public and private, which add to ut ility :for both parties. But 
apart from the effects em the size of the pie, greater wealth also in-
creases the practical potential for side-payments: Because not all 
assets are tied up in shared public goods, some of the surplus gen-
erated by one spouse's extra efforts can be kicked back in mone-
tary form for that spouse's discretionary use. 135 Because having t\vo 
earners tends to make couples financially better off, the income 
factor will tend to foster equality among dual-earner couples 
(especially the more affluent ), thus offse tting sornewhat the sur-
plus-enhancing effects of role division. "6 
The final point to be gleaned frorn the bargaining paradigm is 
the importance of the cost of outside alternatives re lative to the 
cost of the current marriage f:::> r the spouse with the best al terna-
tives, -which is assumed to be the husband. If remarriage is an im-
portant alternative, this suggests that the prospects for egalitarian 
marriage are minimized if the marriage market is dominated by 
women who demand few marriage-specific investments from 
men-as when, for example, men are generally expected to take on 
a small share of domestic responsibility and can devote themselves 
to paid work and leisure. 137 If most women demand little marriage-
specific investment-whether from adherence to convention, poor 
bargaining power, or just plain personal preference-then it be-
comes more difficult for a few women to hold out for a lot more 
from men without pushing these men closer to their threat point or 
beyond and past their reservation price . This suggests that each 
woman's marital bargain can never be entirely independent of the 
marriage that other women are wiiling to make. VVives must bar-
gain in the shadow of the market in a double sense-not just with 
the knowledge of the availability of potential rivals for their hus-
135 See supra note 42 (discussing side-payments). 
1)& The foregoing discussion should not suggest that having both spouses work for 
pay could never be the more efficien t arrangement overall. See Becker , supra note 
34, at 151 (acknowledging that both spouses working for pay may be an optimal ar-
ra ngement as "families [become] smaller, divorce more common , and earning oppor-
tunities for women improve[)"); see also Brinig, supra note 129, at 2469-73 (crea ting a 
model to demonstrate how a dual-ea rner arrangement could be the most efficient for 
some couples). 
137 Under the re lationship described by the equation supra note 124, the chance fo r 
an egalita rian split decreases when CA(H) (a term that includes the husband 's alter-
native marriage-specific in put) becomes smali absolutely and 3mall rela tive to C(H) 
(which includes a componen t of the husband 's current marriage-specific input). 
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bands' affections, but also of the availability of riv:C~ls vvilling to 
offer a more favorable deal. i
13 
C. The Influence of the Bargaining ProceS,\' 
Up to this point, the discussion has foc used on whether and 
v;hen egalitarian marriage is possible. We can predict that some 
rational, self-interested individuals v1ill contract marriages that are 
unequal-those relationships ;,vill never be egalita.ricm (NE). But 
what of the remaining unions? Bargaining theory teaches that just 
because an egalitarian split is possible does not mean it 'Hill occur. 
The discussion in this Section is concerned with the likelihood that 
equality will be realized and with the conditions ftlat '.vill tend to 
foster or impede it. 
If we take as given each party's reservation price and thus the 
negotiation set (that is, the possible set of bargains that are consis-
tent with rational self-interest), what determines which bargain 
within that range will be struck? Game theorists have attempted to 
identify the factors that influence the actual allocation of shares in 
situations that require "splitting a pie." In predicting the outcome 
of real-life bargaining, idealized games can only take one so far. 
There is a large experimental literature suggesting that bargainers 
often deviate from the behaviors predicted from models based on 
perfect rationality and complete information. Social scientists have 
used empirical data to add richness to their models in an attempt to 
predict what real people will do. 139 Because there are so many psy-
chological variables, analysis of the bargaining process has re-
mained speculative and inexact. 
The earliest models of how utilities ·would be divided within a 
feasible negotiation set were static and highly theoretical: They did 
not attempt to play out an actual bargaining sequence of alternat-
m See infra Sections V.C-D, V.E.2 (discussing the relationship between marital 
bargaining and "deals" available on the marriage market). 
139 See, e.g., Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in 
Negotiation (1991); Raiffa, supra note 73, at 44-65; Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 227-
43 (summarizing attempts to model real-life, dynamic bargaining process); Martin 
Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences 395-98 (1982); Colin F. Camerer, Prog-
ress in Behavioral Game Theory, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1997, at 166; Alvin E. Roth, 
Bargaining Experiments, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics 253 (John H. 
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (summarizing research on bargainers' behavior in 
various simulated bargaining games). 
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ing offers and counteroffers, but rather sought solutions that satis-
fied certain simple conditions and were stable in that no player 
would have a rational incentive to deviate from his choices. The 
most famous of these is the Nash bargaining solution. Under that 
scenario, two players called upon to split a pie will divide the bar-
gaining surplus-as delimited by each bargainer's threat point or 
reservation price-down the middle, so that each has an equal share. 140 
The equal-split-of-bargaining-surplus solution, although a theo-
retical construct not meant as a "predictive exercise," 141 has enor-
mous intuitive and normative appeai as a "solution" to a vast 
range of bargaining problems. It is al so useful for unders tanding 
th e concept of bargaining power, and the factors th at influence it . 
Bargaining power is reflected in one party's ability to procure a 
particular share of the bargained-for resources. Bargaining power 
is in part a function of threat advantage-which determines the 
feasible negotiation set-but it is also a function of a party's ability 
to maneuver the other into accepting a proposed position within 
the negotiation set. While there is no a priori reason to believe 
that real-life bargaining will result in parties' adopting the Nash 
solution-an equal split of the bargaining surplus-that solution 
can be used as the starting point for gauging the influence of fac-
tors that might give parties an advantage in real-world bargain-
ing.142 It is not implausible to assume that an equal split of the bar-
1" '' See supra note 122 (outlining a Nash solution for the IBM/S game); Baird, Gert-
ner & Picker, supra note 48, at 21-23; Rasmusen, supra note 65 , at 229 ("Nash 's ob-
jective was to pick ax ioms that would characterize the agree ment th e two players 
would anticipate making with each other. "); Shubik , supra note 139, at 200, 240 
(defining a Nash equilibrium point for noncoopera tive games a nd compa ring a Nash 
solution to those of two alternative models). The idealized Nas h barga ining so luti on 
was o riginally proposed for the so-call ed cooperative bargaining ga me. A coopera-
tive game, as already noted, see supra note 106, is one in which th e parties can make 
e nforceable and binding agreements as to payoffs (or in which a payoff divi sion is 
imposed by fiat " from above"), as opposed to a noncoopera tive bargaining game in 
which any agreement is not binding in the se nse that there is no externa ll y imposed 
penalty for defecting from it. Many of the principles discussed here in, however, ap-
ply also to noncooperative bargains-those enforced solely through se lf-he lp. 
1
"
1 Sen, supra note 32, at 133 n.14. 
1
"' Alan Wertheimer describes the Nash solution as one to which rational actors 
would consent in a bargaining problem that is " fu lly described by a set of possib le 
outcomes in terms of the agent's utiliti es and by a 'threat point' or no transaction al-
ternative. " Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 218-19 n.24. He expla ins that "[ t)he ra-
tional bargaining view of fair tra nsactions is not a pure procedural vi ew .... To the 
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gaining surplus should result if the parties possess perfect informa-
tion and if all the factors that might affect the conduct of the bar-
gaining are in balance as between them. In this sanitized setup, the 
allocation of the cooperative surplus will be a straightforward re-
flection of the "relative strength of the parties' threat advan-
tages. " 1 ~ 3 Put another way, starting from a theoretical position of 
an equal division of a bargaining surplus in a typical split-the-pie 
game, the ability of one party to persuade the other to deviate from 
that position is likely to reflect some bargaining advantage other 
than that conferred simply by the lower limit on what each bar-
gainer will rationally accept. 
In the PE case, the egalitarian split li es within the feasible nego-
tiation set. As the IBM/S example illustrates, an equal split of the 
bargaining surplus will not precisely coincide with an egalitarian 
division of overall payoffs if the parties' threat points differ at all. 
The Nash solution will favor the person with the better outside al-
ternatives. See Figure 4. 
contrary. It attempts to identify the terms on which fully rationa l parties would 
agree." Id . at 218-19 n.24. The conception, however, has a proced ural analogue: It 
can be used to describe a bargain that would be struck if th e influence of factors that 
might confer procedural advantages-including strategic or psychological advantages that 
affect the nego tiating process-are either absent or are evenly match ed on both sides. 
The Nash bargaining solution does not re prese nt the only attempt to provid e a de-
terminate answer to the bargaining "division proble m" for rational actors. See Jules 
L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 37 (1992) (distinguishing the division problem from 
the compliance problem in constructing schemes for rationa l cooperation). For ex-
ample, David Gauthier maintains that rational bargainers should , or would, abide by 
the principle of "minimax relative concess ion, " which seeks to minimize the differ-
ence in utility as between the bargain ers relative to each person's best bargain. 
Gauthier, supra note 46, at 137; see also Werthei mer, note 32, at 219 (describing 
Gauthier's theory). Whether thi s theory is predictive or normative, however, is not 
entirely cl ea r. The Nash solution can be viewed as predictive only in the most ideal 
sense. It predicts the bargain th a t would result if a ll factors that affec t bargaining be-
havior and bargaining strength (except threa t point) are taken out of the equation or 
are se t equal on both sides . In effect, it tells us what would happe n if a person bar-
gained with his Doppelgiinger. 
1') Coleman, supra note 142, at 273. 
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d =Nas h solution 
e = ega litarian split 
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Thus, if the parties have different threat points but otherwise do 
not differ on traits and elements that confer actual bargaining ad-
vantage, they still will not have an egalitarian marriage. T he out-
come of their bargaining process will be point d (equal division of 
bargaining surplus utility), rather than point e (equal percentage 
net utility). The greater the divergence in their threat points, the 
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more the actual bargain struck will devi ate from the egalitarian 
idea1. 1.w 
These observations suggest that even if men and women bar-
gained the same way wi thin a potentially egalitarian relationship, 
the benefits of marriage would on average go disproportionately to 
men. This effect would be due solely to factors that enhance men's 
extramarital and intramarita l threat advantage: most importantiy, 
men's higher extramarital uti lity, better remarri age prospects, and 
longer reproductive life; less importan tly, their greater earning 
power and their somewhat different preference set for providing 
and enjoying domestic and child-oriented "public goods." These 
factors alone explain the lion 's share of men 's bargaining advantage. 
But there is reason to believe that the realities of the negotiating 
process only worsen the imbalance. A num ber of strategic and 
psychological factors have the potential to affect negotiating skills 
or to confer bargaining advantage. It has been suggested that 
women and men are not equally effective negotiators because they 
may differ systematically in various ways that determine the ability 
to strike a favorable bargain within the parameters that fix the 
negotiation set. These include "toughness, patience, perceptive-
ness,"145 risk averseness,146 tolerance for conflict , aggressiveness, 
"taste for cooperation," 147 the differential concerns raised by the 
'"' As Figure 3 illustrates (convex frontier), the less complete the tradeoff in the 
party's we ll-be ing (i.e ., th e more "caring"), the closer the Nash solu tion will be to the 
egalitar ian ideal. This illustra tes the principle th at love tends to promote equality. 
'"5 See Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 64. 
'""T here is a striking paucity of research supporting the freque ntly encountered as-
sertion that men and women differ in their preferences for ri sk. A mong the behav-
ioral ev idence that is common ly cited is male predominance in the incidence of criminal 
behavior, a uto accidents, accid e nta l death, and substance abuse. See, e.g., Bureau of 
Justice Statist ics , U .S. Dep' t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 
1996, a t 380 tbl.4 .8 (Kath leen Maguire & Ann L Pastore eds., 1997) (presenting sex 
ratio of arrests for criminal offenses); National Highway Traffic Safe ty Admin. , U.S. 
Dep' t of Transp., Traffic Safety Facts, 1994, at 95 fig.23 (1995) (presenting data on 
sex ratio of in vo lvemen t in motor vehicle accidents). 
'"7 Commentators have a ttempted to capture women's purportedly inferior nego ti-
a ting ability in various ways, only some of which go more narrowly to negotiating 
ab ility as characterized here in. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 55; see also England, supra 
note 5, at 25 (asserting that women more often operate on a "con nective model" that 
"ta kes both one 's own and a con nected other's utility as roughly of equa l importance, 
regard less of who is in a stronge r bargaining position, " whereas men more often 
"see[) self-interested behavior as natural, and take[} advantage of being in a ' power-
ove r' bargai ning position when it occurs" ); England & Kilbo urn e , supra note 5, a t 
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presence of "hostages" (such as children), 1 ~8 the availability and 
willingness to use credible commitment strategies or first-mover 
advantages, 149 the sense of entitlement and notion of fairness ,15(1 and 
the time-dependent costs of disagreement. 151 
These factors are quite diverse and have disparate roles in the 
bargaining process. Moreover, there are a number of possible ways 
to conceotualize these elements and their effects on the conduct of 
bargaini~g and its outcome. 152 This is not the place for a compre-
hensive analysis of all factors that could possibly affect the conduct 
or oargaming. For the purposes of this Article, the best way to 
analyze the problem of weakness in the negotiating process is to 
focus on some of the general elements that might affect the psy-
chology of bargaining over the allocation of resources within the 
bargaining set. The psychology of marital bargaining is critically 
affected by three closely related phenomena that determine how 
hard each partner will press his or her bargain: (1) the relative po-
tency of defection threats, (2) the sense of entitlement, and (3) the 
endowment effect. In one way or another, these factors reflect 
how marital bargaining takes place in the shadow of the market. 
Each brings to bear the influence of extramarital market conditions 
and values upon the conduct of negotiations within the private, off-
market rel ationship of marriage. 
171-78 (discussing men 's and women's possib le difference in perception and use of 
power); Mahony, supra note 16, at 34 (arguing that the widely held perception that 
women have a stronger desire for cooperation puts women at a bargaining disadvan-
tage); Rose, supra no te 55, at 423 (discussing how perceptions of women's taste for 
cooperation may help put the m at a disadva ntage in acquiring property). 
1
"" See England & Kilbourne, supra note 5, at 172-73; Mnookin & Kornhauser, su-
pra note 89, at 966-68; Rose, supra note 55, at 445. 
1
"
9 See Mahony, supra note 16, at 48-51 (noting that the marital partner with the 
higher status or the more demanding job can more pr::rsuas ively assert the difficulty 
of taking on domestic responsibilities); see also Baird, Gertner & Pickner, supra note 
48, at 43 (discussing first mover advantage in dynamic models of barga ining games); 
Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 35 (same). 
15" See infra no te 164 and accompanying text. 
151 Another important factor that can influence bargaining is access to information 
about payoffs and prefe rences. For discussion of the importance of informa tion in 
the conduct of bargaining, see Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Informa-
tion, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining, in Psychological Perspectives on Justice: 
Theory and Applications 155 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds. , 1993) . 
152 For exampl e, some may be viewed not as going precisely to bargaining "strategy," 
but rather as affecting the utility value of the outcome of the bargai n itse lf. See supra 
note 147; infra Section IY.B .2 . 
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T he first factor-the relative potency of defection threats-
depends on the parties ' respective alternatives to an agreement. In 
addition to fixing the parties' reservation prices, the alternatives 
also have a distinct effect on the psychology of bargaining: T he 
party with the best alternatives has the more credible thre at of 
wal king away if the other party fails to cooperate. That is true 
even if both parties stand to gain from the proposed agreement , 
and thus would not ra tionally abandon it. 153 The resu lt of this stra-
tegic advan tage is that the party with the less desirable outside op-
tions wil l often be more reluctant to drive a hard bargain or more 
willing to make concessions, for fear th at the other party will call 
the deal ofC54 If a wife has more to lose from marital discord or 
" 3 As lo ng as both parties stand to ga in by agreeing rather than fa ilin g to agree on a 
bargain, a ra ti o nal actor 's threat of defection or no ncooperati o n is not strictly cred i-
ble, even if th a t party has comparatively less to lose . See Gauthi er, supra note 46, a t 
185; Sen , supra note 32 , a t 135 & n.21 (no ting that " the re a re some very basic d iffi cul-
ties with any theory of threats, since it has to deal with situa tions after the bargaining 
has fail ed" when "the threa tener has no obvious interest in carrying o ut the threa t"). 
Neverthe less , different threat points can be expected to influ ence the conduct and 
outcome of actual barga ining because the danger of failure to reach a n agreeme nt is 
no t illusory in real life . As Alan Wertheimer points out, " there is no reaso n to as-
sume th at just because bo th parties will gain from any di vision of the social surplus, 
they will find th e ir way to such an agreement, just as there is no reaso n to assume 
that beca use both parties will gain from the coopera tive solution to the prisoner 's el i-
lemma , th ey will both cooperate." Werth eimer, supra note 32, at 237. One reason a 
positive-sum deal may not go through is that refusa l to coope ra te can be part of a 
larger successful strategy; ca rrying o ut ho ldout threats he lps parties e nha nce th e ir 
credibility a nd discourages the other party 's taking advantage in ite rative barga ining 
situations. Thus a strategy that is a short-te rm loser may be a long-term winner. See 
Coleman, supra note 142, at 273; Robert H. Frank, Pass ions Within Reason: T he 
Strategic Role of the Emotions, in 2 Applied Behavioural Econo mics 769, 774 
(S hlomo Maital e d., 1988). But regardless of whether it confers tactica l advantage , 
" breakdown" is always possible betwee n rea l peo pl e, who are not a lways strictl y ra-
tional. Thus, the " breakdown positio n" can be expected to influe nce the conduct of 
bargaining. See Sen, supra note 32, at 135 ("The breakdown position indicates the 
person [sic] vulnerability or strength ... . If, in the case of a breakd o wn , one person is 
go ing to end up in more of a mess . .. , th a t is going to weaken that person's ability to 
secure a favorable outcome." ); see also He nry Sidgwick, The Me thods o f Ethics 288 
(7th ed. 1962) (" [I]n barga ining the less willing has the ad va ntage .'' ). 
'" This ana lys is appli es where the relevant " threa t point" is intra ma rital no ncoop-
eration as well as aband onment of the marriage. As a lready noted, see supra Sec-
tions II.D.3 .b-c, men's intra marital threa t point tends to be higher th an women's. In 
cases where the husband 's intramarital threat utility exceeds hi s extramarita l threat 
adva ntage , the intramarita l threat adva ntage will be especially high. In such cases, 
however, we can expect that the man's divorce threat advantage wi ll more closely 
shadow his intramarital threat utility . That is , the distance be tween the ave rage 
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upon another important sense in which bargaining takes place in 
the market's shadow: Parties may import market values into the 
bargaining process by allowing external criteria to influence the 
perception of appropriate bargaining concessions and demands. 
The market influences how parties value contributions that are of 
different types and thus are difficult to compare, if only because 
the market provides a ready measure of value. vVhat does not 
come from the competitive market will appear less valuable than a 
contribution that is market-priced. Thus, the person whose contri-
bution is in-kind and off-market-that is, the person whose contri-
butions come largely in the form of direct and marriage-specific 
services to the family circle-will be deemed to contribute less than 
the person whose contribution comes largely in the form of money 
h "bl 160 or ot er tang1 e assets. 
'
60 A number of commentators have attributed the devaluation of women's contri-
butions to the family economy to the tendency to discount "off-market" or 
"unpriced" contributions and to exaggerate the worth attached to contributions in 
the marketplace. Barbara Bergmann has described the importation of "a market 
idea of fairness into family life," whereby a family member with higher earnings will 
"buy himself out of spending certain hours doing housework," regardless of other 
measures of contribution or value. Bergmann, supra note 7, at 271. Amartya Sen 
calls the strong tendency to discount the value of nonmarket internal contributions in 
favor of more easily measurable (and externally priced) contributions from the mar-
ketplace the "perceived contribution response." Sen, supra note 32, at 137. He adds 
that 
[t]he nature of "perceived contribution" to family opulence has to be distin-
guished from the amount of time expended in working inside and outside the 
home. Indeed, in terms of "time allocation studies," women often seem to do 
astonishingly large amounts of work even when the so-called "economic" con-
tribution is perceived to be relatively modest. The perception bias tends to re-
late to the size of the direct money earning rather than to the amount of time 
and effort expended .... 
I d. at 139-40 (citations omitted). Sen describes how notions of "exchange entitle-
ment," which are pegged to market value, produce the result that women are unable 
"'to see [their] work as a value-producing work."' Id. at 144 (quoting Maria Mies, 
Lacemakers in Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the World Market 173-74 
(1982)). A greater market role can boost bargaining power by giving a woman "(1) a 
better breakdown position, (2) possibly a clearer perception of her individuality and 
well-being, and (3) a higher 'perceived contribution' to the family's economic posi-
tion." Id. Finally, Shirley Burggraf describes the market invisibility of a woman's 
customary contribution to the family, which comes largely in the form of opportunity 
cost and value added to children. That invisibility fuels a pervasive tendency to take 
women's domestic contributions for granted and to discount their value. See 
Burggraf, supra note 81, at 16. 
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Finally, marital negoti ations are heavily influenced by an "en-
dowment effect," which pegs the exchange value of bargainers' of-
fers to a preexisting status quo. 161 In this respect, women are hurt 
by the fact that bargaining rarely takes place on a clean slate. In 
the generic, idealized split-the-pie game, parties come to the table 
without a history of preexisting al locations and without preconcep-
tions about the shares to which they are entitled. Real-life marital 
bargaining deviates from this ideal by taking place in the shadow of 
powerful cultural expectations for men and women in marriage. 
The conventional role divisions in marriage-in which men invest 
more heavily in market labor while women take on more domestic 
responsibility-make the worth of each spouse's contribution de-
pend on a baseline in which the spouses ei ther perceive themselves 
as possessing a presumptive entitlement or as seeking to acquire 
such an entitlement. The bargaining process then proceeds 
through a set of exchanges in which spouses propose concessions or 
demands that may alter the conventional baseline. If men see 
themselves as entitled to certain services, and women see them-
selves as duty-bound to provide them, then any woman who seeks 
to shift responsibility for those services onto her husband must 
purchase that shift through larger concessions than would be neces-
sary from a neutral baseline. Likewise, men will demand greater 
concessions before they will consent to take that responsibility 
upon themselves. 162 Moreover, because individuals are generally 
101 See Cotter, supra note 10, at 2113 ("An endowment effec t is sa id to arise when 
the price I would demand to se ll something already in my possession is greater than 
the price I would be willing to pay to acq uire that same thing if I did not already have 
it. "); see also id. at n.188 (citing sources in the experimental social science literature 
concerning the psychology of endowme nt effects); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Al-
trui sm, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 
1309, 1358-61 (1986) (noting the implications of endowment effect research for the 
economic analyses of law) ; He rbe rt Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment 
Effect, 20 J . Legal Stud. 225 (1991) (suggesting applications of the endowment effect 
to the formulation of law and policy); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179-81 (1997) (discussing behavioral manifestations of " loss 
aversion" as a form of endowment effect); Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and 
the Offer/Asking Price Gap, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 663 (1994) (discussing the implications 
of the endowment effect for entitlemen t allocation policies). 
161 See Sigel, supra note 85, at 190 (commenting that "men expect to receive at home 
but to give at work ... [wh ereas) th e woman also gives at work, [but) she has to give 
at home as well"). Focus groups conducted by Sigel among 650 dual-earner famili es 
provide evidence of a significant endowment effect influencing men 's perception of 
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observed to have different preferences for the risks of gains and 
losses, the endowment effect, like the quality of fallback options, 
can also influence the adamancy with which negotiating partners 
press their case. In experimental situations, "players are more 
willing to risk disagreement when bargaining over possible losses 
than when bargaining over possible gains." 163 Since greater sharing 
of a wife's traditional responsibiiities represents a loss for the hus-
band relative to the baseline, he is likely to resist concessions more 
firmly than his wife (who stands to gain) will insist upon them. 
In practice, these three effects- "threat potency," entitlement, 
and endowment-all result in a wife's efforts counting for less than 
a husband's in any bargaining situation. The person who believes 
he has brought "more" into the relationship will think he deserves 
a better deal and will push for one. Even if contributions are ob-
jectively similar (for example, in representing an equal investment 
of time), the person who is viewed as bringing "less," feeling un-
worthy, will grant larger concessions or refrain from demanding 
more. Thus, a shared perception of the lesser worth of a woman's 
efforts-whether in the labor market or at home-will generally 
lead women to reduce their bargaining demands and men to in-
crease theirs, causing women to lose out in situations that turn on 
hard bargaining. If "a wife's hour is not worth as much as a hus-
band's hour, her dollar is not worth as much as his, her education 
and training count for less, and her attitudes carry less weight when 
spouses are negotiating," 164 it is hardly surprising that women will 
working women 's contributions to the family. In general, men focused on the costs of 
their wives going out to work, and saw the extra income generated by their wives' 
employment as a mixed blessing. Id. at 163-64. This perception depended on men 
comparing their dual-earner existence to a more traditional baseline arrangement. 
The endowment effect created by that baseline allowed husbands to see th eir wives' 
income as earned at considerably greater sacrifice to the family than the ir own and to 
discount the value of that income accordingly. Thus, although husbands viewed their 
wives' earnings "as helping provide for the comfort of the family," id. at 164, and ad-
mitted "enjoy[ing] the higher standard-of-living their wives' employment facilitate[ d]," 
id. , they mentioned many drawbacks. Among these were decreased wifely attention , 
decline in quality of services, loss of the prestige and pride in the exclusive breadwin-
ner role, and (for the more affluent) a loss of simplicity of lifesty le and an increase in 
consumerism from the availability of more disposable income . Id. at 163-65. 
16-' Camerer, supra note 139, at 172; see also Sunstein, supra note 161 , at 1179-81 
(discussing behavioral evidence that an individual's displeasure from losses tends to 
exceed the pleasure from equivalent ga ins). 
J6J Ruth Milkman & Eleanor Townsley, Gender and the Economy, in The Hand-
book of Economic Sociology 600, 614 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 
, 
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come away with less of the bargaining surplus, and that the result-
ing bargains will deviate from the egalitarian ideal. 
If women even partly share in the perception that their contri-
butions are 'North less, this carries important implications for the 
real-life conduct of marital relations. Bargainers' subjective per-
ceptions of fai rness can directly affec t bargaining behavior. 
Women who th ink they have received a fair shake may simply 
cease trying to get more (even if they would be happier with a 
larger share) .1"5 But if willingness to press harder is a component of 
1994) . The effects described might al so help to expl ain repo rts tha t many women, 
including th ose who are objective ly overwo rked rel ative to their husbands, do not 
perceive th eir situa tion as inequitable or unfair. In the words of one researcher, 
many em ployed mo thers express "a surprisingly high level of sat isfaction with an ob-
jectively unfai r situ ation. " David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and 
the Division of Domestic Labor, 42 Fam. Rel. 323 , 328 (1993). There is a voluminous 
literature reporting on field studies in which husbands and wives are asked whether 
they believe marital responsibiliti es are allocated fairly. In many, although not all, 
more than a majority of both me n and women consistently reply that the division is 
fair. But cf. Sigel, supra note 85, at 36, 96-100 (finding that more than 80% of 650 
women in sample focus groups expressed dissatisfaction with household division of 
labor) . Even though women do complain about "overload" and even though women 
who ieceive more help from husbands at home are generally happier, most wives pro-
fess to be satisfied with less than a 50/50 split in responsibility or the balance of work 
and leisure. 
For a comprehensive review of the literature on perceptions of fairness, see Perry-
Jenkins & Folk, supra note 16; see also Biernat & Wortman, supra note 11 
(discussing the results of interviews with 139 married couples regarding their atti-
tudes about home and work life); Sampson Lee Blair & Michael P. Johnson, Wives' 
Perceptions of the Fairness of th e Division of Household Labor: The Intersection of 
Housework and Ideology, 54 J. Marriage & Fam. 570 (1992) (analyzing factors in 
wives ' perceptions of the fairness of the division of household labor); Bryson et al., 
supra note 22 (studying dual-career families); Hochschild, supra note 23 (examining 
the division of household responsibilities between wives and husbands in two-job 
couples); Emily W. Kane & Laura Sanchez, Family Status and Criticism of Gender 
Inequality a t Home and at Work, 72 Soc. Forces 1079, 1095-96 (1994) (discussing 
perceptions of gender in equality at home and at work); Lennon & Rosenfeld, supra 
note 21 (investigating the sources and consequences of employed wives' perceptions 
of fairness in the divisi on of housework); Major, Entitlement, supra note 157 
(attempting to explain the perception of justice despite objective imbalance as stem-
ming from women's sex-based perceptions of lesser dese rvingness and entitlement as 
well as the intrinsic value attached to being male) ; Ste il & Weltman, supra note 11 
(describing the effects of reso urces and personal attributes on the perceived impor-
tance of careers and sharing responsibilities at home). 
165 Alternatively, women 's resignation may represent sour grapes or an adjustment 
of expectations to what women think they can get. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: 
Studies in the Subversion of Rationality 109-40 (1983); Sen, supra note 32, at 126; 
Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 32; see also Hochschild, supra note 23, at 258-62 
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bargaining power, it might be possible for women to increase their 
share simply by being more insistent. This strategy might work 
precisely because where bargainers come to rest within the nego-
tiation set is largely a matter of subjective perceptions of value and 
worth. There is no inexo rable requirement that a particular con-
tribution within a closed bilateral monopolistic system must carry 
any fi xed exchange value within the relat ionship. T here is no rea-
son why income must transl ate into marit al power more readily 
than domestic work , or why "women 's fert ili ty, child rearing, emo-
ti onal work, and housework are somehow less of a contribution 
than men's earnings." '"6 These relative values are a matter of psy-
chology, not economics; bargainers in an off-market relationship 
that generates a bargaining surplus are not price-takers. T here is 
no competitive market , with many buyers and sellers, where aggre-
gate supply and demand curves meet to dictate price. 167 T hus, 
"exchange" values within a bargaining relationship are not the 
product of microeconomic forces generating an objective metric of 
value that is beyond the influence of individual actors. 168 On the 
contrary, the "value" of a particular contribution is a matter of the 
allocation each party can force the other to accept, which in turn is 
determined by volatile processes of negotiation and renegotiation. 
Once the negotiation set and bargaining surplus are fixed (by fac-
tors that do in part reflect the external market value of the parties ' 
holdings and contributions), there is no reason, outside the percep-
tions of the parties, for the party who happens to be male, or whose 
primary contribution is monetary, to have a strategic advantage. 
T he advantage proceeds from the bargainers' choice to honor the 
metrics of a market external to the bargaining process. That choice 
is far from inevitable, because the values bargainers attach to any 
deal are not fixed by any outside force. 
(suggesting that wome n cease to press for change in their do mestic situation princi-
pa lly because they reali ze they lack the power to obta in a be tter ba rgain). 
Inn England & Kilbourne, supra note 5, at 165 . 
167 See Rasmusen , supra note 65 , at 227. 
I6S The market price is generally impervious to individual cho ices or will. That does 
not mean, however, that peopl e must adhere to the marke t price in day-to-day trans-
actions involving market commodities. There is nothing to stop persons from selling 
o r buying something for less or more than its marke t price if they can find a trading 
partner to join them in their fo lly. Finding som eone to go along is the challenge . The 
market at least provides a n o bj ective measure of va luat ion to which those transacting 
business can refer. 
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On the other hand, just because some factors conferring bar-
gaining advantage are "in the head" does not mean that they are 
easy to change. For one thing, there are two piayers to the marital 
bargaining game, and spouses' in terests in adjusting the valuation 
of marital contributions are clearly divergent. Even if a woman 
successfully fights the psychology of her own devaluation and fear 
of loss, she must still negotiate to "get her way ." But that intro-
duces yet another factor that may impede women's bargaining suc-
cess. That women at times seem to obtain obj ectively smaller 
shares can be fully explained by a combination of ent itlement, en-
dowment, and "threat potency" effects. But women 's smaller share 
is often attributed to women's being more deferen tial, accommo-
dating, or conflict-averse. 16·> The latter can aiso be reconstrued as 
reflecting the uti lities attached to the spoils of bargaining when set 
off against the psychic "transaction costs" of obtaining those spoils. 
As Jeffrey H arrison has put it, "one could say that the accommo-
dations of others or the avoidance of conflict is something from 
which [a woman] derives utility. " 170 A worse deal only looks worse 
because personal transaction costs have not been factored in. On 
this view, the problem with the "soft negotiator" is not that she 
does not press hard enough for what she wants. Rather, she just 
d . h 171 oes not want rt enoug . 
The possibility of reinterpreting what can be viewed as tactical 
weakness as simply reflecting the "utility of the bargain" means 
that the status of the factors that are said to affect bargaining strat-
egy is necessarily more ambiguous than those that determine the 
negotiation set. But , as already noted, the "softer " party's person-
ality and strategies are not the only ones at stake. Men's tendency 
to attach little importance to women's efforts is as critical to the 
169 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 10, at 7-9; see also id. at 8 ("[A]n accommodating 
person dealing with a non-accommodating person will likely receive a smaller share 
of the ga in from the exchange."); see generally Rose, supra note 55 (discussing the 
irnportance of women 's putative conflict-averseness in bargaining over property). 
170 Harrison, supra note 10, at 7. 
17 1 That cannot be the whoie story, of course. A deferential bargainer will, in the 
long run, find herself with fewer objective resources, and she will have less to bargain 
'>-Vith at a fut ure time whe n there is something that she dearly wants and she is willing 
to shed any scruples against " hard bargaining." See, e .g., Rose, supra note 55 
(describing how women fail to accumulate tangible bargaining ch ips in the form of 
property over the course of a long-term relationship). 
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outcome of the process as women's tendency to denigrate their 
own contributions. If a woman's firmer belief in her own deserv-
ingness ·were reflected in greater boldness and higher expectations 
at the bargaining table, she still might not succeed if her husband 
did not share her views. Both parties' expectations are critical to 
the outcome Clf bargaining. Of course, one could argue that this is 
only appropriate: One cannot expect men to give up value for what 
they regard as worth less. D oes this reflect a tactical advantage , or 
is it just a rnatte r of men's being true to their own utility profiles? 
The difficu l of resolving this question makes it hard to know 
whether and hovv mucrt the strategic considerations discussed in this 
section can be said to ini:1uence equity, or deviations from equity. 
There is always the possibility of reframing considerations that 
seem to retlect the psychology of bargaining as simply reflecting 
the value of the underlying bargain itself. 
The foregoing discussion focuses on why women might make 
greater concessions in one-on-one bargaining than they really need 
to. But, there is some evidence of movement in the opposite direc-
tion: that women's sense of fairness or equity is increasingly work-
ing to place limits on the concessions that they are willing to make, 
even to the point of leading to the rejection of some bargains that 
otherwise appear better than no bargain at all. There is, for exam-
ple, evidence from behavioral game theory that parties will some-
times "irrationally" reject positive-sum bargains if they believe 
they are being taken advantage of. 172 In noniterative situations 
(like marriage) where the strategic advantages of establishing a 
reputation as a "hard bargainer" by rejecting a favorable deal are 
not apparent ,173 the decision to divorce a spouse who insists upon 
lopsided bargains can be explained as reflecting an independent 
"taste for equity," which factors revulsion against unfairness into 
m See Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 229; Roth , supra note 139, at 266-74 (attempting 
to explain the rejection of profitable offers in some "ultimatum game[ s ]" as mani-
festing a prefe rence as to "relative share[s)'' or "fairness," or as advancing strategic 
retaliatory or credibility-enhancing goals); see also supra note 153. 
173 Marriage is still most commonly entered into only once or twice in a lifetime, and 
a reputation for having called a previous spouse's bluff may well make it somewhat 
harder to find a nevv " trading partner." Although discarding a spouse as a strategic 
move probably has fe w tactical advantages, driving a hard bargain within the context 
of a particular marriage might. 
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the utility function. 17 4 Re gardless of whether the rebellion against 
bargains perceived as lopsided is seen as a tact ical choice or as a 
shift in the perception of costs and benefits, it may he lp account for 
the observation that most divorces are initiated by women, even 
though marital breakup leaves most women objectively \NOrse off 
(and worse off than thei r husbands).i75 
D. Hard Bargaining and Dual-Earner Couples 
If we accept that some of the factors discussed in the foregoing 
Section may operat.e to ca use marital deals to deviate frorn equity 
in favor of men (rather than to change the way we calculate eq -
uity) , the payoffs of the actual bargains struck vvould diverge from 
the egalitarian ideal to the vvife's detriment even more than those 
struck from bargaining equipoise.176 T here may be additional coun-
tervailing forces, however, that act selectively to moderate these 
sources of women's putative bargaining disadvantage. By some-
aithough not necessarily all-external measures of \vell-being, tra-
ditional role-divided marriages are more egalitarian than dual-
worker marriages: Specifically, conventional housewives' hours of 
174 See Harrison, supra note 10, at 5-9 (discussing ways to conceptualize , or incorpo-
rate into utility calculus, the observed " irrationality" of be hav ior in experime ntal ul-
timatum games); id. at 9 (suggesting that , as a matter of sim ple economics, " as soon 
as a potential contracting party develop[s] a sense of compe nsatory justice tha t pre-
ve nts the making of the bargain, the bargain is not one that would have enhanced the 
position of both parties in the first place") . But see Werth e imer, supra note 32, at 
239 n.75 (questioning whether the preference for fair deals is best analyzed as a 
"psychic utility gain[]" from fairn ess). 
175 See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Vio-
lence, and Other Bad Arguments fo r Fault Divorce, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 719,731 n.44 
(sta tin g that it is often difficult to determine whether wives or husbands are instigat-
ing a divorce, but noting polls that reveal that "between the ea rl y 1970s and the !a te 
1980s, a majority of divorced persons shifted from re porting that their divorce was 
the husband 's idea to reporting that it was the wife's "); see also Paul DeWitt, Break-
ing Up is Hard to Do, Am. Demographics, Oct. 1992, at 53, 56. Data from the first 
half of the century indicate that the tendency of wives to initiate most divorces is not 
a recent trend . From the 1920s to 1950, women sought almost three-quarters of all 
divorces and annulments nationwide . See J. Herbie Difonzo, A lte rnatives to Marital 
Faul t: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change , 34 Idaho. L. Rev. 1, 6 
(1997) (citing Pau l H. Jacobson, American Marriage and Divorce 121 tb l.58 (1959)). 
For furth er discussion of how the bargaining paradigm helps explain patterns of ini-
tiation of divorce, see infra Section IY.C. 
176 This divergence is represented in Figure 4 by point f. Supra p. 578. 
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work more closely match their husbands', whereas employed 
women generally work significantly longer hours than their hus-
bands overall. 177 As already discussed, the traditional wife's sources 
of bargaining weakness (large marriage-specific investment and 
market opportunity cost leading to reduced outside earning poten-
tial) might be partly offset by the utility-enhancing effects of the 
housewife 's specialized efforts and preferences. 178 If housewives do 
get more of what they want, however, the one important reason 
may be the strong conventions that dictate that, in carrying most of 
the dom estic load without contributing earned income, a 'Homan 
has done all that is expected of her-that is, she has done her fair 
share. Although breadwinner husbands may theoretically be in the 
position to extract more from the marriage-by demanding an 
even higher level of services, or effectively monopolizing all the 
discretionary income, or dictating all major family decisions-
social taboos may prevent the more powerful person in a tradi-
tional marriage from really pressing the bargain to unseemly limits. 
Thus, the actual bargain in many traditional marriages may be 
skewed even closer to the egalitarian point than even a bargaining 
surplus split would allow. 179 That equality would not reflect real 
equality of bargaining power, but rather a form of grace or gift con-
ferred in the shadow of social expectations regarding the proper 
balance within the family. Nonworking wives can thus achieve an 
actual though uneasy equality of well-being within an ongoing mar-
riage. Nevertheless, they do not hold power equal to their hus-
bands'. Their equality is provisional, in the sense that it depends 
both upon men's forbearance and upon forestalling divorce. 
In dual-earner couples, in contrast, social conventions governing 
the division of labor will tend to accentuate rather than mitigate 
inequality. V/hen a woman brings in some portion of the family in-
come, however large, there is no perception that she has done ali 
that is expected. Quite the contrary. In this situation, there are 
fewer normative checks on a husband's full use of his bargaining 
power to negotiate for a more favorable deal and powerful incen-
tives for him to do so. The result will be, at the very least, a failure 
177 See Pleck, supra note 15, at 62-63; Szinovacz, supra note 15, at 175; see also supra 
Section I.B (discussing the work-leisure gap among dual-worker couples). 
17
' See discussion supra Section III.B. 
179 See point gin Figure 4, supra p. 578. 
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to mitigate the deviation from equality that would othervvise result 
from the host of other factors creating imbalance. The foregoing 
analysis he lps explain why women's economic gains in the work-
place have not transl ated into gains at home. 180 Although market 
earnings increase bargaining power, other factors supervene to un-
dermine parity in dual earner families. This suggests that the fu-
ture of egalitarian marriage is not bright and grows dimmer as mar-
ried women engage in more and more paid work to generate 
needed income for the family. 181 
IV. INEQUALIT Y OF BARGAINING POWER: THEORY AND R EALITY 
A. Equality in Practice? 
The marital bargaining paradigm and the working definition of 
egalitarian marriage used in this analysis beg many questions. 
These questions are both theoretical and practical. The theoretical 
objections center on issues of baselines (the starting point for 
measuring equality in the working definition of egalitarian mar-
riage), metrics (the currency in which equality is measured), and 
the choice and treatment of variables such as preferences, norms, 
1sv This conclusion is buttressed by data collected by the economist Victor Fuchs 
which suggest that the bargains married women have struck with their husbands have 
generally become less favorable in recent years. Using data from a number of sources, 
Fuchs found that in 1960 men on average worked longer hours than women 
(including hours of wage and non-wage domestic work). Fuchs, supra note 7, at 78 
tbl.5.1. By 1986, that trend had reversed, and women worked more hours. Id. Fuchs 
also calculated an index of effective income per hour of work (paid and unpaid) for 
all men and women, and for married men and women, using an assumption of equal 
sharing of marital income. He found that the ratio of married women's to men's ef-
fective income per hour of work declined steadily from 1960 to 1986, dropping more 
than 10% in that interval. Id. at 82. The 1986 ratio was still slightly greater than par-
ity, however, which may represent the influence of the traditional couples in the mix. 
(Unfortunately, Fuchs lumped together dual-earner and sole breadwinner couples, 
thus limiting the usefulness of his data for this Article's purposes.) Fuchs attributed 
the decline in the sex ratio of effective income to "the increased burden of work on 
women who took paid jobs but still had substantial responsibilities at home." Id. at 
82. Although the ratio is not a complete gauge of well-being by any means, it does 
provide one good measure of women's economic status relative to men's, which re-
flects women's effective access to the pool of marital income. That access may serve 
as one indicator of women's relative bargaining power. 
181 See supra note 7 (discussing the importance of women's earnings to maintain 
their families' standard of living over time). 
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and social conditions that are taken as exogenous in setting up the 
bargaining model and in defining egalitarian marriage. 
Even if the basic elements of this framework are accepted , those 
disinclined to believe that marriage is an engine of sex-based ine-
quality are not without argument. It is one thing to posit a theo-
retical frame>;vork that predicts inequality of bargaining pmver in 
marriage, and another to assert that marriage often produces real-
life inequality in fact. It can be argued that a truly complete ac-
counting of all the costs and benefits of marriage for bo th sexes \vi ll 
produce a version of marriage that is, in practice, much more 
anced. Indeed, alternative stories can be told to suggest that rnar-
ried men are in fact operating quite near their reservation price for 
h l · , · h.l 1s2 Th - , . r t e re at10nsmp, w 1 e women are not. . e purpose ot tms rart 
is to examine some of these possible accounts. 
1. The Drudge "'vVife and the "Efficient" Household 
Consider the example of a household that the social science data 
suggest is fairly common: Husband and wife engage in roughly 
similar hours of paid work and make significant, although not nec-
essarily equal, contributions to family income, but the wife per-
forms most of the domestic labor; she acts as a "drudge wife." 
Each hour of household work is costly to the performer. 183 But the 
work also generates positive utility, in the form of the production 
of services performed. Assume the couple shares in this positive 
utility in various degrees. 184 Suppose that, all else being equal, the 
wife has a modest absolute advantage in domestic productivity. 1s5 
182 See, e.g., S.A. Lloyd, Family Justice and Social Justice, 75 Pac. Phil. Q. 353, 367-
68 ( 1995) (offering three hypothetical marriages in which labor is unequally divided 
between spouses-with the greater burden resting with the wife-and attempting to 
reinterpret these as creating just allocations of burdens and benefits). 
183 That is, it generates "intrinsic negative utility" for the person who performs it. 
This function takes into account the inherent pleasure or consumption value (if any) 
of actually performing the work minus the cost of the effort expended. The sum of 
these two factors is assumed to be negative. 
184 Differences in shares may result from different preferences for public goods 
(such as a clean house) or because some of the tasks are performed for the benefit of 
one person only (such as ironing a husband's shirts). 
185 This may be because she generates more utility when she performs the tasks (she 
does a better job) or because she dislikes performing these tasks less than her hus-
band does (although her performance is still costly for her). 
19981 
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\Vhy does the wife consent to act as a drudge wife? O n the as-
sumptions here, the lopsided division of domestic responsibility is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient for the unit as a whole if we compare it to 
an arrangement in which some of the domestic labor is reallocated 
to t he husband (a so-called "sharing" arrangement). T he drudge-
wife produces a greater q uantity of gains for the spouses to share. 
The problem with that explanation , as ~we have seen , is that it does 
not teli us whether or how those gains are divided. O ur impulse is 
to assert that the wife must be capturing enough of a share of the: 
extra gains to make her effort worthv;hile . T hat is, the arrange-
ment must be Pareto-superior to any alternative division of respon·· 
sibility within the fami ly, despite the extra costs imposed upon the 
wife, or she ·would not consent to it. This could occur in two ways. 
The drudge-wife scenario cou!d be intrinsically Pare to-superior to 
alternatives (such as "sharing") .186 O r it could be m ade Pareto-
1s6 How, despite appearances, might the wife be better off doing a ll the work? T here 
are several possible stories to te ll. T here are two sources of pos itive utility fo r the 
wife : her share of the ben efits of her labor, and the intrinsic consumption value from 
perfo rming it (which can include vicarious pleasure in o thers' consumption of her 
services). On the negative side of the ledge r are the costs of her effort (which factor 
in her degree of distas te for ho usework , which may on average be less than her hus-
band's) a nd the opportunity cost of fo rgone leisure or o the r activities. Leas t plausi-
ble as an explanation fo r why wives do more is the possibili ty tha t a wife enjoys doing 
a ll the house ho ld work so much that he r positi ve consumption va lue o utweighs any 
extra nega tive utility or leisure opportunity costs she incurs. More credibl y, the wife 
might have an absolute prod ucti vity advantage in domes ti c tasks, and her direct share 
of the yield from the larger pie , even without side-payme nts, might e ffectiv e ly com-
pensate her for the extra net cos ts of taking on more work (which, due to differences 
in distaste for housework , mi ght be somewhat less than her husband 's costs under an 
even-sp li t arrangement). In bo th of these scenarios, the wi fe takes on the extra tasks 
" vo luntarily"-that is, because she herse lf comes out a head by doing them. Put a n-
o ther way, if given the cho ice, she wo uld choose these arra nge ments over an oste nsi-
bly more even spl it o f responsibility. 
T he working wife's tak ing on the lion 's sha re of domesti c responsibility might also 
increase househo ld productivity ove rall in a nothe r way: by increasing her husba nd 's 
ea rning power. If the wi fe ga rne rs a great enough share of th at increased earning 
power (which is by no means ass ured, see discuss ion infra Section IV .B.l.a) she may 
come out ahead despite her "extra" effo rt over the base line of an equal split. T he 
sources of increased earning power might include a rejuvenation effect , whereby the 
ex tra leisure men enjoy enables them to work harder a nd perfor m be tter on th e job. 
If the husband earns more than the wife , the enhanceme nt o f family income fro m 
rej uvena ti on might be greater for th e man than the woma n. Simila rl y, the fl exibility 
that freedo m from domestic responsibility affords a man may have a significant im-
pact on earning power by allowing him to be ava ilable to respond to unpredictab le 
work dema nds a nd contingencies. Such flex ib ility may be more va lua ble to the fa m-
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superior by a redistribution of the surplus through side-payments. 
In exchange for the wife's greater contribution of time, the hus-
band might cede to her enough of a share of the surplus generated 
by the wife's more productive efforts, in the form of other tangible 
or intangible benefits, to cover the wife's costs and make her better 
off overall than if she reduced her own effort at his expense. 
Although these scenarios are no doubt apt depictions of some 
relationships, there are important reasons to doubt that they ac-
count for most observed instances of drudge-wife households. 
First, the example takes for granted that the arrangement is Kal-
dor-Hi cks efficient because the wife has an absolute advantage in 
all domestic labor-an assumption that is problematic at best, and 
especially problematic in the case of dual-earner couples.187 Even if 
ily in the hands of men either because men 's earning power is greater fo r eq uivalent 
jobs or because male jobs te nd to require more flexibility o r greater commitment. 
A lterna tive ly, perhaps employers reward men 's extra commitme nt at a higher rate. 
Even if such sex- linked effects were elimina ted, however, it is not clear tha t two per-
sons, each with half as much flexibility as a traditional husband, could equal the 
earning power of one person who has a monopoly on the ability to respond to em-
ployer demands. On the perils of trying to combine paid work with do mestic labor, 
see Hochschild , supra note 23; Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: 
Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 Yale L.J . 595 
(1993); Williams, supra note 3. 
An additional factor that makes it costlier, to both men and women, for men to 
substitute domestic responsibility for leisure is that disgrace a ttaches in o ur society to 
men who take on tasks or ro les that are associated with fem ininity. See Case, supra 
no te 159, at 3; see also supra Secti on III. C (discussing the devaluation of trad ition a ll y 
feminine activities). This intangib le stigma is compounded by more concrete reputa-
tional or signaling costs that may adverse ly affect a man 's occupation a l position o r 
prospects, with financial ramifications for th e entire famil y. Even leaving aside the 
poss ible financi a l effects , a wife may refrain from attempting to press her husband 
into domestic service beca use she prefers not to be marr ied to an uxo ri ous man-
either beca use she cares about how her husband appears to o thers or because he will 
appear less attracti ve to her. 
Finally, a comparison based sole ly on dura ti on of work time- the metric of marital 
contribution th at implicitly underlies concern over the work-leisure gap-does not 
take into account the intensity of work effort, work-related stress, and the subjective 
unpleasantness of work. It can be clai med that men on average " work harder" or are 
subjected to more stress on th e job, and that the " extra" work women do a t home 
barely makes up for this in th e cost-benefit calculus. 
1x7 Discussions of the allocation of wage work an d domes ti c effort be twee n spouses 
are often domin ated by images conjured up by Becker's efficiency mode l, in which 
women are assumed to have both a " natural" absolute adva ntage as well as a com-
parative advantage over men in domestic pursuits compared to wage work . See 
Becke r, Treatise, supra note 36, at 22 (d iscussin g comparative advantage); Bergmann, 
supra note 7, at 266-67 (summarizing Becker 's theory of comparative ad vantage); 
,. 
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that is the case, however, a drudge-wife arrangement will not 
necessarily be more efficient in every case than a more even split of 
responsibility. 188 Second, it is unclear what husbands are system-
B!a u & Ferber, supra note 16, at 37-45 (describ ing the simple neoclassical mode l o f 
fami ly special iza tio n a nd exchange): Hadfield , supra no te 55, at 96 (di scussing 
Becker's theory); Isabe l V. Sawhil l, Economic Perspec ti ves o n the Fa mil y, 106 
Daedu lus 11 5, 118-20 (1977) (summarizing Becker 's theory of compara ti ve advan -
tage); Jana B. Singe r, A li mony and Efficiency , 82 Geo . LJ. 2423, 2429-34 (1994 ) 
[he re in a fte r Singer, A limony and Effici ency ] (descr ib ing efficiency justifica tion for 
a limony) . For a critique of the compa ra ti ve adva ntage argumen t, see Hadfiel d , supra 
note 55, a t 96-98. 
Becker's comparative advantage argu ment for ho usehold specia li za tion is prem ised 
o n a o ne-for-one tradeo ff betwe e n the hours worked by husbands and wi ves in 
mark et and no nmarke t sectors, in which the husband's time freed up by the wife's 
domes ti c labor is p lowed into prod ucti ve wage work, and vice versa. Tha t mode l is 
consistent with bo th spouses' devo ting equ al time to work and e njoying a n eq ua l 
amo unt of le isure, and it does not d irectl y add ress the e fficie ncy or o the r conse-
que nces of a significant di spari ty in work and le isure time. 
As we have seen , ma ny dua l-earne r ho use ho lds devia te fro m Becker 's premi ses. In 
many ho useholds , a spo use's work in o ne sector does not always come at the expense 
of work in the other. R ath er, it comes at the expe nse o f th at spouse 's le isure . 
Becke r's model simply does no t tell us how "optimizing" spo uses should, or wo uld , 
a llocate the distribution o f work and le isure hours in excess of the observed "matched 
ho urs" of labor, when one person is substituting consumptio n fo r work. See supra 
Section I.B. 
ti'S T he re a re a number of fac tors th a t could te nd to reduce the e ffici e ncy o f a 
"d rudge-wife" situatio n re la ti ve to sha ring. A bedrock ass um ptio n of G a ry Becker 's 
a na lys is is that women are mo re producti ve in the domestic sphe re . See Becker, 
T reat ise, supra note 36, a t 22-23 . But Becker 's "sepa ra te spheres" analys is assu mes 
th at the firs t and las t hours of women's work are in the un paid secto r, and that me n's 
and women's efforts are ro ughl y matched . When women work fo r pay, the first hour 
of domestic work comes afte r many hours of paid work. T hat p laces her household 
effort o n the steep part o f th e curve where the cost o f puttin g in additional hours ri ses 
rap idly . Moving tasks to a tl a ttcr pa rt of the curve ca n be expected to reduce costs 
overa lL Thus, the total costs of di stributing tasks more even ly be tween two working 
people may well be less than the tota l costs incurred by overl oading one person with 
most of the respo nsibility. 
F urthermore, the marginal va lue of le isure ri ses as the number o f ho urs of work 
pe rformed increases. Thus, th e first ho ur o f le isure afte r e igh t ho urs o f work is worth 
less tha n the first ho ur aft e r twe lve, which means tha t, ceteris paribus, the consum p-
tion utility to the du al-ea rner unit will be grea ter when the le isure is shared than 
when it is monopolized. See Blau & Ferber, supra no te 16, at 47 (" [L] eisure is like ly 
to be more highly valued by the partn er who has less of it.") . 
As already noted, see supra no te 129, the gains a ttri butab le to specializatio n in 
domes tic work are also greatly a ttenuated (an d the q uality o f the product much re-
d uced) when one spouse must sq ueeze do mesti c tasks into off-work hours rather tha n 
perform them as her primary activity. This a tten uation arg ues fo r more sharing 
amo ng worki ng couples. Of co urse, it might a lso argue for wives' avo iding paid work 
altoge ther. But see Brinig, supra note 129, a t 2472-73 & tb i.I (expl aining why, con-
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atically g1vmg their wives-or what benefits 1NOmen are system-
atically enjoying-to make up for tbe extra work the wives are 
doing across the board. 189 Third, although these accounts mitigate 
trary to Becker, dual-earner famili es are sometimes mor•; efficie nt than traditional 
breadwinner famili es). 
Finaliy, for some couples-for examp le, where both spouses can command a high 
enough return on the labor market-the most effic ient arrange ment might be to hire 
household help. See Bergmann, supra note 7, at 260 (descr ibi ng the " cash-paying" 
altemativc to house keep ing); supra note 129. O nly aboui 15 % o f couples use any in-
home paid hel p at a ll, which suggests that the "cash-paying" so iution is not efficient 
for most couples, and thus matters litt le to our analysis here: . See Bergmann, supra 
note 7, ot 263 tb!.11-2. 
''?Sec supra no te 186. For examp le, mone tary side-payme nts wi ll largely be con-
fined to those affluen t families in which most resources ar.:: not consumed in meeting 
basic needs and husbands have access to discretiona ry ir;come that can be " kicked 
back" to the wife to make in-kind efforts worthwhile. In most families, however, 
money is short, so most transfers must be in-kind. T he on ly way the husband can 
"compensate" his wife is by giv ing up his le isure or by making o ther concessions. 
(Some of those concessions might be sexual. See infra Section IV.A.3.) 
A lso, both the rejuvenation and flexibility arguments lose the ir force unless men's 
freedom from responsibility raises total marital income (compared to the income un-
der the sharing arrangement) enough to convince the woman, given he r individual 
and joint shares, to agree to do most of the work. Such circumstances are most likely 
familiar only to upper-income bracket couples, for whom the nature of employ ment 
puts a steep premium on round-the-clock availability. See, e.g. , Williams, supra note 
3, at 2236 (describing the "dominant family ecology'· of high sta tu s professional jobs, 
where the ideal worker can be away from home for more tha n twelve hours each 
day). Finally, the claim that men work at more stressful jobs is difficult to support 
empirically, as it is grounded in highly subjective preferences and requires a generali-
zation over a range of diverse experiences. To the extent that there are durable 
measures of work-re lated stress, however, the evidence suggests that persons in low 
status, low control, or humdrum jobs experience more stress; it is women who are 
more likely to ho ld such jobs. See Spain & Bianchi, supra note 7, at 90-96 (discussing 
occupational trends of women); Shirley Fishe r, Control and Blue Collar Work, in Job 
Stress and Blue Collar Work 19, 44 (CaryL. Cooper & Michael J. Smith eds., 1985) 
(concluding that " the blue collar worker should incur more distress at work") ; Ben C. 
Fletcher, The Epidemiology of Occupational Stress, in Causes, Coping and Conse-
quences of Stress at Work 3, 21-24 (CaryL. Cooper & Roy Payne eds., 1988) (citing 
studies that found higher levels of strain and stress among those in low occupational 
positions); Mahony, supra note 16, a t 14-17 (d iscussing occupational sex segregation). 
T he main problem with the conclusion that some variation on the drudge-wife ar-
rangement is Pareto-superior to sharing is that it fails to account for the sex bias in 
the data: Not only does the work-leisure gap in every study uniformly favor the hus-
band on average, but it also does so in every fam ily. It is exceed ingly rare to find 
specific couples in the samples for whom the work-leisure gap is reversed. See 
sources cited supra notes 18, 21 . Thus, the suggest ion that money-or nonmonetary 
concessions-wi ll routine ly be used by one spouse to "compensate" the other for the 
extra effort represented by the work-leisure gap only begs the question of why wives 
are virtually never observed to use money or intangible concessions to compensate 
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the apparent inequalities of the drudge-vvife situation, none pro-
vides any guarantee that the work-leisure imbalance will leave the 
wife as well off as other family members who benefit from her ef-
forts.1'i0 On the contrary, th ere is a more compelling scenario: that 
a drudge-wife situation is Pareto-inferior to sharing-that is, it en-
ta ils an absolute loss for the wife, ·with or without side-payments. 
The bargaining paradigm explains why this scenario is not just 
plausible but likely to occur in many cases: The wife consents to do 
more because she lacks the bargaining power to get a better deal. 
Thus, acting as a drudge is not , for the wife, Pareto-superior to 
sharing (or, for that matter, to a number of marital arrangements 
the couple could " rationally" adopt). Rather , it is better for the 
wife than the prospect of losing her husband. And although the 
husband who shares might also be better off doing half the work 
than losing his income-producing wife, his greater bargaining 
power allows him to avoid facing that choice. 
2. Married Women's Labor Market Choices 
The previous discussion suggests a diversity of answers to a ques-
tion that has long engaged economists (and others): What deter-
mines whether and how much a married woman decides to work 
for pay? 191 The evidence suggests that married women who enter 
the workplace shoulder a greater burden of work than women who 
the husband for taking on more responsibil ity . Even if women are on average better 
a t performing domestic tasks , it is difficult to believe that working women are so uni-
formly more domestically productive than their husbands, or that the flexibility or 
rejuvenation effects are so uniformly more valuable for men, that a reversed pattern 
is never more e ffici e nt for any family. Fin all y, the mos t powerful objection to such 
models is tha t there is simply no intram arital mechanism to ensure that, even if an 
unequal division of labor produces a surplus, enough of that surplus will find its way 
back to the wife to make her extra e ffort better for her than a more equal division of 
responsibility. 
190 For example, there is no guarantee that the husband's putative extra earnings 
due to the wife's greater domestic efforts wi ll be di stributed in the same manne r. In-
deed , existing evidence on the di stribution and control of marital income suggests 
that, even when women make a significant contribution to family income, the hus-
band still maintains greater control over di scretionary spe nding and family finances. 
See supra note 11; infra note 220. 
"' See, e.g. , Shelly Lundberg, Labor Supply of Husbands and Wives: A Simultane-
ous Equations A pproach, 70 Rev. Econ . & Stat. 224 (1 988); David Shapiro & Lois B. 
Shaw, G rowth in the Labor Force A ttachment of Married Women: Accounting for 
Changes in the 1970s, 50S. Econ. J. 461 (1 983) ; James P. Smith & Michael P. Ward, 
Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor Force, 3 J. Lab. Econ. 59 (Supp. 1985). 
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work exclusively at home. Certainly in some cases a woman may 
judge that the "positive utility" she enjoys from working for pay 
outweighs the greater burdens. The sources of such utility can in-
clude the woman 's share of a larger famil y income; her vicarious 
interest in her children's greater economic well-being; her expected 
long-term payoff fro m career investment; the value of insurance 
against marital breakdown; the bargaining pmver gains from im-
proving her extramarital prospects and contributing fa mily income; 
and the psychological and social benefits of occupational endeavor 
and career advancement. Of the items on this list. the value of in-
surance against eventual marital breakup probably looms espe-
cially large in light of current divorce rates and may go a long way 
towards explaining many women's apparently costly labor market 
choices. But that factor will not necessarily explain all wives' deci-
sions to work .192 
It is tempting to assume that no wife will go out to work unless 
working makes her personally better off. (Many women are moti-
vated by their desire to make their children better off, but such de-
sire counts in the present model as a personal gain in the wife's 
welfare.) If a married woman is better off not working, why would 
she ever go to work? This question should be answered in light of 
evidence of ambivalence towards fathers and mothers in married-
couple households both working full-time for pay. The data sug-
gests that some working mothers would like to work fewer hours or 
not at all. 193 It is possible that women who say they would like to 
'"For an arti cle that find s a corre lation be tween wome n's labo r market participa-
tion and the availability of no-fault divorce , see Allan Parkman , Why Are Wome n 
Working So Hard ?, 18 Int ' l Re v. L. & Econ. (forthcoming 1998) (on fil e with the Vir-
ginia Law Review Association). Parkman find s that " living in a no-fault divo rce sta te 
results in marri ed women having four and a half hours less leisu re and approximately 
the sam e amount of additional time devoted to work." Id. (ma nuscript a t 11). He 
speculates that the increase in paid employment " is mo ti va ted by a des ire for per-
sonal insurance against the potentia l costs o f divorce rather than to increase [the] 
family 's we lfare. " Id. (manuscript at 13). Nevertheless, women still "continue to pro-
vide substantial hours of domestic work" so as to "make their marriage attractive to 
the ir husband ." ld . 
193 In a survey conducted by the Independ ent Wome n's Forum in 1996, only 13 % of 
a rand om sample of male and fema le voters stated th at both parents working full-
time was their " ideal balance between work and famil y,·· and 36% of respondents 
said that one pare nt should stay home full-time. See Karl Z insmeister, Indicators: 
Home Life & Life Work II , Am. Enterprise, July-Aug. 1997, at 16. Yet the majority 
of mothers of children under 17 work full-tim e. See supra note 19. 
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work less are not focusing on net benefits. Ra ther, they are focus-
ing selective ly on, and expressing regret over, the cost side of the 
ledger, which includes less time with thei r children and work over-
load, while selectively ignoring the compensating benefits (money, 
family power, relief from boredom) they receive from outside 
work. Perhaps what they are truly expressing is a desire for the 
benefits without the costs. 
It is possible to imagine an entire ly different explanation for this 
regret or ambivalence, informed by a scenari o in which the woman's 
gains from working do not outweigh the personal costs to her: In 
that case, a housewife 's move into the workforce wi ll cause her to 
be net worse off within the marri age . A woman might work be-
cause her husband and family want more money-they want a big-
ge r pie and believe her working will get them one-and she lacks 
the power to refuse them. But, as the bargaining model shows, a 
bigger pie does not necessarily translate into a bigger slice for the 
person who works to expand the pie. Indeed, depending on that 
person's bargaining position, she may find herself in a worse position. 
How might this come about? Assume that a wife and husband 
agree that the family needs more money. They are faced with a 
dilemma: If the wife works, who will care for the children and run 
the home? These responsibilities, the couple might understandably 
resolve, will be adjusted after the wife begins her job. Assume, 
however, that they are never adjusted after all, or at least not 
much. T he woman finds herself with more responsibility and less 
time. Her share of the family's larger income simply does not 
make up for her personal utility losses. O nce she adjusts to this 
crunch (by delivering fewer or shoddier domestic services or deliv-
ering services less efficiently) , the household may indeed be better 
off as a unit than before. But it may be worse off. 194 Regardless of 
whether the pie is larger or smaller (that is, whether the bargaining 
frontier moves out or in compared to the alternative of a single 
breadwinner household) , the new equilibrium bargain may place 
the woman in a worse situation than she was in before . If there are 
net gains to the unit, most of those gains may go to other family 
members, with "assignment of the cost of increased economic 
194 See supra Section III.B on the inde terminacy of effici ency co nsequences of wives 
work ing for pay . 
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benefits the whole family enjoys thanks to the wife 's employment 
to he:r alone. "l''s And even in the absence cf net gains, the restrik-
ing of the bargain may shift the allocation of existing family re-
sources away from the wife and towards other family members. In 
particular, the wife's paid labor may benefit the husband at the ex-
pense of others in the household. The husband rnay spend more of 
his incorne on personal pursuits, leaving his -;vife to pay house hold 
expenses previously paid out of his earnings alm1e. :'16 A nd he may 
not mind the lmver quality or increased disorder resulting from his 
wife 's diverted energies, especially if those costs fall mainly on the 
children. T hus, despite a husband's rueful attention to the;; costs of 
' . . ,. ' ' . J07 ' f th f '1 . . I t ' ,.,, ms wne s woncmg, · ana even z _,.e am11y unit rmgn _ De worse on 
as a whole, a husband might actually want his wife to continue 
working because his gains outweigh his costs. This explains why 
women might work even though they really do not want to (in the 
sense that they would personally be better off if they did not). 
Their husbands want them to, and their husbands have the power 
to get their way. 19s 
In the same vein, however, bargaining theory also explains why 
some women might not work even though they do want to. Sup-
pose that a woman's going out to work would increase net returns 
to the household unit as well as make the woman, individually, bet-
ter off. Assume further that the husband perceives that his wife's 
working for pay would make him individually worse off He would 
1''5 Pleck, supra note 29, at 284. 
196 See infra note 220 (describing how men's greater bargaining power enables them 
to force their wives to spend their earnings on the household while allowing men to 
sequester some portion of their own earnings for personal spending). 
197 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (indicating that men are aware of and 
express regret over the costs of wives working). 
'"
8 Although he overstates his case and erroneously assumes that all married women 
who work are the "victims" of husbands who force them to do so, the conservative 
writer David Gelernter is not too far off the mark when he writes that 
the typical husband would always have been happy to pack his wife off to work; 
he had no need of Betty Friedan to convince him that better income in ex-
change for worse child care was a deal he could live with. Society used to re-
strain husbands from pressuring their wives (overtly or subtly) to leave the 
children and get a job. No more. 
David Gelernter, Why Mothers Should Stay Home, C'::tmmen tary, Feb. 1990, at 25, 
28; see also Maggie Gallagher, Enemies of Eros 45-48 (1989) (noting evidence that 
men increasingiy are insisting that their wives work); David Gelernter, Drawing Life 
90-98 (1997) (same). 
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then resist her decision to work. His greater bargaining power in 
the relationship, and the threat of his alienation or defection, might 
result in the wife's staying at home. 
F inally, a housewife may recognize that working for pay could 
potentially carry some positive gains for her. But she might lack 
the bargaining power to force a reallocation of household respon-
sibi li ty that would make going out to work a net positive ra ther 
tho.n a net negative move for her. If she could get other household 
members to change their ways, working woul d be worthwhile for 
her. But since she Jacks the leverage to do so, she wi ll find herself 
net v;orse off by going into the workforce and wil l choose to forgo 
the positive benefits of working that she might othe rwise enjoy. 
In sum, the wife's decisions about whether or how much to work 
are very much a function of her bargaining power within the marital 
relationship. And without an account of the reality of bargaining 
position, our understanding of workforce participation and other 
aspects of family decisionmaking must be incomplete. Side-payments 
and simple preferences can only be part of the story. Bargaining 
power is an essential part of the explanation for existing patterns. 
Husbands (and wives), like all "negotiators," will not compensate 
others for what they can take by threat. The insight that bargain-
ing power affects distribution allows us to state what by now is ob-
vious: Families can make adjustments towards efficiency- or, for 
that matter, towards inefficiency- in which one partner loses 
something, then loses more, and still more again . That the losing 
partner sticks around anyway should not surprise us. The loss of 
the bargain in its entirety would be even worse. 
3. Love, Fear, and Fidelity 
Those who would object to the suggestion that spouses enjoy 
unequal v;e lfare might also point to the impossibility of knowing 
the dominant motives that operate when one spouse's choices ap-
pear largely to vindicate the other's interests. The divorce threat 
model posits that the person with the worse fallback options will be 
influenced to some extent by the fe ar of the other partner's defec-
tion, with its consequences of diminished extramarital prospects 
and disproportionate loss of marriage-specific investments. Thus a 
wife will sometimes (and more often than her husband) do what is 
worse for her personally or what she does not want to do because 
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she fears the long-term consequences of getting her way in the 
short term. But how does one distinguish between striking a 
seemingly disadvantageous bargain out of a self-interested fear of 
defection, and engaging in the same activities out of love or an un-
alloyed interest in the welfare of others? A woman may be 
interested in the weifare of her husband for his own sake, be-
cause she loves him, and for the sake of her children, because 
she loves them. She may therefore want to make a sacrifice for 
her husband or her children that is in the nature of a gift. ... Or 
the point can be put differently. One might say that her utility 
is immediately increased by giving her husband or children a 
gift , so that the wife is getting an immediate return on her in-
vestment in the form of the gratification that comes from giving 
the gift. 1''') 
The gift story is undoubtedly true in many cases, and the bar-
gaining framework does not rule out pure generosity as an impor-
tant motive in family life. Furthermore, husbands as well as wives 
undoubtedly give gifts in many forms. Working husbands, after all, 
give by allowing family members to share in their earned income. 200 
But working women choose to give in that form, too. So why do 
women systematically give so much more than men in the form of 
domestic effort or work time? If altruism without expectation of 
reward dominates in the marital calculus, its effects ought to bal-
ance out by sex, in the absence of a theory as to why they do not. 201 
199 Schneider, supra note 63, at 212; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of 
Contract and the World of Gift, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 821, 823 (1997) (defining a gift as "a 
voluntary transfer that is made, or at least purports to be made, for affective reasons 
like love, affection, friendship, comradeship, or gratitude, or to satisfy moral duties or 
aspirations like benevolence or generosity, and whic~ is not expressly conditioned on 
a reciprocal exchange"). 
200 As previously suggested, see supra Section III.D, there is evidence that some 
men give gifts in the form of voluntary "forbearance" to press as hard a marital bar-
gain as they might-although it is suggested that love does not carry the full freight 
here and that forbearance is confined largely to circumstances in which social conven-
tions are on a woman's side. 
201 Although women may choose more often than men to express their altruism to-
wards their families by providing direct domestic services, working women have ob-
viously not chosen this as their primary mode of contribution. Unless women are 
generally more altruistic than men (as opposed to simply different in how they 
choose to channel altruism), it is not easy to explain observed patterns of effort and 
reward. See supra note 133. 
· . I'· . • ~ .• 
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Yet another way in which the typical snapshot of the utility/ 
disuti lity balance within marriage may be deceptive is in discount-
ing or overestimating the value of certain elements of the marital 
bargain for men or women. For example, there may be subjective , 
hidden costs to men- and, more tentatively, benefits to women-
from marriage that fl ow from the conventional expectation of sex-
ual fide lity. Men and women may place a different value on sexual 
variety- a ifference that could have biological roots .202 Men may 
experience the sexual exclusivity expected within marriage as more 
of a burden., \vhile women may gain more from sexual continuity 
and security. 
There is yet another way in which average differences in men 's 
and women 's sexuality might have implications for bargaining 
power within marriage. A lthough the " law of sexual scarcity" for 
men has eased somewhat in recent years-in that it has become 
easier for men to find sexual outlets outside of marriage203-the 
greater urgency of male sexuality may mean that controlling access 
to sex within marriage is a more potent bargaining tool in the 
hands of women than of men. Certainly, sexual withholding is 
sometimes mentioned (although rarely written about) as a unique 
source of women's power in marriage, and it is tempting to con-
clude that it serves as a counterweight to male advantage in other 
sources of power. But the tactical advantages of sexual withhold-
ing for 'Nomen are almost certainly minimal. First , a wife who de-
prives her husband of sex may also deprive herself. Second, sexual 
withholding is a risky strategy because it may induce extreme dis-
satisfaction, or even anger, in men.204 Like sexual infidelity, it may 
destroy "marital capital" wholesale, dramatically reducing the 
value of the marriage for the other partner in a manner that is of-
ten difficult to calibrate or control. Thus, it represents a potentially 
high risk strategy that is as likely to lead to divorce as to a viable 
202 See David M. Buss, Evoluti on and Human Mating, 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol 'y 
537, 544 (1995) (d iscuss ing evidence of male desire for sexual variety); Robert 
Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology 33-92 
(1994) (same). 
203 See supra Section II. D.3.a; infra note 338. 
:OJ See, e.g., David M. Buss, Conflict between the Sexes: Strategic Interference and 
the Evocation of Anger and Upset, 56 J. Persona lity & Soc. Psycho!. 735 (1989) 
(reporting, based on responses to theore tical questionnaires , that sex ual withho lding 
by wives elicits most extreme expressions of ange r and dissatisfaction from husbands). 
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bargaining advantage . Finally, because relatively little is known 
about the conduct of marital sexual relations (apparentiy one of 
the last taboos), it is unclear whether, in actual fact, m ale sexual 
deprivation within marriage is a greater problem-and femal e 
withholding a more common tactic-than female sexual depriva-
tion and male lack of interest. Also, many women may be neither 
willing nor able to engage effecti vely in this ploy. 205 
The expectations of marital exclusivity and fidelity, goes the ar-· 
gument , can more plausibly be seen as adding more to the cost or 
minus side of the n1arita l ledger for men, thus decreasing the sum 
total of their intramarital vveU-being. This cost to men must be 
b j f 1 ' ' ' f" I • • I su tracter rom tne otner resources ana oene<1ts tney enJOY m LH~ 
net utility calculus. \Vhen the psychic disutility of sexual fid eli ty is 
added to vvh at men otherwise ge t from marriage (and the psychic 
utility of sexual security perhaps taken into account for women), 
there is less inequality in men's and women's share of marital util-
ity than meets the eye. By this analysis, the fidelity differential 
does not exacerbate inequality, but reduces it. 
But there is an alternative way of viewing the effect of the fidel-
ity factor. Negative utility attached to fidelity within marriage can 
alternatively be viewed as positive utility attached to the opportu-
nities for sexual adventure outside it. 206 By raising men's premarital 
or extramarital threat point or reservation price relative to women's, 
enhancing these opportunities narrows the possibility for equality 
in the distribution of the other resources of marriage, and poten-
tially exacerbates the problem of inequality of shares. Men would 
demand an even greater share of the net pool within marriage to 
bring them above their reservation price for entering into marriage 
in the first place. Because men's compensating share must come 
205 Douglas Allen and Margare t Bri nig argue that whether the willingness to ac-
commodate the other partner sexually, or the threat not to, can serve as a bargaining 
chip for one spouse depends on the spouses' relative level of interest in and demand 
for sex within the relat ionship. They speculate that the relative level of interest 
changes during the course of the relationship as a function of each spouse's age, with 
men 's demand for sex genera ily exceeding women's during the earlier and later peri-
ods of marriage, but women's exceeding men 's during the middle period. According 
to their analysis, a lower demand for sex creates a "property right" that can be traded 
away for other concessions or to forestall divorce. See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret 
Brinig, Sex, Property Rights, and Divorce, 5 E ur. J .L. & Econ. 211 (1998). 
2
CQ See discussion infra Section V.F on changes in social conventions regarding pre-
marital and extramarital sex. 
1998] Egalitarian !\-1arriage 607 
out of other elements of the bargain that are up foe grabs, the fi-
delity differential will drive inequality in other spheres. 207 
What is the best way to understand the fidelity factor? The 
analysis that treats men's relative preference for sexual variety as 
tending to produce inequality r ather than equality in marriage re-
lies upon a fr amework similar to that evident in the egalitarian 
convention: H views persons' prospects outside the relationship as 
external to, rather than as built into, the concept of an egalitarian 
marriage. T his vievv is cri tically dependent m1 accepting a particu-
lar baseline for measuring equality of welfare . In addition to in-
corporating assumptions as to baseline, the framework put forward 
here also depends on adopting a utility metric and accepting a role 
for certain tastes or preferences as contributing to, or detracting 
from, equality.cc'·' Is this approach justified, or are there better ways 
to assess the balance of marital relations? 
B . Equality in Theory? 
1. The Lessons of Bargaining Theory: Egalitarian A1arriage as 
Heuristic 
To understand marriage as a bilateral bargaining relationship is 
to position it within a category of interactions taking place in 
widely varying social contexts. The puzzles posed by these rela-
tionships have much in common.209 There are no universally 
207 The British antifeminist author Geoff Dench sees the exchange value of male 
fidelity as central to the explanation of observed patterns of effort and reward in 
male-female relationships. According to Deneb, "on the issue of sexual possession 
most men feel no less and probably much more, trapped than women do. Men would 
say that it is they who are 'giving' most in a relationship which requests mutual fidel-
ity." Geoff Dench, Transforming Men 228 (1996). Elsewhere he states that "[i]t may 
well be that most women are sti ll prepared to carry a double load of domestic work, 
in return for male fidelity. '' ld. at 229. 
208 See discussion infra Section IV .B.2. 
2
()<) For a general discussion of these issues in the context of bargaining generally and 
off-market monopolistic bargaining in particular, see Coleman, supra note 142; 
Wertheimer, supra note 32; Young, supra note 46; Gauthier, supra note 46; Harrison, 
supra note 10; see also Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New 
Perspective on Contract IVIodification, 26 J. Legal Stud. 203 (1997) (examining set-
tings in which nonmodifiable contracts might enhance contractors' welfare ); Edward 
B. Rock & Michael L. \Vachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment 
Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913 (1996) (examining the coexistence of self-
enforcing systems of norms and state-enforced contracts); J. Hoult Verkerke, An 
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agreed-upon principles for fai r transactions and no unproblematic 
criteria for equality of bargaining power within exclusive long-term 
relationships,210 just as there is no uncontested theory of a just or 
equitable society as a whole . 
Empirical Pe rs pec ti ve on Ind efin ite Term Employment Contracts , 1995 Wis. L. Rev . 
837 (offering an empirica l investigat ion of barga ining fo r just ca use pro tect ion). 
110 A complete treatment of the ques tion of whet her marri age is exploitati ve is fa r 
beyond th e scope of this Article. Noneth eless, the characte ristics of marri age ex-
plored herein would suggest at leas t the possibility of an affirmative answer for some 
who have attempted to define explo itative relationships. For example, Alan Wertheimer 
and Joe l Feinberg have argued that mutual ga ins from a relati onship a re not inconsis-
ten t with a claim of exploitation, a nd coercion and d uress are not necessary concom i-
tants. Wertheimer, note 32, at 251 (citing Joe l Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 176 
(1 988) ). 
The philosopher David Miller suggests that there are two criteria for a n exploita-
tive transaction: 
First, the tra nsaction must typ ica ll y be more advantageous to the explo iting 
party a nd less advantageo us to the expl oi ted party tha n some be nchmark 
transaction which we use (tacitly or exp licit ly) as a point of re fere nce. SecoT'd, 
the actual transaction must have come abo ut through some speci al advantage 
which the exploiter enjoys, upon which he capitalizes to induce the exploited to 
engage in this rela tively less beneficial exchange. 
David Miller, Exploita tion in the Market, in Modern Theories of Exploitation 149, 
156 (Andrew Reeve ed. , 1987). If eq ual shares of we lfare is the benchmark, and if 
better extramarital prospects constitute a "special advantage, " then marriage could 
be exploitative. Both criteria, however, stand in need of fur ther justification. 
From the point of view of marriage as a fo rm of relation a l contract, reso lving the 
question of whether marriage is explo itative requi res deciding whe the r changes in the 
marita l status quo tha t a re induced or motiva ted by th e poss ibility of the o ther 
spouse 's defection are to be regard ed as va lid or legitimate modificatio ns. T he an-
swer to that ques tion may partly turn on whether the ongoing agreeme nt not to 
aband on the marriage is to be regarded as fre sh considerat io n for the other party's 
otherwise unremunerated concess ions. How tha t question is resolved may, in turn, 
depend on whethe r there is some bas is for deciding that th e promise not to abandon 
the marriage is a constituti ve part of the agree me nt to marry in th e first place. It is 
on the last point th at claims tha t marriage is inh e re ntly explo ita ti ve potentia ll y foun-
der. Under the domestic law in operation in mos t states , which permits partners to 
call the contract off without incurring the types of penalti es tha t would ord in arily be 
appropriate for a breach of contrac t for continued performance, there is lit tle basis 
for inferring that e ither partne r has made a forma l legal promise to re ma in in the 
marri age indefinite ly. For this reason, one partne r 's agree me nt to stay on would ap-
pear sufficient to support any sacrifice on the part of the other spouse. T hu s, any 
claim that concessions motivated by the fear of defection, or concess ions ex tracted by 
the threat of defection, are ex plo ita tive must find support in the realms of conven-
tion , morality, or socia l und ers ta nding. See , e .g., Eric Rasmuse n & Je ffrey Evan 
Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Persona li zing the Marriage Contract, 73 In d. L.J. 
453 (1998); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott , Marriage as a Relat io nal Contract, 
84 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov . 1998). 
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The idealized criteria for an egalitarian relationship suggested in 
this Article include a utility metric and a benchmark of equal 
maximum percentage utility. Equality of division is measured from 
a baseline marital pool that employs a "worldly goods" assumption. 
The partners bargain over everything they have, with nothing held 
back. For the most part , their preferences and tastes are taken as 
exogenous-although not all preferences have the same status 
within the egalitarian model. 211 
As suggested in the previous Section, the framevvork advanced 
here-especially in its use of the ·working definition of an egalitarian 
relationship--is conceded ly vulnerable to challenge in a number of 
respects. Before engaging in fur ther discussion of the problematic 
aspects of the analysis , however, it is best to review the strengths of 
the bargaining model in general and of combining that model with 
a notion of egalitarian marriage in particular. This analytical 
framework powerfully illuminates certain fundament al principles 
of allocation between family members that would otherwise be un-
explored or poorly understood. What have we learned from the 
discussion so far? 
a. The Fallacy of Compensatory Exchange 
First, the bargaining analysis adopted here decisively scotches 
the notion that a viable marriage is one in which each partner must 
be as well off, or gain as much from marital transactions, as the 
other. One spouse can start out better off outside the marriage and 
once married continue to be better off. 212 Indeed, it is precisely be-
211 See infra discussion Section IV.B.2. 
212 This point requires recognition of the difference between baseline utility or well-
being, and gains therein. Attempts can be made to compare baselines or, alternatively, 
utility gains as between persons. Here, the argument is that men's higher extramarital 
baseline confers the ability to bargain for larger increments in utility over baseline. 
Put another way, because women have a greater desire to be married, they get less of 
what marriage has to offer. An analogy can be drawn to the relationship between an 
unemployed subsistence factory worker and a business owner. The unemployed 
worker's baseline well-being is extremely low. Precisely because of his dire straits 
(which make him desperate to raise his baseline well-being, even if only slightly), his 
bargaining position is weak. He is willing to accept quite a low wage (which repre-
sents his portion of the productive surplus generated by his work for the owner). The 
owner, who starts out from a higher baseline, is in a far better position to do without 
the worker than the worker is to do without him. This gives him the leverage to gar-
ner the lion's share of the productive surplus. It is tempting to conclude that for 
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cause the better-off spouse (in general, the husband) star ts out 
ahead that he can garner the lion ;s share of what the rela tionship 
has to offer. The more favorable baseline confers bargaining strength, 
which translates into ownership of a greater porti on of the gains. 
The coupling of a higher baseline with greater gains for men helps 
explain the seeming paradox of the folk wisdom that women often 
appear relatively eager, and men relatively re luctant, to marry despite 
evidence that marriage boosts men's \Veil-being more than \vomen 's.m 
someone who starts out with a lower baseline we l:-be ing, the marginal utility of a sin-
gle quantum of sought-after benefit or resou rce wiil be greater fo r that person. In-
deed, A lan Werthe imer seems to acce pt thi s ass umptio n. See ·w e rtheimer, supra 
note 32, at 64-70. A lthough this may be true fm m oney (which has diminishing u tili ty 
as the leve l of wealth rises), it is not necessaril y true of other types of reso urces. The 
marginal utility of a particular asset o r be nefit tra nsferred to a person bears no neces-
sary relat ion to the baseline utility from which that person starts o ut. See, e.g., John 
C. Harsanyi, Interpersonal U tility Comparisons, irz The New Palgrave: Uti lity and 
Probability 128 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1990); see also 
Steven Croley & Jon Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1814-16 & n.103 (d istinguishing 
be tween baselin e utility and increments in utility an d explaining that it is possible for 
persons with lower levels of well-being to experie nce smaller marginal utility gains 
from receiving certain quantities and ty pes of resources). In any event, the ways in 
which the amount of utility gained from a fi xed a lloca tion of resources might relate to 
baseline starting points has little to do with the pos ited disparities in marital well-
being, which are based on differences in utility th at assume no par ticular di stribution 
of reso urces. Rather, those dispariti es are simply a function of the initially bet ter-off 
spouse's ability to bargain for a greater share of uti lity from the pool. 
213 See Linda J . Waite & Glenna D. Spitzc, Young Women's Transition to Marriage, 
18 Demography 681 (1981); see also Waite, supra note 40. Married men are notably 
be tter off than single men on measures of physica l and mental health, life expectancy, 
occupatio nal success, and earning power. The difference between married and single 
women on these parameters is far less pronounced. T his pattern may refl ect men 's 
abi lity to gamer the lion's share of the marital surplus when marri age docs occur. 
Men 's large gain in well-being from marriage makes their supposed re luctance to 
marry seem puzzling, but that reluctance may be explained by men's higher "baseline, " 
wh ich in turn is attributable to men's far longer re productive life a nd the availability 
of extra mar ital substitutes for much of what men seek from marriage. See supra Sec-
tion II.D.3 .a. The lack of urgency that men seem to fee l about marrying, despite its 
benefits for them, may also reflect th e nature of ma ny of marriage 's benefits fo r men . 
Married men are healthier and earn more, but those gains are long-te rm and cumula-
tive. Because it is hard for the individual on the thres ho ld of marriage to appreciate 
and assess these effects, men may tend to overestimate the benefits of remaining sin-
gle , while underestimating the benefits of getting married. 
Bargaining theo ry also he lps explain why me n might fear divorce less than women 
though marriage is a better deal for them. Bargaining theory predicts that me n 
would value being married, whereas women would value staying ma rried. Even if 
men gained disproportionately from any "positive-sum" re lationsh ip , they would still 
typically place a lower value than the ir wives on the particular marriage they happen 
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Bargaining analysis also cautions against indulgence in what 
rriight be termed the fallacy of compensatory exchange. As the 
discussion of the drudge-wife scenario demonstrates,2J.l it is tempt-
ing to assume that any marriage that is a viable going concern will 
consist of a series of Pareto-superior intramarital deals or ex-
changes in which no partner loses ground over time, and all com-
promise takes place from a starting point in which both spouses 
sr:are equally in surplus-producing decisions. Without this condi-
tion, what reason would the partners have to consent to any spe-
cific 1narital sub-deal?215 But this is obviously all wrong. In the 
evolution of any marriage, one spouse's contribution need not be 
matched by the other's, and one spouse can lose ground absolutely 
compared to where that partner, or the other, started out '.vithin 
the relationship. All that is required for the marriage to remain 
feasible as between rational actors is that the deal struck be better 
for both partners than calling the deal off. This is perfectly consis-
tent not only with one partner being chronically locked into a 
worse position than the other, but with her position relentlessly de-
teriorating over the course of the marriage. 216 
to be in presently because they have a better chance of finding a replacement mate. 
Women would place a higher value on any existing marriage, because their chance of 
finding a replacement is smaller (and grows ever smaller with time). 
21 " See supra Section IV.A.l. 
215 This type of logic appears to inform Ira Ellman's landmark article on alimony, in 
which he takes the position that alimony should not take into account the balance of 
costs and benefits incurred during the life of the marriage. Ellman, supra note 63. 
Ellman writes that "a spouse who finds the intact marriage unsatisfactory, because 
the 'current exchange' seems unfair or for any other reason, has the option of leaving 
the marriage.'· Id. at 280. He goes on to assert (somewhat contradictorily) that when 
"financial expropriation" continues within an ongoing marriage, it must be the case 
that "the apparent victim is receiving some compensating financial or nonfinancial 
benefits from the marriage." Id. Nevertheless, "(t]he availability of exit" means "we 
need not worry about imbalances in the exchange during the marriage." Id. at 280-
81. But it is precisely because of the availability of exit that we do need to worry 
about imbalances of intramarital exchange. 
216 See infra Section IV.C (discussing the "bargaining squeeze"). This point about 
the application of the bargaining paradigm to marriage is consistent with the lessons 
of game theory generally, which show that "repeated play can sustain equilibria in 
which people do very bad things to each other." Andrew Rutten, Anarchy, Order, 
and the Law: A Post-Hobbesian View, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1150, 1158 ( 1997). Indeed, 
the correct statement of the major result in the theory of repeated games is that 
re peated play allows virtually any payoff to be an equilibrium outcome. In 
other words, anything can happen in a repeated game. The reason is simple: 
when people work together, they generate a surplus over what they could 
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b. The Shadow of rhe Mark et and the Measure of Va lue 
On a more specific level, the bargaining framework set for th 
here has the additional virtue of laying bare the hidden importation 
of market values into the marital bargain. Consider an objection 
that could be leveled against one aspect of the analysis: the m arital 
pooling condition, which assumes bargaining over all individual as-
sets , net of utility costs. Implicit in this condition is the assumption 
that unequal sha ring or access to monetary income potentia lly rep-
resents a deviation from the egalitarian condition. 217 But men on 
average earn more than women, and most husbands earn more 
than their working wives. 2!S At the very least, it could be argued, it 
is fair for wives to \Vork longer hours to obtain access to an equal 
share of their husbands' greater income.21 9 Put another way, per-
haps the better method of achieving equality would be for couples 
to commingle equal amounts of earned income, withholding any 
excess for their own exclusive use. One spouse would share his or 
her excess only upon the condition that the other make additional 
contributions. 220 But to posit a swap of extra earned income for ex-
ac hieve on the ir own. This surplus is the point of working toge ther. However, 
there is no natural way to divide the surplus; as long as each player ge ts more 
than she would ge t by working alone, she is better off wo rking with others. 
Id . (citations omi tted) . 
217 Of co urse, the presumption will oft en be rebutted, since th e me tric of equality in 
the mode l is utiiity ga in , not contro l ove r inco me. Not eve ry insta nce of deviation 
fro m strict equality in income-sharing is inegalita ri a n. Nor is eve ry devia ti o n from 
strict equa lity in time devoted to work activiti es. Individual coupl es may have differ-
ent utility function s for money, just as they have different prefere nces for work and 
leisure. But a pop ulat ion-wide pattern of wives ' chronic in equa lity of access to hus-
bands' income (despite wives' equa l or greater work hours) , li ke a pattern o f wives' 
chronic inequality of work time, ra ises suspicio ns o f structura l inequa lity of access to 
these reso urces, for th ere is no reason to expect gend er bias on average in preferences 
for control over mo ney and leisure. In " equal power" relati o nships , the di stribution 
of th ese resources between the sexes, although subject to variation across relation-
ships , would be expec ted to balance o ut in the aggregate. 
218 See supra note 20. 
219 The marital pooling assumption seems especially strained in extreme cases in 
which husbands hold vast fortun es. lf Bill Gates fails to share all hi s holdings with his 
wife, does he then fa il at egalitarian ma rriage? Even if he docs, can he hope to have 
an ega litarian marri age on our description? As noted, however, see supra no te 54 
and accompanying text, this Article concerns itse lf primarily with marriages that do 
not represent such extre mes. 
220 The ev idence that wives do not always have e ffecti ve ly eq ua l control o r access to 
famil y income, see supra note 11, can be interpreted as refl ecting the outco me of bar-
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tra hours of domestic service is in effect to abandon a measure of 
mari tal balance in terms of individual net utility, and to adopt a 
market measure of the worth or value of contributions in marriage. 
A spouse's insistence upon being excused from domestic responsi-
bility because of greater earning power represents the ultimate in-
trusion of the metric and ethos of the market into the precincts of 
private marital relations, which are supposed to be sheltered from 
the market's crass demands. But, as we have seen, the adoption of 
such a market measure, at least to the extent it influences ailocation 
of the bargaining surplus, is a choice, not an economic necessity. 
To suggest that a man would be justified in refusing to contract , or 
in cailing off, a marriage in which his extra earnings were not 
matched by his wife's extra domestic effort is to say nothing more 
than that he will use his superior bargaining power to extract an 
exchange based on signals from a market that stands outside that 
relationship. He elects to ground his marital relations in market-
based values. 
gaining over to tal famil y income, or it can be viewed as the result of men 's violation 
of the pooling condition by holding back a po rtion of ea rnings for the ir own exclusive 
use. See supra Section II.D.1 (discussing pooling conditions a nd " holding back " ). 
There is evidence that working for pay increases women 's control and access to 
marital income although it rare ly eq ualizes it. See, e.g., Alsto tt , supra note 6, at 2027-
28; Marjori e E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, a nd 
the Joi nt Income Tax, 45 Hastings L.J. 63, 90 (1993); Lundbe rg & Pollak, Bargaining 
and Distribution, supra note 56, at 154-55 (describing evidence for th e "kids-do-
be tter" hypothesis, in which wo me n 's mo ne tary ea rnings are correl a ted with higher 
famil y expenditures on women a nd children). Although thi s increased access could 
be viewed as part of a marital exchange in which increased access fun ct ions as a side-
payment or ex tra reward to compe nsate for work overload , see supra Section lll.B , 
the better expl anation is that working for pay increases women's barga inin g power. 
But a lthough earning power may provide working women with more potential co n-
trol over spending than housewives, women's market effo rts will no t necessarily 
equal control because, as noted , men have other so urces o f bargaining power. In-
deed , in some cases, a husband 's greater bargaining powe r may transla te into a 
woman's loss of control over her ea rnings. See Marj o rie Kornhauser, T heory vs. Re-
ality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Tax Law Versus Intra-
Household Allocations , 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1413,1430-31 (1996) (describing a famil y in 
which a ll child related expenses, including " the au pair, baby clo th es, baby toys , un-
covered medica l bills, etc.," were paid out o f the wife's sma lle r income, with money 
for a ny additiona l expenditures to be "requested" from the husband ). Moreo ver, if 
greater con tro l over inco me fun ctio ned as a " reward " for role over load , o ne wo uld 
~xpect to see women with the grea tes t role overload exercising mo re control than 
wome n in '·sharing" fa milies. Whether thi s pattern obtains requires empirical inves-
tigatio n. 
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c. VVhar Does a Wom an H1ant? or From Choices ro Preferences 
Revisited 
The insights sf bargaining theory, when combined with the 
working definition of egalitarian marriage adopted here, also re-
veal a broad set of misconceptions about what lies behind couples ' 
ordering of thei r affairs and, more importantly, about the relation-
ship between preferences and choices in and outside of marriage. 
First. b;· high li ghtinQ the votential influence of extern al threat 
' ........ ........ "--' .J.. 
advantage on the bargain that is actually struck , the bargaining 
paradigm shows that observed patterns of marital behavior may 
have as rnuch to do with women's desire to remain married and to 
hang onto their husbands as it does vv ith the actual in trinsic tastes 
and preferences for, and costs and benefits of, the elements of the 
marital bargain itself. Marriage is widely valued because it is po-
tentially a positive-sum game. There are reasons why women may 
value playing this game even more than men and why they may be 
loathe to lose the relationships in which they find themselves. This 
all-important "threat" factor is often pointedly left out of the 
highly idealized accounts of divisions of marital responsibility. 
Those accounts often attempt to explain women's choices as 
grounded exclusively and straightforwardly in their intrinsic skills 
and tastes for domestic activities. But that explanation is radically 
incomplete. That women do not mind shouldering the domestic 
responsibility as much as men do, or that they do it better, does not 
explain why they do so much of it, for they would still rather not. 
Fear of the consequences of doing less completes the account . 
The bargaining paradigm helps clarify the true relationship be-
tween choices and tastes. The disparity in bargaining power is based 
in some part on mean differences in men's and women's prefer-
ences or tastes. But there is a careless way of discussing those dif-
ferences, uninformed by bargaining constraints, that provides a 
highly misleading and radically incomplete account of why women 
and men do what they do. To tell the truth about men and women, 
one needs to tell the truth about the way in which marriage forces 
men and women to engage in bilaterally monopolistic bargaining 
that differentially circumscribes the option set from which they 
choose. Simple-minded attempts to link preferences with observed 
choices do little to explain why responsibilities and privileges are 
distributed as they are , and they ignore the problems of fr ee ri ders, 
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holdups, and defection threats that distort the payoffs within a bar-
gammg game. 
Recall the Parable of Neat and Slob. 221 Neat likes a clean apart-
ment nwre than Slob does. Because they are forced to live to-
gethe r, Neat bears all the costs of a clean apartment, while both 
enjoy t i1e benefits . A n outside observer is tempted to reason back 
hom beha vior to preferences. He infers that Neat "prefers" to 
clea n and "prefers" a d ean room, and that Slo b "prefers" to study 
and "prefers " a messy room. But neither of these statements is 
true. Slob prefers a clean room to a messy one, just as Neat does. 
A nd for his part, Neat would rather Slob clean the apartment. 
lVIoreove r, l\Teat's perform ance of all of the housework cannot be 
explained as a joint effort to maximize efficiency. That Neat gets 
more positive utility than Slob from a clean apartment does not 
necessarily mean that it is more efficient for Neat to do the clean-
ing. That depends on what Slob does instead; he might be, for ex-
ample, watching television. Even if the reason Neat cleans first is 
that he gets less disutility from cleaning than Slob (so that having 
Neat rather than Slob clean increases overall net utility), that does 
not explain why Neat cleans. He does not clean because it is more 
efficient for him to do so. Rather, he would be quite happy to foist the 
job on Slob even if that would result in less gain to the unit overall. 
So far, the simple story of what Neat and Slob want does not 
take into account the influence of exit threats. Now suppose that 
Neat threatens to leave the apartment, sticking Slob with the entire 
cost of the rent , unless Slob takes on full responsibility for cleaning 
the apartment. Further suppose both roommates know that it 
would be impossible for Slob to find another roommate for the 
balance of the semester. One would not be surprised to learn that, 
in such circumstances, Neat no longer cleans the apartment. 
Rather, Slob would do all the work, and Neat would study in a 
clean apartment. One might say that Neat "prefers" to study, 
while Slob "prefers" to clean, but that conclusion would be as non-
sensical as its converse. To say that one party "prefers" cleaning 
confuses a desire to gain the benefits of having an activity per-
formed with a desire to perform it. Under the threat and non-
threat scenarios, both parties have in common that they benefit 
211 See supra Section ILD.3.c. 
616 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 84:509 
from the results of cleaning. Both understand that cleaning im-
poses costs. Both would prefer enjoying the benefits alone to en-
joying the benefits while incurring the costs. Who will get his way? 
As the Parable of Neat and Slob illustrates, the confusion inher-
ent in the usual way of speaking of men's and women's choices in 
marriage is compounded by the fact that intrinsic preferences and 
the allocations forced by the bargaining dynamic (including the ex-
trinsic differential threat of exit) often point in the same direction. 
Women might value the fruits of domestic labor more and might 
mind doing it less (although they still mind). They might have 
more exacting standards for the duration and quality of parental 
care (although t hey may be largely indifferent as to which parent 
provides it). But it does not follow that women would not choose a 
different bargain-one in which the allocation of costs, benefits, 
and responsibi lities was more favorable to them-if they could 
only get it. The fact that they often cannot is related to their pref-
erences, but only indirectly. It is related to the manner in which 
their preferences interact with the structural features of marriage 
as a bilateral and exclusive monopoly and the rules for exit from, 
and intervention in, marriage as ordained by law. 
Where there are cost-benefit tradeoffs between bargaining part-
ners, there is always another, better bargain that each partner 
could conceivably procure.222 Each partner could always get a 
larger slice of the pie. It follows that there is always another more 
~~~This situation follows from the most basic structural feature of a bilateral bargain 
to split a fixed pie. If the bargainers differ in their preferences or utility functions, 
one party's gains will entail losses for the other. Whether more or less depends on 
how much those utility functions differ or overlap--which is determined in turn by 
the degree of mutuality, commonality, and love within the relationship. But none of 
those can completely abolish the need for tradeoffs or a role for power. See infra 
Section IV.B.l.d. As Alan Wertheimer explains it: 
[T]here is an important sense in which any marginal gain to one party within 
the zone of agreement is indeed at the other party's expense: while the parties 
may prefer any outcome within the zone of agreement to the nonagreement 
solution, they are not indifferent to the distribution of the social surplus within 
the zone of agreement. Each would prefer a price that is furthest from his or 
her reservation price. And any movement away from one's own reservation 
price is, in that sense, at the other party's expense. 
Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 21 (footnote omitted). A more piquant observation on 
the situation is offered by Rebecca West, who stated that "the great enemy of femi-
nism is that men don't like housework and women don't like housework." Leslie Garis, 
Suburban Classic, Ms., July-Aug. 1987, at 142, 142 (putatively quoting Rebecca West). 
' . 
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favorable bargain that each would like to have , but might lack the 
leverage to obtain. In the words of Susan O kin, a division more fa-
vorable to the other side will be resisted by those who "do not want 
[it], and are able, to a very large extent, to enforce their wills." 223 
Thus, doing what one wants to do in a bargaining situation is al-
ways a comparative concept. If the act of providing a benefit im-
poses costs on one partner, that partner will want to provide less of 
it. If the resuit of a benefit being provided favors one partner, she 
will want more of it to be provided, but preferably by another. As 
between two partners, the re lative magnitude of costs and benefits 
does not matter as long as the net calculus points in the same direc-
tion: Each wou ld rather free ride. That calculus will be retlected in 
each partner's preferred ordering of bargained-for deals. 
The effects of bargaining constraints on bargaining partners' 
choices are parallel to the effects of tax policy on married women's 
labor force participation, which have been described by Edward 
McCaffery.224 McCaffery accepts that men and women have differ-
ent exogenous preferences for employment, as revealed by a "greater 
[work] elasticity among married women" and a greater interest in 
part-time work. 225 But the choices men and women make, given 
those preferences, depend critically on a system of taxation that 
taxes second-earner incomes at a much higher rate than primary 
breadwinner's earnings. By attaching consequences to work that 
"push[] men to work more and many women to work less," the tax 
system "perpetuates social stereotypes" about what men and 
women really want. 226 Yet, under a different tax system, men and 
women might make very different choices that provide far less 
support for those stereotypes. 227 The same can be said about men's 
m Okin, supra note 32, at 153. 
m See McCaffery, supra note 186; Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right Sort, 
6 UCLA Women 's L.J. 289,306-17 (1996). 
:15 McCaffery, supra note 224 , at 316. 
226 ld . at 317. McCaffery makes a similar although less straightforward point about 
how women's choices are influenced by the paucity of "quality" part-time work op-
tions in the labor market, which he describes as a form of market failure. McCaffery, 
supra note 186, at 619-22. 
227 McCaffery faults Richard Epstein and others for "repeatedly point[ing] to free 
'choices' as being responsible for whatever observed inequalities we see. How can 
we make men and women change if they don't seem to wan t to?" McCaffery, supra 
note 224, at 316. Epstein has commented that "[i]f individuals do have different 
natural endowments, then the system of voluntary arrangement should reflect those 
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and women's choices in marriage. \IVithin a very different institu-
tion-or outside of the institution altogether-men and women 
might behave quite differently than they do, and we might speak 
about "what they \Vant" in very different terms. But the situations 
in which men and ~;vomen find themselves mili tates decisively 
against different choices. 
d. The Ineluctable Role of Pmt·er 
Ferninists are sornet imes acc·used o f cli storting tl~1e '~ tr11e" nature 
of marriage by viewing po-,ver as a key determinant of relations be-
l r :; ~h. . c ' ' . . . h t·,veen L1e sexes. ~ 1 11s recastmg m an age-ow mst1tutwn w. ose 
guiding principles are supposed to be cooperati on 0.nd affection is 
criticized as sinister and destructive. Although no one denies that 
some actual relationships fall short of the mark, the attainable ideal 
of a "good marriage" is thought to be one in which the assertion of 
power has no place and no explanatory role. Power simply falls 
out of the picture as a meaningful component of a "good marriage" 
as it is commonly understood. 
The modeling of marriage as a bargain teaches that this ideal 
is hopelessly unrealistic. Feminists who assert that power is an 
ineluctable feature of marriage may be guilty of subversive de-
mystification, but they are not wrong. When the interests of two 
individuals fail precisely to coincide, there is potential for conflict. 
Even the very best marnage is marked by some degree of con-
differe nces," thus implying that tas tes and dislikes are the exclusive source of family 
divisions of labor, and that bargaining leverage has nothing to do with it. Richard A. 
Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist Thought, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 331, 340 
(1995). But Epstein candidly admits elsewhere in the same article that there is a " risk 
of exploitation ... present in marital arrangements" because a typical husband is in 
the position to "extract most of the gains from the marriage, even if the wife is better 
off than she would have been if the marriage had never taken place." I d . at 344. This 
concession evinces an understanding of th e central insights of bargaining theory. Un-
fortunately, Epstein does not identify the forces and structures that determine how 
gains within the family will in fact be allocated. Nor does he expand on the point that 
those with a better fa ll back position within and outside of marriage have more power 
to get their way within their relationships. 
" 3 Ruth Wisse , a Harvard literature professor critical of feminism, has recently 
stated: "By defining relations between men and women in terms of power and com-
petition instead of reciprocity and cooperation, the [women 's] movement tore apart 
the most basic a nd fragile contract in human socie ty , the unit from which all other 
social institutions draw their strength." Ruth R. Wisse, On the Future of Conserva-
tism, Commentary, Feb. 1997, at 41 , 42. 
r 
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flict-not in the overt sense of acrimonious disagreement, but in 
the sense that both partners cannot simul taneously maximize the 
satisfaction of all their preferences and desires . When both part-
ners cannot \Vin, what determines who gets his or her way and who 
gives way? In a bargaining relationship , the answer is bargaining 
pmver. 
Certainly the participants in a good marri age have many goals, 
desires, and tastes in common . There are large areas of endeavor 
in which conflict is absent because the couple is of one mind: Pri-
orities overlap, and agreement is complete and absolute . And then 
there is love, which can transform the fulfillm ent of another per-
son's -wishes and desires into one's ovm. But although conflict may 
be uncommon in some relationships, it is never absent. At some 
point , individual interests assert themselves. /"..s long as the spouses 
are in any way distinct persons with distinct goals, there will be 
conflict in marriage. 
The bargaining paradigm predicts that conflict will be resolved 
against women more often then against men. To be sure, women 
are not wholly powerless within marriage. That they will get their 
way less often than men does not mean that they never will, nor 
does it mean that men will never have to relinquish their objectives 
or do things they do not want to do. Moreover, an individual 
woman may be very powerful, both absolutely and relative to her 
husband. The point is that women as a group have fewer of the 
traits and assets that confer power within private consensual rela-
tionships. Their power is idiosyncratic, not structural. Indeed, 
many individual attributes that confer power within relationships 
could be expected to balance out between men and women: For 
every woman who is physically beautiful, gracious, tenacious, or in-
timi dated by displays of emotion, there is a man with similar traits 
(although those people m ay not be married to each other) .229 But 
229 In measuring marriage against an egalitarian id eal, one can imagi ne three possi-
ble si tuations: (1) equality case by case for each marriage; (2) a range of more or less 
lopsided marriages, arrayed on a bell curve that measures imbalance in favor of one 
or the other sex, but with no clear sex-based skew overall ; or (3) a distribution of im-
balance in relationships, but with more relationships favoring members of one sex 
and favor ing them to a greater degree (which this Article asserts is the prevailing pat-
tern, in favor of men). 
The great diversity among individ uals who enter in to marriage and the heterogeneity 
of coupling suggest that the realization of the egalitarian idea l for each individual 
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when potential sources of power are considered over the popula-
tion as a whole, a structural advantage emerges over and above the 
individual variation, and that advantage favors men. \!1/ omen are, 
on average, relatively powerless, which means that, on the occa-
sions when compromise is called for , it is women who will end up 
compromising more often. 
This conclusion holds regardless of whether women tend to be 
more deferential th an men. Indeed, the point stands even if we in-
dulge every hoary stereotype about "difference" and accept for th e 
sake of argument th at the average woman is more deferential , al-
truistic, and averse to con fl ict than the average man. 230 Even if we 
assume that women defer to their partners more often than men 
because they want or "prefe r" to (in the sense that they "get posi-
tive utility out of it"),23 1 that does not exclude the distinct possibi li ty 
that women also defer more often than men even when they do not 
couple-represented by the first possibility-is an unrea li stic aspiration. T he diffe r-
ences between people who marry each other are bound to give rise at the individual 
level to disparities in the factors that confer power within relationships. Altho ugh 
th e elimination of the extremes of such individual di sparities is in itself desirable, this 
Article is centrally concerned with inequalities o f bargai ning power within rela tio n-
ships that correlate systematica lly with sex. 
A consideration of homosexual unions clarifies the importance of distinguishing 
sex-based imbalances of power with in the population as a whole from any variance in 
power balance within re latio nships-either in the aggregate or individually-that is 
unre lated to sex. For example, lesbian couples may on ave rage be more "equitabl e" 
than mal e homosexual relationships-that is, th ey may cl uster more closely around 
the center of the be ll curve fo r power dispariti es be tween the pa rtners. Yet, by de fi-
niti on, homosexual relationships do not give rise to asy mm etries in power within re la-
ti onships that correlate with sex. See England & Kil bourn e, supra note 5, at 172. 
230 T his insight about power's ine luctable role in marri age also does not depend on 
how rich or "loaded" our concept of psychic utility in marriage is. E ve n if each 
spouse's utility function is replete with vicarious prefe rences and second-order de-
sires, a ll that matters is tha t, in each marriage, each spo use 's e levat ion of the o the r's 
satisfaction over his or her own will at some point run o ut. T he time will come wh en 
each spouse will want something on his or her own accoun t. In other words, all that 
matters is that pure (or even partial) selfishness comes into play once in a while. 
The important point is that th e conclusions about th e role of bargaining power ho ld 
even on a fairly straightforward rational choice model. This shows that the mode l is 
some times quite useful in demonstrating the validity of fe minist insights and that the 
fe minist critique of the rational actor model as subvers ive of feminist goals is not al-
ways well-taken. See, e.g., Beyond Economic Man: Feminist T heory and Economics, 
supra note 36; Engl and, supra note 5; Elizabeth Anderson, Should Feminists Reject 
Rational Choice T heory?, Address to the AP A Eas tern Division Meetings (Dec. 30, 
1996) (transcript on file with the Virginia Law Rev iew Association) . 
231 See discussion supra Section III. C. 
r 
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want to. The first type of (directly preference-driven) deference, 
though perhaps the product of undesi rable or "oppressive" social 
conditioning,2' 2 might still be said to add to the welfare of the actor 
herself."'3 The second type of (non-preference-driven) deference, 
in contrast, is a matter of power only. It fo rces the actor to take 
steps that do not add to her immediate well-being. R at her, she acts 
to forestall imminent or future consequences that will work an 
even greater deprivation. That is, she acts out of fear of conse-
quential harm, not out of an anticipation of immediate personal 
benefit. The layering of tbe effects of power upon any preexisting 
cendencies wi ll make women seem even more deferential than they 
really are. 
The confl ict inherent in marriage also sheds light on forms that 
fem ale sexuality can take both within and outside that relationship. 
A satisfying treatment of marital sexuality cannot proceed without 
a fu lly nuanced anatomy of desire and, perhaps, a normative hier-
archy of the consistency of varieties of sexual experience with the 
dignity and integrity of the person. Even without these tools, how-
ever, it is possible to recognize a continuum of sexual encounters: 
from those accompanied by elemental sexual arousal or sexual de-
sire, to those devoid of sexual feeling but undertaken for distinctly 
instrumental purposes. On the latter end of the spectrum, a person 
might decide to have sex without arousal or desire because of the 
expected negative consequences of refusing or to make it easier to 
obtain a desirable nonsexual objective. T he most extreme example 
of "instrumental " sex is submission motivated by a fear of physical 
violence. But that is not the main concern here. Rather, the more 
interesting category for our purposes is that of women who find 
themselves having sex, not because they welcome the encounter for 
its own sake or even simply fro m a loving desire to give pleasure or 
to make a partner happy, but because of concerns about conse-
'"See supra note 32. 
233 There are, of course, man y who would questio n a utility model that viewed the 
sa tis fac tion of all preferences, however fo rmed , as enhancing the welfare of the per-
son holding those preferences. See supra note 32, and sources cited therein ; see also 
Sen, supra note 8 (arguing that an individual's preferences are intlu enced by exoge-
nous pressures); Sumner, supra note 32, at 66, 160-62 ("[P]ersonal va lues are al so no-
torious ly subject to influence by accustomed social conditions. "); Cass Sunstein, Le-
ga! Interfe rence with Private Preferences, 53 U. Ch i. L. Rev. 1129 (1986) (noting that 
private preferences are not uninfluenced by legal rules). 
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quences v;ithin and for the relationship. A woman may decide 
against refusing h.;:;r husband for a range of reasons: she may an-
ticipate his displeasure or dread his moods or worry that he will 
. C' 1 . • '1 . 1 . renege on 2 prormse. J ne may recogmze that a we1 -t1mec sexual 
encounter \vill help her to "get her way" in a conflict tha t lies on 
the horizon or \vill simply aid her in procuring day-to-day coopera-
• ,, ~ . l • h ,. l"" 1 1 ' twn. Ur S1le roay s1mp1y WlSl to sonu.ny or preserve a va1uea rela-
tionship by m~nimizing the incremental tensions that can lead to 
1 -·· r· -~ • 1 "' T 1 · .., eve11tua1 d1:;artect1c)n -or aoa11aonme11t. j _ c' oe stlre~ men m1,g.nt C)C-
casionally fin d themsel-ves having sex "without really wanting to" 
for simil~r reasons. 21 ; And there is certainly room for" disagree;nent 
"h 1 " 1 -.' ~ )) c 1 • l as to \V_~ etn_r=~r 211 .. ~ 1n_strtlrnentai reas(Jns tor na·v1ng sex~ as so ae-
scribed, are ttl be considered suspect or undesirable, especially 
within an ongoing long-term relationship. Because motives are of-
ten mixed, the line between sex provided from anticipation of loss 
or gain and sex provided out of love can sometimes be very fine in-
deed. Nonetheless, it must at least be acknowledged that marriage 
provides a potential setting for sex that has little to do with ardor 
or affection as such, and much to do with fear of being deprived of 
the forms of material and social well-being that a partner can pro-
vide. Women's weaker bargaining position suggests that the expe-
rience of having sex that is "unwanted"-in the sense that it is not 
undertaken out of an immediate physical desire for the other per-
son or from the wish to give or receive sexual pleasure, but rather 
out of a concern for a deprivation the other person might inflict-is 
a more common one for women than for men. The fundamental 
insight is that women's experience of sex must be decisively col-
ored by the power men (including husbands) exercise in ordinary 
marital relationships. 
234 Biology ensures, however, that a man-unlike a woman-cannot have hetero-
sexual intercourse in the absence of sexual arousaL 1f sexual desire is a richer and 
more complicated psychological state than mere arousal, a man could find himself in 
a situation in which he would prefer to forgo a sexual encounter despite a level of 
arousal that makes the encounter possible. In that case, he might go ahead despite 
his lack of desire for the same reasons a woman might do so: to further some instru-
mental purpose. Cf. lv1ary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 
UCLA \\'omen's LJ. (forthcoming 1998) (on file with the Virginia Law Review As-
sociation) (recognizing a category of sexuai experiences that "one would rather forgo 
than endure were there no negative consequences"). 
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2. Egalirarian lvlarriage and Prernarital Endowrnents 
Formidable forces are arrayed against the realization of the 
egalitarian ideal for marriage. Before further exploring the prag-· 
matic implications of this insight , it is necessary to discuss some 
problem atic limitations of the egalitarian paradigm. Every concept 
~ 1. , l . , 1 . ... 1 - .... " ot equa11ty must not only answer tne questiOn .. equauty or wnat; 
but also ''equality as compared to 'Nhat?" The latte r inquiry re-
. ' }" 1 • 1 1 • ' ~ • 1 · I • qmres estao 1snmg a oasenne agamst wmcn w measure equauty-a 
baseline that is as free from arbitrary assumptions and "undeserved" 
credit as possible. How \Vell does the concept of egalitarian mar-
riage employed here satisfy those conditions? 
The utility measure and the marital pooling condition seek to 
minimize " the importation of a market idea of fairness into family 
life. "235 The measure of entitlement is not an individual's market 
resources, but the more neutral metric of equality of satisfaction or 
well-being. That measure strives to be "for internal use only"236 in 
two senses. First, it does not rely directly on market price and 
value in fixing the terms of exchange within marriage. Second, it 
excludes certain conditions external to the marriage-partners' dif-
ferential prospects on the remarriage and labor markets, for exam-
ple-in determining the measure of well-being. 
These conditions raise the question of whether, even if spouses 
are equally likely to get their way within a marital union, they are 
really equally well off if one spouse, but not the other, could do 
almost as well within another marriage or outside of marriage alto-
gether. Should the measure of relative posi tion take account of 
opportunity cost-that is, hmv well each spouse is doing compared 
to his or her prospects elsewhere? T his question shows that re-
jecting extramarital opportunities as the basis for assessing equality 
requires some justification. 
The decision to view exuamarital prospects as external to the 
bargain is a decision to reject extramarital well-being as a baseline 
for gauging marital equality, and equal gain in uti lity over that 
baseline as the benchmark for equality. If the latter measure were 
adopted, the basis for equal division would be the divorce-threat 
bargaining surplus, and an equal division of that surplus would 
2Js Bergmann, supra note 7, at 271; supra note 160. 
236 Bergmann, supra note 7, at 272. 
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spell marital equality. Such an approach would obviously yield a 
quite different assessment of the degree to which real life bargains 
deviate from the egalitarian norm, because the potential effects of 
unequal extramarital prospects between men and women would be 
rendered invisible by fo lding these factors into the starting point 
for equality. Nevertheless , our fr amework suggests that actuai re-
lationships might still deviate from this measure of equali ty, though 
perhaps not as sharply as under our working mode l: T he free rider 
effects of diffe rent intramarital th reats or the sex imbalance in ne-
gotiating skiiis and strength might still opera te to allow men to 
garner a greater share of gains over the extramarital baseline. 
The main problem with adopting an extramarital baseline and 
shares of utility gain over that baseline as the measure of equali ty 
is that it "may well prescribe exactly the sorts of distributions that 
motivated the concern with inequality of bargaining potential in 
the first place. "237 This does not mean that it is the wrong principle. 
But it is a less heuristically valuable one. The chosen fram ework 
permits clear identification of more of the key factors that put 
women at a real-life disadvantage. 
It is nonetheless important to acknowledge that the egalitarian 
calculus adopted here does not create a division rule that is entirely 
untainted by fixed traits, market values, or other extrinsic social 
forces that influence the parties' baseline endowments. Indeed, 
it would be difficult to come up with a calculus free from these in-
fluences that did not wholly flout our intuitive sense of marital 
benefits and burdens. Partners' endowments (in the form of be-
liefs, talents, energy , tastes , and skills) help determine how much 
utility each spouse can and will contribute to the marital pool. 
Those endowments also determine how much value each spouse 
draws from the pool (including how much benefit is derived di-
rectly from the other spouse 's contributions). A paradigm that al-
lows these endowments to affect gains and entitlements-as does 
ours-can be faulted as arbitrary or unjuse3s in its treatment of the 
m Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 68. 
238 On the supply side, earning power and accumulated wealth inevitably affect the 
utility calculus because earnings expand the pool of marita l assets to be di sbursed and 
generate utility for family members. But earning power and wealth , like other assets 
and endowments spouses bring into the ma rriage, can be traced in part to arbitrary 
advantages that differ by sex, such as better educational, training, or job opportuni-
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range of background conditions that may create a debt for one 
party in favor of the other.m 
ti es for me n. Alternatively , sex-correlated preferences fo r certain kinds of work 
might produce supply-side di slocat ions that dep ress or e nh ance the pay for some sex-
stereotyped jobs. A lso , me n migh t have a greater ·'tas te" fo r wealth accumulation. 
See Spa in & Bianchi , supra note 7, at 90-96, 129-31; Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P 
Lazea r, Comparabl e Worth and Discrim inat ion in Labor Markets, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
891 (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Ana lysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1311 (1989). A lternat ively, though, grea t wealth and earni ng 
power may also be the product of great pre marital effort or hard work, which is ge n-
era lly costly to the spouse expe nding that effort. I1. cou ld be a rgued that a spouse 
should somehow get credi t within the marriage for ·' negative utility" expended in 
creating asse ts that are imported int o th·.; marriage, at least to the degree that those 
pre marital costs exceed th e other partner's . Ye t our mode l does not generally permi t 
such credit , since it ne ts o ut from th e marital pool only those costs individually in-
curred during the life of the ma rri age. 
Furthermore, a husband may be ab le to add value to the marriage through minimal 
effort because he is handsome. empathic, or charming. These a ttributes generate 
marita l capital, which red o unds directl y to the benefit of his wife. The wife's gain is a 
functi on of the husband 's fixed, pass ive, a nd " unearned" characteristics, and not of 
his effort or active input. Yet the husband wi ll "get credit" for these contributions in 
the marital calculus, if only because they add directly to hi s wife's satisfaction. Th e 
amount of satisfaction his wife gains from the husband's possession of those attrib-
utes is in turn based on her preferences and tastes, which are equally arbitrary and 
undeserved. More pertinently for present purposes, it is suggested that men and 
wo men may differ in their degree of distaste for domes tic tasks. If a husband hates 
doing laundry twice as much as his wi fe does, is he to be rewarded for this preference 
by having to do half as much o r ge tting tw ice as much ma rital compensation for do ing 
it all? The latter case presents the problem posed by a re la tionship in which one 
spo use 's preferences threa te n to turn him into a type o f " utility monster"-that is, a 
pe rson who obtains "enormously greater gains in utili ty fro m any sacrifice of others 
than these others lose." Robert Nozick, A narchy, State, and Utopia 41 (1968). These 
possibilities raise difficult issues that this model does not resolve. But see Wertheime r, 
supra note 32, at 216-30 (discuss ing how the judgment of the fai rness o f a bargain is 
influenced by the sense of justice or the moral significa nce o f the background condi-
tions contributing to the bargainer's endowments and o utsi de opportunities). See 
ge nerally Richard H. Fallon , J r. , To Each According to His Ability, From None Ac-
cording to His Race : Th e Concept of Me rit in the Law of A ntidiscrimination , 60 B.U. 
L. Rev . 815 (1980) (assessing the costs and bene fits of merit-based distributive systems) ; 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justi ce (1971) (describing the a rbitrariness of talents); 
George Sher, Desert 22-36 (1987) (assess ing Rawls 's critique of concepts of desert). 
239 There are additional probl e ms with the model 's trea tme nt of preferences. For 
example, in discussing the influe nce of the endowment effect in the negotiating proc-
ess, men 's tendency to di scou nt the worth of working wives' monetary income 
(because those inputs are see n as coming at the expense of other valuable wifely 
services) is viewed as contributing to deviation from an egalitarian relationship be-
cause it "distorts" the negoti ati ng process. There is , however, an alternative way to 
think about this phenomenon. If men view their wives' paid work effort as imposing 
gri evous costs as well as benefits, then perhaps it mak es se nse for women to work 
harder at home just to balance o ut those perceived costs and even up the ledge r of 
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These probiematic features cannot be completely avoided if one 
sticks with subjective, psychic utility as the m~asur; of well-being. 240 
A lthough this exercise by no means requires a larger commitment 
to the view that preferences are exogenous, the model adopted 
here by and large takes people as it finds them. \Ve need only be 
mindful that the working egalitarian calculus has the potential to 
hide problematic sources of advantage in the marita l bargaining 
game. Nevertheless, the concept of egalit arian marri age , for all its 
flaws, provides a useful heuristic for identifying and examining a 
host of forces that push intramarital arrangements in directions 
that favor men over women and for understanding the conse-
quences of bargaining imbalance. 
C. The Bargaining Squeeze 
The bargaining approach helps identify the forces that cause the 
average wife to agree to take on a greater burden of domestic work 
and responsibility than her husband. If the wife also participates 
significantly in the paid labor market, she will find herself working 
harder overall. Nloreover, as discussed,24 1 power distribution af-
effort and reward . In o ther words, if we take men's pe rcep ti ons of the worth of 
women 's efforts as given in the utility calculus, then perhaps women's greater domes-
tic effort should be perce ived as making the relationship mor e equa l, not less . 
Moreover, in choosing one baseline among oth ers, the mode l treats ce rt ain e le -
ments (like personal tastes or preferences, or labor marke t prospects) as sometimes 
intern al to the model and at other times ex ternal to it. Like earning power, a 
spouse's professional status, mecha nical sk ill , social graces, and love of childre n are 
all incorporated into the measure of an egalitarian re lationship , in that each affects 
the conte nts of the pool from which the other spouse draws satisfacti on within the 
marriage . In contras t, a ma n's desire to marry a younge r woma n is a pre fere nce th at 
is viewed as external to the re lati onship and to the definition of equality. Thus, some 
differences in prefe rences and endowments defin e eq uality wh il e o th ers are ide nti -
fied as sources of deviation from it. Also, some of the same elements appear on both 
sides of the equation , as when market earning power figures bo th in the creation of 
the mari tal pool (which fixes the crite rion for the id eal ega li tari an division ) and in th e 
magnitud e of the marital threat va lu es (which determines th e negotiation set and 
thus the likely deviation from equality). 
2.w For example, in proposing a "sharing ethic," in which each spouse 's contribution 
would be valued "as proportio nal to the tota l time the pe rson devoted to the famil y's 
economic well -being" and " [e]ach hour woul d be valued inverse ly to the pleasure the 
activity gave," Barbara Bergmann sidesteps the difficult proble m of assessing the eq-
uitable value of spouses' pos itive con tributions by adopting the metric o f hours of 
work. Bergma nn, supra note 7, a t 272. She thus obviates the need to consider any 
subjective measure of th e utility spouses generate for themselves or others. 
2' 1 See supra Section IV.A.2. 
, 
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fects tr1e choices that wives make about whether and how much to 
participate in the labor market A wife might work for pay even if 
she would be better off staying home, or she might stay home even 
if she would be better off working. A more detailed and dynamic 
examination of the elements of marital bargaining adds richness to 
these insights by showing how initial disparities in bargaining 
power, and ether factors that compound those disparities, create a 
f t'"f ] ' 1 ~ .. 1)2-!2 ·- '1 '1 .~.' 1'£' :..orm o~ ieecoacK Lransm1ssion, or teeao2cK oop, t!la[ amp 111es 
behavioral differences betv;een the sexes and, ultimately, gender 
inequality. T he result is a progressive bargaining squeeze that has 
potentially detrimental consequences for women, for children, and 
for the marital unit as a whole. 
Hmv does feedback transmission work? This Article has sug-
gested that men and women do not start out with equal bargaining 
power in marriage because marriage is on average more valuable 
to women than men, and because men and women have different 
utility functions for the supply of public goods.w That initial dis-
parity leads the average woman to agree to take on a greater bur-
den of domestic responsibility than her husband, even if she also 
works long hours for pay. Initially, she may find herself making a 
more intensive "active" investment in idiosyncratic marriage-
specific capital than her husband. Even if that greater investment 
does not at first result in greater labor market opportunity costs 
(i.e., cutbacks at work), she still functions as a first performer of the 
implicit marital contract: Her greater sunk costs (which necessarily 
increase her relative costs of exit) will lead to further erosion in her 
bargaining power. She will also begin to experience a decline in 
her remarriage options, which will add to the weakness of her posi-
tion.244 As her bargaining position slips, her husband is tempted to 
press for a greater share of marital gains because he has the power 
to get his way. As a result, she may experience steadily increasing 
pressure to take on more responsibility. The greater pressure has 
t\vo possible results. The wife may resist the pressure by shirking 
and cutting corners at home in order to bring down her total costs 
2"2 The phrase is Amartya Sen's. Sen, supra note 8, at 138 n.25 (noting the tendency 
to " ignor[e) the role of ' feedback transmiss ion· in sustain ing gender asymmetry "). 
w See supra Section II.D.3.c. 
244 This corresponds to the passive first performer component, described above. See 
supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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in the marriage and increase her net share. At the same time, she 
may increase her investment in paid work, in order to buy 
"insurance" against the spouse's further reneging or decision to 
dissolve the relationship altogether. A lternatively , she may with-
draw from paid work and specialize more in unpaid work in order 
to relieve the pressure and costs of greater responsibility. But the 
latter choice only worsens her bargaining position by introducing 
significant market opportunity costs as well as deepening her sunk 
costs (in the form of marriage-specific investment) re lat ive to her 
"portable" employment market investment. This process can con-
tinue indefinitely until the woman withdraws from market work to 
a significant degree or drops out of the labor force altogether. 
This scenario reflects the fact that the inability to enter an en-
forceable long-term contract to govern a relationship where one 
party is the first performer is equivalent to inviting inefficient op-
portunistic renegotiation. 245 Because couples cannot make a pre-
marital contract that is enforceable intramaritally, they must con-
stantly negotiate and renegotiate the marital bargain as the 
marriage progresses. The position from which women renegotiate 
the bargain is generally one of progressively declining bargaining 
strength, in which they stand to relinquish the gains, or "quasi-
rents" that they might have captured if an enforceable, long-term 
agreement had been negotiated before entering into the relation-
ship.246 The response to the threat of opportunistic appropriation is 
some form of suboptimal investment, in which the more powerful 
party reneges or threatens to renege, and the vulnerable party 
scrambles to minimize her potential losses by decreasing her total 
investment as bargaining strength permits (by cutting back at work, 
:,; See Cohen, supra note 4; supra Section I.B (discussing the first performer prob-
lem); see also Brinig & Crafton, supra note 55 (d iscuss ing opportunism in marriage 
under no-fault rul es). The first performer problem is a variant of the larger dilemma 
posed by "sunk costs, " or specialized inves tment in the context of relational contracts 
in which the parties find it necessary (because of unanticipated continge nci es) to re-
nego tiate the terms of th e contract midstream. In tha t case, the parties "have ince n-
tives to use strategic or opportunistic behavior in order to secure a large r slice of the 
enhanced contractu al 'pie."' Goetz & Scott, supra note 107, at 1101. For a discussion 
of relational contracts, see infra notes 250, 297 and accompanying text. 
2J6 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 287-89. 
, 
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at home, or both) or by rechanneling her efforts into "portable" as-
sets (such as labor market human capital). 247 
Consider the hypothetical bargain that a particular couple would 
strike on the eve of marriage if they possessed perfect information 
and were guaranteed perfect enforcement of their deal. Even if the 
couple did not start out from positions of equal outside options and 
equal extramarital welfare, and thus would be unlikely to negotiate 
a perfectly egalitarian deal, 248 the ability to negotiate a binding an-
tenuptial agreement would still have salutary effects, because it 
would arrest the bargaining squeeze and eliminate the potential for 
opportunism that it presents. If we assume that the couple first set-
tles on some significant level of mutual parti cipation in the paid la-
bor market,2~9 then they would likely agree initially to an allocation 
of unpaid labor that was efficient (Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks), and 
then would agree on side-payments that reflected their relative 
bargaining position. This might result in some degree of role divi-
sion. But because, by hypothesis, their agreement would be both 
specific and specifically enforceable for the life of the relationship, 
any role division (which might require one party to make a greater 
domestic investment) would not contribute to the more domestic 
spouse's deteriorating bargaining position. There would be no op-
'"7 Although it may "cost" a woman to combine domestic work with market work 
during the life of the marriage (as compared to dropping market work altogether), 
investing in market work is a wise strategy in a climate of uncertainty regarding the 
contours of the marital deal or the very continuation of the marriage itself. One ex-
planation for why women persist in working for pay despite the relative overload of 
dual responsibility is that they are purchasing insurance against divorce. See supra 
Section IV.A.2 . 
'"8 The average premarital positions of men and women-the positions from which 
they would write a private contract to govern intramarital relations-are probably 
not the same and thus would not be expected to produce an egalitarian deal for most 
women on the market. An egalitarian deal might be possible if the woman settled for 
a much Jess desirable partner than she could ordinarily obtain on a marriage market 
in which both matches and marital terms would be determined competitively. For a 
discussion on the interaction of the marital bargain and the marriage market, see su-
pra Section 11.0.3; infra Sections V.C, 0.1 . 
'"'In reality, not all couples would decide on this level of mutual employment, and 
the decision about just how much paid labor each person would perform would not 
be made independently of all other decisions about work, leisure, and distribution. 
Moreover, the couple's commitment to paid employment could not really be inde-
pendent of bargaining power. But, for simplicity, this discussion takes as its starting 
point a situation in which both members of a couple engage in significant amounts of 
paid work. 
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 84:509 
portunistic renegotiation because the more vulnerable party could 
refuse to renegotiate the contract or demand compensation for 
doing so. The deal would be stable and permanent, and an optimal 
and efficient level of domestic services would be supplied. 250 
But consider \Vhat happens when any initial arrangement is not 
enforceable. Once the marriage is underway , the vvoman wil l come 
under pressure to do an even greater share of unpaid vvork ; her 
greater sunk costs improve her husband's bargaining position, al-
lowing him to engage in opportunistic shirking of the performance 
of his initi ally agreed-upon amount or to ren ege on promised side-
payments. The husband 's shirking will in tum induce the wife to 
shirk: It may not be wor thwhile for her to continue to maintain the 
to rallevel of domestic services contemplated in the original agree-
ment by taking over the husband's share in addition to doing her 
greater agreed-upon share. Rather , she will adopt some level of 
output of domestic services (probably a level between her own ini-
tially bargained-for level and the amount needed to maintain the 
total-his plus hers-bargained-for output) that is optimal for her, 
given the balance of costs and benefits. Because of the ceiling ef-
fects of women's time and effort overload and the steep increase in 
the negative marginal utility of work near the top of the ceiling, it 
may be in her interest to reduce her effort significantly. In other 
words, she will engage in a process of self-help to soften the effect 
of her husband's refusal to honor the bargain, thus capturing some 
portion of the benefits of the bargain at his expense. The result 
may well be an overall undersupply of domestic investment to the 
unit (by both husband and wife) relative to the optimal amount. 
250 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J .L. & 
Econ. 297, 301 (1978) (describi ng the efficiency costs of opportunistic behavior). Of 
course, a comprehensive anticipatory contract is a virtual im possibility because the 
parties cannot possibly predict all future eventual ities that bear on the relationsh ip 
bet\veen the parties. To posit a fully specifiable contract is, in effect, to read mar-
riage out of the category of relational contracts as they have been described and 
anal yzed. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 66; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Co-
operation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. R ev. 2005 (1987). lt is nevertheless 
analytically useful to set out the ramifications of assuming that an anticipatory bind-
ing contract could be devised. See infra Section V.D.l. 
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The unit as a whole would be worse off, and both spouses, as indi-
viduals, would be too. 251 
T here is another possible consequence of men's shirking from an 
ideal bargain if that behavior is coupled with direct pressure on 
wives to take up the full degree of slack: Men's greater bargaining 
power might result in some husbands' overp laying their hand and 
pushing women beyond their "reservation price" for the relation-
ship, thus inducing wome n to initiate divorce. This scenario helps 
explain how evolving bargaining inequal ity due to diverging threat 
alternatives can destabilize marriage. It also helps explain how the 
data suggesting that women initiate divorce more frequently than 
men252 is fully consistent -,vith the bargaining paradigm and with 
women doing worse by marriage than men. Because of her weaker 
bargaining position and he r smaller surplus share, the typical wife 
may be squeezed closer to her reservation price than her husband, 
and the margin for further pressure is smaller. In the give and take 
of marital negotiation, the person in the weaker position (the wife) 
is more likely to be pushed past her reservation price to a zero, or 
negative, share of marital surplus. 253 The husband, in contrast, has 
a much larger cushion of surplus going into any negotiation, and 
thus is less likely to be pushed "over the edge" by the other part-
ner's hard bargaining. This explanation for observed patterns of 
divorce initiation holds good even though what awaits the woman 
after divorce is less attractive than what awaits her husband. The 
wi llingness to divorce is not a function of this interpersonal com-
parison. Rather, what matters is the intrapersonal difference in 
how well each spouse can do inside versus outside the marriage. If 
the woman's bargaining position is so weak that she cannot gain 
even a minimal share of marital surplus, she will initiate divorce. 
vVives are more likely to be in that position than husbands. 254 
~51 That is because, by hypo thesis, ihe size of the pie would be smaller under th e re-
negotiation scenario than if an e nforceable deal could be made between the same 
sp6uses up front. This scenario ass umes that there is no marriage market effect from 
being able to write an enforceable prenuptial agreement. See infra Section V.D.l. 
152 See supra note 175. 
153 T his effect can be exacerbated by a woman's sense of the unfairness of being 
pushed too hard. On the role of the "taste for equity" in fue ling marital breakdown, 
see supra note 174. 
~ j.l B ~t see infra note 268 (suggesting factors going to variations in timing of divorce 
initiation by men and women). 
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The real victims of th e spousal race to the bottom, however, may 
be third parties who typically benefi t most from investments in 
domes ticity: children. As working couples engage in their rounds 
of se lf-protective shirking, children may receive less than an opti-
mal amount of attention and suffer accordingly. Indeed, the sce-
nario shows how women's lesser bargaining power within marriage 
can hurt children. Women may have strong preferences for chil-
dren's receiving parental attention and care. If working women 
could somehow attain greater barga ining power in marriage, they 
might use it to induce men to relinquish some of their leisure time 
in orde r to care for children. If women had the bargaining strength 
to effect more spousal sharing of domest ic responsibility, each unit 
of women's attention to children wou ld come at lower cost than 
under conditions of severe maternal work overload. The result might 
be a greater degree of combined parental time for children overall. 255 
The social science data provide evidence of a dramatic reduction 
in total household time devoted to both housework and childcare 
over the past thirty years.256 To be sure, much of the decline fol-
lows women's substitution of paid work for unpaid work, which in-
creases monetary income that can be spent on children. Whether 
the reduction in parental time represented by the substitution of 
paid work for domestic work represents a harmful net loss for chil-
dren in a family is a function of a complex calculus: It depends on 
whether increased earnings make up for the loss of maternal atten-
tion, whether one or both parents have adjusted the quantity or 
quality of attention paid to children in off-work hours,257 and 
~~~ This conclusion is of a piece with the " kids-d o-better" hypothesis, see supra note 
220, which asserts th at "childre n benefit wh e n their mothers co ntrol a larger fraction 
of fa mily resources." Lundbe rg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56, 
a t 155. That control can take the form of ini tia l materna l command over resources 
brought into the marriage (such as the moth er' s earnings or child allowances assigned 
specifically to th e mother, see Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Mod-
e ls , supra note 56, at 135) or through any measures that give women more bargaining 
power within the family. 
256 See Blau & Ferber, supra note 16, at 126 tbl.5.3; Robinson & Godbey, supra note 
18. For an interes ting sociological perspective on the " fli ght from domes ticity," see 
Arli e Hochschild , The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes 
Work (1997). 
257 As to the issue of "quality time, " Steve Nock and Paul Kingston, in the ir 1981 
study of working couples with children , found that children in single breadwinner, 
two-pare nt families spend substantially more time with their pa re nts (mostly moth-
ers) than children in dual-earner families , but that the differe nce with dua l-earne r 
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whether there is an important and independent value in a parent's 
just being present for most of a child's waking hours. It is possible 
that, in some families, couples work too hard and long to give chil-
dren the attention they need, even if all of both parents' nonwork 
hours are devoted to children. Below that level, and at any given 
level of total commitment to paid work, reductions in parental at-
tention during off-work hours may at some point start to detract 
significantly from children's well-being. Evidence indicates, as al-
ready discussed, that the void at home produced by women's entry 
into the job market has not been completely fi lled by men. On the 
contrary, men seem to have taken full advantage of their bargain-
ing power to minimize the extent to ~which women's market efforts 
impinge on their freedom and leisure. This analysis suggests that, 
by imposing costs on women and pressuring them to engage in self-
help, this strategy may have come at children's expense as well. 258 
The foregoing explains how the marital bargaining squeeze might 
produce suboptimal total investment in domesticity and children. 
In other cases, however, it might have the effect of exerting down-
ward pressure on a woman's investment in paid work below the 
level that a woman might select if she bargained from a position of 
greater strength. Some wives might choose to recapture a greater 
share of the bargaining surplus not by cutting back on domestic 
families is "largely accounted for by the lesser time of employed mothers in activities 
that involve children only peripherally, not in directly child-oriented activities." Ste-
ven L. Nock & Paul William Kingston, Time with Children: The Impact of Couples' 
Work-Time Commitments, 67 Soc. Forces 59,59 (1988). 
'"This conclusion comports with the observations in one study of working spouses' 
childcare arrangements, which found that "variation in husband's [sic] hours of work 
has no statistically significant effect" on men's childcare responsibilities or time with 
children. Richard R. Peterson & Kathleen Gerson, Determinants of Responsibility 
for Child Care Arrangements among Dual-Earner Couples, 54 J. Marriage & Fam. 
527, 532 (1992). The authors conclude that "[h]usbands' involvement in paid work 
and relatively low participation in household work appear to be the path of least re-
sistance." Id. 
Nock and Kingston found that fathers in dual-earner couples do not generally 
make up for even a portion of parental time lost to children by mothers' going out to 
work. Rather, they spend on average less time with their children than otherwise 
comparable men in single:earner couples. See Nock & Kingston, supra note 257, at 
74. Much of this effect is the result of couples ' practice of engaging in staggered shift 
work in order to minimize the cost of paid chil dcare. Moreover, the data suggest that 
couples tend to arrange shiftwork so that fathers are at work and mothers are at 
home when children are present and awake (e.g., afterschool and early evening). See 
id. at 73-76, 81 & tbl.3. These arrangements mean that men can spend more time at 
home at leisure rather than engaging in childcare. 
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labor but by reducin g the effort expended on pa1d labor.m The 
pressure to withdraw from paid work is independent of efficiency 
considerations, since it results from the vveaker party's desire to re-
capture a greater share of the marital surplus by reducing her ef-
fort. But the woman ;,vho chooses this avenue of cost-reduction 
further 1,veakens her bargaining position because she effectively 
. .. . k I S' 1 . . spec1atrzes m nonmar et \Vorte. ne tnus mcreases marnage-
specific in·vestment and market opportunity cosrs, which \Videns the 
divergence between her expected extramarital utility and her hus-
band 's. This strategy creates a vicious cycle in which v.,rithdrawal 
from .rnarket vvork generates fresh pressure to ~;vithdra'N even more. 
These pressures operate independently of lhe famed returns to 
specialization touted by Gary Becker, which tend to increase role 
division by enhancing marital surplus. 2cn H.ather, the increased role 
division here is a matter of power loss wi thin a bargaining relation-
ship due to the divergence of threat points and has no necessary 
connection to efficiency gains. 
T he downward pressure on paid work has fa r-reaching conse-
quences for women's well-being and social status as a group. First, 
the prospect of encountering such pressures affects women's long-
term incentives to prepare for market work, since women who an-
ticipate that they will be forced to take on a greater share of unpaid 
work and to withdraw from paid work will underinvest in labor 
m arket capital. 26 1 Since high earning power only alleviates, but 
25' This choice between cutting back on domestic work and scaling back paid work 
might reflect variation in women's tastes for pa id work and domestic work. It might 
also reflect in trasex differences in utilities a ttached to certa in types of risk, since 
women's market work probably plays an important role as insurance against marital 
breakdown. See supra notes 191 -193 and accompanying tex t. That there is some 
range of taste in th ese matters is suggested by data showing th at married women fall 
into distinct camps based on their labor supply e lasticiti es, and that th ey differ in th e 
magnitude and direction of income and substitution effects . Some studies indicate 
that married women with high labor marke t participation have elasticities close to 
those o f marri ed men, whereas women who work less are generally highly responsive 
to factors that make work more or less lucra tive. See Alstott , supra note 6, at 2018-20 
& n.75. ln light of these differences, one would expect that some hypo thetical 
"egalitarian " couples might choose to strike quite '' equaiitari an" deals characterized 
by similarity in marital roles, see supra Section ILC.l, whil e o thers would negotiate 
for more role di visio n. 
260 For a discussion of Becker's comparative advan tage argument, see supra note 187. 
161 See Ok in, note 32, at 144; see aiso Mahony, sup ra note 16, at 69-71 (describing 
how a trad itional woman "b urns bridges" to a lternatives to being a homemaker); 
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does not eliminate, the disparity in bargaining power, this effect 
vvill operate apart from any other incentives to engage in labor 
market capital investment. Second, the logic of disparities in bar-
gaining power dictates that small initial inequalities of responsibil-
ity for household work inexorably tend to snowball. Although sex 
differences in preferences, tastes, earning power, or comparative 
advantage hel p to create initial bargaining disparities, those dis-
parities unleash a set of forces that take on a life of their own. The 
effects of barg2.ining inequality are then added to the other social, 
personal, and labor market factors that militate against women's 
full participation in the workforce, or in any other worldly endeav-
ors-such as pohtics-that require large commitments outside the 
home. 262 This contributes to the creation of a caste-like system in 
'vVhich women as a group enjoy less economic and political power 
and fewer of the benefits that economic and political power bring.263 
V. Is THERE A CURE FOR BARGAINING IMBALANCE? 
Suppose equal bargaining power is defined as the condition that 
would allow the partners, regardless of sex, to negotiate an egali-
tarian marriage. What, if anything, could be done to attain that 
ideal? How might v;e go about correcting the sexual imbalance in 
bargaining power that marks the institution of marriage as it cur-
rently exists? 
The sources of women's bargaining disadvantage are threefold: 
differences in the premarital and evolving divorce threat advan-
tage, differences in the intramarita l threat advantage, and differ-
ences in factors leading to weakness in the negotiating process. 
Each of these sources of bargaining imbalance stems from the pe-
culiar interplay of differences between men's and women's prefer-
Williams, supra note 3, at 2241 (discussing the rhetoric of choice: "women are really 
equal, goes the argument, they just make different choices"). 
'"'See, e.g., Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman & Stanley Verba, The Public Consequences 
of Private Inequality: Family Life and Citizen Participation, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 
373, 382-83 (1997) (exploring possible links between spouses' control over family 
money and free time and involvement in political activities); see also McCaffery, su-
pra note 186, at 623 (noting that women planning to marry may have fewer incentives 
to pursue education); Okin, supra note 32, at 138-39 (suggesting that women may 
make themselves more vulnerable by an ticipating the division of labor within marriage). 
"'See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2411 (1994) 
(describing castes as resulting from "social and legal practices [that] translat[ e] highly 
visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage"). 
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ences or social position with key features of the marital regime. 
The most important features are fundamental to marriage itself: 
Both legally and conventionally, marri age is understood to be an 
exclusive, bilaterally monopolistic contract within which spouses 
are committed to satisfying a host of mutual needs. T wo other key 
features are the legal convention of marital privacy--which gives 
rise to a strong formal rule against intramarital enforceability of 
explicit contracts between spouses-and marriage's practical char-
acter as a complex rel ational contract-which makes the creation 
and enforcement of explicit terms for the conduct of marriage as a 
going concern highly infeasible. The fina l feature of the marital 
regime is the law of exit (or di lorce ). Divorce is made easy and is 
accompanied by limited redist ribution of resources. The rules of 
divorce are also sex-blind, in that they take no systematic notice of 
the structural differences between men 's and women's fate follow-
ing divorce. Consequently, men and women are forced to bargain 
in the shadow of the markets for employment and for mates, where 
those markets offer different prospects for men and women. 
Any corrective for bargaining imbalance must deal adequately 
both with men's exit threat advantage and their intramarital advan-
tage. (It would also ideally come to grips with women's potential 
weakness in the process of negotiation itself-a tall order.) Unfor-
tunately, a measure that may correct or mitigate some sources of 
imbalance will not necessarily address others, may exacerbate 
them, or will produce other perverse effects. For this and other 
reasons, a comprehensive solution to bargaining imbalance is hard 
to come by. 
A. Rules of Jl..1arriage and Divorce 
The deep structure of marriage and the conditions of exit from 
marriage appear most critical to the development of the bargaining 
imbalance. The most obvious corrective is to abolish either mar-
riage or divorce. Although the former has recently been pro-
posed,26~ and the latter actually implemented in the past,265 neither 
is a feasible solution. Because a suitable marriage is a positive-sum 
1"' See Fineman, supra note 3, at 228-30 (proposing that the legal institution of mar-
riage be abolished). 
265 See Lawrence Stone, The Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987, at 1-8 (1990). 
, 
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game, 1t 1s safe to predict that peopie will find a way to play it. 
Thus, even if legal marriage were abolished, people would continue 
to couple up, to make relati onship-specific investments, and to lose 
those investments through sex-skewed opportunistic defections 
under conditions that favor the strong at the expense of the weak, 
ju t as they do today .266 The abol ition of legal marriage would at 
most effect a deregulation of a social practice that would continue 
without benefit even of the inadequate post-mari tal safeguards 
(such as child support and property division laws) that are cur-
rently in place. 
As for abolishing divorce. the problems of an absolute ban are 
inherent in any change that makes divorce harder to obtain: 
Women (and men) who would like to stay married would be fa-
vored at the expense of women (and men) who would not. In any 
event, some spouses would still abandon one another (and with-
draw their marital contributions) , since no divorce rule can force 
people to live together. Many more would stay together, but at the 
cost of the worst type of marital inefficiency: Both partners would 
be better off divorced. 267 Although the differential value of staying 
married for men and women might mean that female winners from 
a ban would outnumber the losers, there would still be a consider-
able number of women for whom marriage to a particular man would 
no longer be worthwhile under any feasible bargaining scenario. 268 
2' 6 See Amy L. Wax, T he Two-Pare nt Family in the Libera l Sta te: The Case fo r 
Se lective Subsidies, 1 Mich. J . Race & L. 491 (1996) (discuss ing Martha Fineman 's 
proposal to abolish marriage, and predicting the emergence o f " virtual" traditiona l 
marriages even withou t legal recognition for marriage). 
267 Cf. Estin, supra note 4, at 534 ("[A]n 'ineffici ent divorce' is one that occurs even 
th ough husband and wife toget her e njoy a greater gain from marriage than they 
wo uld fro m divorce."). 
z~>S See supra text accompanying notes 174, 252-254 (discussing reasons why women 
might frequently initiate divorce despite appearing to have more to lose from marital 
break up, including dissatisfaction with inequity as such, me n's "hard bargaining" push-
ing women past their reservation price, and the reduction o r destruction of a woman 's 
share of '· marital capital " by irreconcilable conflict o r by the husban d's misfeasance , 
such as abuse, noncoopera tion, or sexual infidelity) . While forec losing divorce weak-
e ns men's bargaining positi on by precluding exit, it also weakens women's position by 
depriving them of the strategic ad vantage of threaten ing to leave. Even when con-
ti nuing a particular marriage remains a positive-sum game, a woman may better her 
bargaining position if her husband believes that she might "call hi s bluff" by acting on 
her own threats or forcin g him to act on his . On the rol e of making credible threats 
in positive-sum games, see supra note 153. 
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Short of a ban on divorce, rule changes have been proposed that 
attempt to make exit m ore di fficult. Currently, all fifty states have 
some variation of no-fault divorce, and the great maj ority have 
unilateral no -fault. 269 Although reintroducing fault or universaliz-
ing bil ateral consent rules would allmv -vvomen to block or impede 
male-initi ated divorce, it would not equalize intramarital bargain-
ing pmver. Exit threat is only one component of the imbalance. 
As the foll owing discussion illustra tes, by trapp ing vvomen within 
noncooperative or disharm onious marriages, sex-neutral impedi-
ments to exit would exacerbate the inequalities th at stem from in-
tramarital differences in access to resources. 
A rule of bilateral consent would alleviate the bargaiuing im bal-
ance created by the threat of a husband 's defection : 'Women who 
wish to remain married despite their husband 's desire to divorce 
would be given an effective property right to the marriage. If the 
husband gained more from divorce than the wife gained from mar-
riage, the husband could try to induce the wife 's consent by effect-
ing a transfer that would make her indifferent between divorce and 
continuing the marriage. 270 But the buyout tactic is only open if the 
initiating spouse's gains from divorce exceed losses to the other. If 
Although there is some data to suggest that women initiate most divorces , see su-
pra note 175, there is a paucity of information about the timing of divorce initiations 
by men and women. The bargaining model wou ld predict that most early divorces 
wo uld be initiated by women , since women 's bargaining power and remarriage pros-
pects decline during the early years while men's are on th e rise. It is especially to a 
woman's advantage, if things are not going well, to end a marriage before the birth of 
children. Men, on the o ther hand , have much to gain from staying with a woman un-
til both have reached middle age (since his position is on the rise relative to hers). 
Thus, male-initiated divorces might begin to increase and perhaps even dominate as 
middle age approaches , even though that is when women's bargaining position is 
weakest. Cf. supra text accompanying note 253 (discussing why women might tend to 
initiate more divorces as their bargaining position deteriorates). 
269 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
~ 70 Ideally, the marriage would then only dissolve if divorce was Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
(producing enough gains to one or both spouses to allow a Pareto-superior redistri-
bution). See, e .g. , Estin, supra note 4, at 541 (discussing Allen Parkman's argument 
that "mutual consent ... permits a wife opposed to a divorce to demand compensa-
tion for all the nonfinancial losses that result from divorce"); see also Martin Zelder, 
Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Pubiic Goods: The Case of No-Fault Di-
vorce, 22 J. Legal Stud. 503 (1993) (explaining that, by compelling a red istribu tion 
that leaves both parties better off upon divorce and discouraging di vorce unless there 
are enough gains to improve both parties' positions relative to remaining married, the 
bilateral consent rule promotes "efficient marriage"). f or a discussion of "efficient" 
alimony rules , see infra text accompanying notes 316-317. 
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that condition does not obtain-or even if it does---the spouse 
seeking a divorce might try to induce the other w abandon the 
marriage by destroying through his or her own conduct much of the 
unique marital capital that makes the marriage valuabie in the first 
place. T here would no longer be a marriage worth saving, or at 
least the marriage would not be worth nearly as much 2s before, 
and it would thus be easier for the disgruntled spouse to persucl.de 
• "l '71 the otner to grant consent.-
T his point illustrates why reform of consent or fault rules cannot 
provide the complete remedy to bargaining imbalance . Rules that 
regulate exiT address only the componenT of bargaini ng we ak-
ne ss that is attributable to differential exit threat advant age . T hey 
leave untouched other possible sources of bargaining V.feakness-
specifically, the h usband 's superior intramarital thre at position un-
der the "burnt toast" scenario. If, as hypothesized, husbands on 
average have a greater ability to make their \Vives miserable within 
marriage than wives do their husbands, equalizing exit threat ad-
vantage alone will not solve the problem. 
In any event, a bilateral consent rule will have consequences that 
could hurt some women. By granting a property right in the mar-
riage to the husband that is symmetrical to the wife's, the rule adds 
as much to men 's bargaining strength as to women's. A woman 
who wanted to divorce might in turn be blocked by a husband who 
might be able to extract concessions (such as the relinquishment of 
property or custody rights) as the price for exit, thus making the 
woman even worse off. 272 Although combining a bilateral consent 
rule with a fault regime would discourage some forms of deliberate 
marital misbehavior, women would still be stuck with undesirable 
partners who fell short of the fault standard, and would lose protec-
tion if they were " at fault " themselves.m 
In sum, reviving fault or consent rules can only be a partial solu-
tion to bargaining imbalance. Indeed, it helps some women at the 
expense of others. For women whose marriage has lost its value or 
27 1 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 300 (" Because the law can do little to enforce 
the most meaningful and possibly onerous obligations of a marriage, it is possible for 
a party to breach the contract. while remaining nominaily married." ). 
272 See Mnookin & Korn hauser, supra note 89, at 963-64. 
m For a review of the general critique of fault rules in divorce, see Estin, supra note 
4, at 559-64; see also Ellman, supra note 99 (general review of fault rule ). 
64 (' . J Virginia Law Review 
worse, remaining married is nightmarish. For \vomen who dearly 
wish to hold onto their husbands and recoup their investment in 
married life, abandonment is their greatest fear. Fault rules favor 
the second group over the first, but both need help. 
The limitations of fault and consent rules stem partly from trying 
to find sex-bl ind and symmetrical solutions to a sex-specific prob-
lem. T he conservative commentator Irving Kristol has suggested 
tha t unilateral no-fault divorce be made available on ly to women; 
men would be required to prove wives ' misfeasance to obtain a dis-
solution.m A lthough this regime would give wives considerable 
leverage, the solution would not be cost less. Iviost notably, it 
would hurt men whose wives' reprehensible behavior falls short of 
legal fault. The main drawback, however, is that the rule might not 
survive a constitutional challenge, since it makes an overt legal dis-
tinction between men and women.275 
B. Child Custody 
O ne area in which the law long tolerated a sex-specific p refer-
ence (in favor of mothers) is child custody. But the law surround-
ing divorce shifted from formalistic and rigid rules (such as 
"maternal preference" or "maternal presumption") to more fl uid 
or egalitarian standards (the "best interests of the child" or "joint 
custody").276 T he process of shaping the details of custody ar-
rangements, as with other aspects of the law governing family rela-
tions , has become increasingly "privatized."277 Child custody is now 
determined primarily by interspousal bargaining. 
"• Irving Kristol , Sex Trumps Gender, Wa ll St. J. , Mar. 6, 1996, at A20; see also 
Burggraf, supra note 81, at 136 (discussing Kri stol's proposal and responses) . 
175 See United States v. Virginia , 518 U .S. 515 (1996); Califano v. Goldberg, 430 
U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S . 71 
(1971); see also Alstott, supra note 6, at 2042 n.171 ("Constituti o nal precedent sug-
gests tha t the gender-neutra l formul a tion would be necessary in the Uni ted States .'' ). 
276 See Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
271 See, e .g., id. a t 8-10 (" [C]ontemporary divorce law has increasingly recogn ized 
the legitimacy of 'private ordering."'); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 89, at 952-
56 (discussing the shift to "priva te ordering"); id. at 963-77 (discu ss ing the role of pa-
rental negotiation in resolving child custody issues) ; id. at 977-84 (di scuss ing di ffe rent 
child custody regimes); see also Jana B. Singe r, The Privatizatio n of Family Law, 
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443. 
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Mnookin and Kornhauser have explored the effect of negot iated 
child custody arrangements on the welfare and position of partici-
pants following divorce. 278 But , as with all conditions that bear on 
the spouses' "exit options ," the prospect of having to bargain ove r 
custody at divorce also influences what goes on within "successful " 
marriages. The move from a maternal preference rule to negotiabie 
child custody arrangements and joint custody can best be de scribed 
as having a detrimental effect on women's intramarital bargaining 
position. By awarding the mother something she is likely to find 
quite vaiuable (if only because of her limited reproductive poten-
tial and her larger investment in existing offspring), the old-
fas hi oned maternal presumption or preference improved the 
mother's extramarital position and thus her exit advantage relat ive 
to her husband's. To the extent some (if not many) fathers value 
more than sporadic contact with their children, the maternal pref-
erence reduced those men's exit advantage by increasing the price 
(loss of contact and control over children) attached to divorce. 
An understanding of men's and women's respective bargaining 
positions within marriage points the way to significant (and backward-
looking) reform in the law of child custody. Where bargaining 
power is unequal, as it often is for husbands and wives within mar-
riage and after divorce, private ordering will inevitably cause the 
weaker party to lose out unless bargaining takes place against a 
baseline that corrects for this imbalance.279 Child custody should be 
at least partly "deprivatized" by reviving a strong presumption for 
maternal custody. Of course, a mother can always relinquish cus-
tody by private agreement, but she would do so against a baseline 
entitlement that could only rarely be taken away. Moreover, the 
rule should not take the form of a primary caretaker rule, which 
looks to which parent provided the most "hands-on" care. Although 
such a rule would favor women in most instances, it would under-
mine the bargaining position of working women who are the most 
likely to share childcare responsibilities with their husbands and 
paid caregivers but who, as we have seen , still suffer from unequal 
bargaining power within marriage for other reasons. The purpose 
of a return to maternal preference would only partly be to compen-
~·s M!iookin & Kornhauser, supra note 89, at 951 . 
"' For a di scussion of "private ordering" solutions to bargaining imbalance, see in-
fra Section Y.D. 
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sate for the loss in barogaining omver that results when women take 
~ L 
on a disproportionate share of childcare within marriage. T he rul e 
would also provide a crucia l counterweight for the structural ad-
vantage men possess by virtue of their longer reproductive li fe 
(which makes their investmen t in each child, however large, less 
important to them) and the marriage-market advantages that flovv 
from this biological fac t. Moreover, any legally enforceable pater-
nal visitation rights shoul d be conditioned on paymem of chil d 
support. T his condition would strengthen the wife's hand within 
marriage by taking away a possible bargaining chip from tbe father 
in the event of divorce ."so 
As vvith so much else in divorce lav.;, post-divorce ch ild custody 
rules are rarely discussed in light of their effects on the conduct of 
marriages in which divorce is not (yet) an issue . Yet couples con-
duct their daily married life not just in the shadow of the market 
but also in the shadow of everything that awaits them after mar-
riage dissolves. The lack of realism about the relationship between 
married life and divorce, and an ill-advised quest for neutrality, 
flexibility, and autonomy in divorce law, has resulted in rules that 
hand men potent bargaining tools and deprive women of what little 
power they have. Recent "reforms" in child custody rules have in-
creased sex-based disparities in bargaining power within marriage. 
C. Informal Social Norms and Self-Help 
Traditionally, strong norms regulated many aspects of behavior 
surrounding marriage and reproduction, ranging from the division 
of sexual responsibility within marri age to the social consequences 
of premarital sexual conduct, adultery, spouse abandonment, and 
divorce. tv1any of those norms have changed dramatically in recent 
years. 28 1 Is it possible to imagine any informal norm changes, un der 
~80 This quid pro quo rule would make it harder for fathers who care little about 
visitation to use their rights strategically by offering to reduce contact with the chil-
dren if the mother would accept less money. But cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra 
note 89, at 980-85 (criticizing a proposed lega i rule to deny noncustodial parents visi-
tation rights). 
" 1 See, e.g., Burggraf, supra note 81, at 112 ("Prior to the late 1960s, non marital sex 
was a strong taboo in American cu lture .. . [and] the social sanctions were n' t tri v-
ial. "); George A . Akerlof, Jane t L.Ye!len & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277, 278 (1996) (noting 
the erosion of the custom of shotgun marriage in the 1970s); Amy L. Wax, Against 
f'l 1 -1.,- ~. ·r-·r mar·I.;30P O.r'r·l a'ivf'rre f "'" Ol.ffie"' tn' at "'OU1d l.l"" 1tn tO eOU::J!;7P ..,, ..... _ _._ V.Ltt. 1.:. 1 .1 
0
,_., u.,. l ,._,;. .. v ..... v 0 ... ~ w, L 1.. ¥l' _ l ... v t" .... ~,.,..~. .!."'--' "-' 
bargaining power bet\veen men and women? In considering this 
question , it is important to be mindful of the distinction between 
normative conventions that are enforced by conspicuous external 
sanctions and mechanisms, which are perhaps resisted by persons 
expected to follow the norm, and internaiized norms, which are not 
resisted btE adopted as values and preferences. In the arena of 
m8rital behavior, many conventions may have significant compo-
nents both of external sanction and in terna lized taste that are diffi-
cult to disentangle. Moreover, some conventions may have an im-· 
b. ' " 1 .,. 1 " 1 b 1 7 <' port ant JOlOg1ca. source; n so, tney m1 gnt not e easy to cnange .·· · 
Certainly , some of the problem of sexually skewed bargaining 
power \vould go away if women and men shared the same average 
preferences, tastes, drives, outlook, and utilities respecting all func-
tions interna l and external to the family economy. ·w e have so far 
treated observed preferences as exogenous, fixed, and largely unin-
fluenced by the very pressures that create bargaining disparities 
and account for their feedback effects. 283 Although the notion that 
men's and women's preferences are exogenous and impervious to 
social expectations and choice-constraining pressures has repeat-
edly been challenged,284 and there is evidence that the challenge 
may in some respects be justified,235 there is no obvious known 
method for moving men's and women's preferences-if indeed 
they are disparate-towards parity. 
Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. Chi. L Rev. 307, 347-48 & n.68 
(1996) (book review) (noting erosion of social nom1s that imposed sanctions for divorce ). 
" 2 See Wax, supra note 281 , at 307-08. 
~83 See supra notes 32, 233. 
"~See supra notes 32, 233. 
"'A small study of "equalitarian" (ro le-sharing) married couples is provocative on 
this score. In describing the experience o f her sample, the author wrote: 
The change to a more even sharing of domestic chores was not easy. Not o nly 
did the wives have to contend with the husband's disinclination to do chores , 
they a lso had to cope with guilt fee lings about aba ndoning the ir tradition al ro le 
a nd with the mixed feel ings they had seeing their husbands do nontraditio na l 
tasks . As their strong interest in a profession consumed more and more of the ir 
mental and physical energy over the years, however, housework seemed in-
creas ingly tedious ra ther than ch a llenging. ln addition, the women's mov ement 
led them to beiieve that doing double work is unfair and mad e them feel better 
about sharing domes tic chores with their husbands. 
Haas, supra note 43, at 294. 
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There is another set of preferences that are external to the mari-
tal economy but critically important to family bargaining power: 
the preferences for partners, which operate on the marriage and 
remarriage markets. As already discussed, men prefer younger 
women and are indifferent to parity or mild infer iority of social 
status. Women marry slightly older men and seem to prefer higher 
status husbands.2x6 These patterns give men more currency on the 
remarriage market and exacerbate disparities in earning power as 
between couples. 
Two tactics have been proposed to deal with the conditions that 
create men's superior remarriageability. Concerned with neutral-
izing the effects of remarriage patterns on women's bargaining 
weakness within marri age,287 Rhona Mahony recommends that 
women adopt a strategy of hypogamy-marrying down in status 
and earnings.288 Lloyd Cohen, on the other hand, recommends that 
women marry much older men, on the theory that those men's 
value on the marriage market will decrease with age. 289 Both Co-
hen's and Mahony's recommendations appear to be directed at 
women only. The assumption seems to be that self-help is superior 
to politics: People are more likely to change their own conduct to 
advance their own interests than to get other people to change 
their behavior to their detriment. 
Mahony's proposal necessarily entails women marrying down in 
age. She suggests that men married to higher-earning women will 
choose to specialize in marriage-specific capital as readily as women 
married to higher-earning men, and thus will relinquish the exit 
threat advantage conferred by better labor market prospects and 
fewer marriage-specific investments. Mahony's suggestion is un-
likely to work very well , for several reasons. First, a sudden shift to 
a world in which women prefer younger and lesser-status men will 
do little good so long as men's preferences do not change. It takes 
28q Status dispariti es have bee n moderated in recent decades by the rise in assorta-
tive mating, which tends to match people of similar educational a ttainment and initial 
occupational poten ti al. See, e.g., Robert D. Mare, Five Decades of Educa ti onal As-
sortative Mating, 56 Am. Soc. Rev. 15 (1991) (documenting the dramatic rise in edu-
cational syngamy, or the tendency to marry another with similar years of schooling, 
especially among the college-educated). 
2s7 See Mahony, supra note 16. 
2&< See id . at 215-38. 
289 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 293. 
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two to make a marriage, and the match a woman can make is not 
simply a function of her own tastes. R ather, it is determined by a 
process of "pairwise-bargained allocation"290 in which various sup-
ply and demand curves, reflecting men's and women's priorities, 
meet. If men do not give priority to higher status wives, but continue 
to seek the traits they have traditionally found desirable (youth, 
beauty, and conventional femininity), there will be a serious mismatch 
on the market, and fewer women may be able to find mates at all. 
Second, Mahony's suggestion requires a coordinated and uni-
form change in women's preferences and practices. Even if a par-
ticular woman could find a man of lesser status to marry her, there 
will be a steadily increasing pool of other women willing to marry 
up to him as he gets older and earns more , and his wife will still 
face a declining pool of men willing to marry her. Thus, female 
hypogamy as an individual solution can only delay, but cannot 
wholly solve, the problem of women's declining currency on the 
marriage market. 
The task of persuading all women to shun hypergamy (marrying 
up) and embrace hypogamy (marrying down) presents all the for-
midable collective action problems entailed in trying to change an 
existing norm, and in maintaining uniformity in the face of incen-
tives to defect from the norm. 291 But even if women could over-
come their emotional attraction to men of higher status-which 
may be just as deeply ingrained and difficult to alter as men's pen-
chant for younger women-they may not gain much by marrying 
down, for they will give up valuable tangible benefits by choosing 
lower status men. A smaller piece of a larger pie (in the form of an 
unfavorable marital bargain with a higher status man) may be 
worth as much-or possibly more-than a larger piece of a smaller 
one, in the form of an egalitarian marriage to a lower status man. 292 
Whether women as a whole would be better off as more equal 
290 See Rochford, supra note 56. 
291 See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 32 (discussing the difficulty of a minority 
faction changing existing norms). 
292 See infra Section V.D.l. Departures from rationality due to information deficits, 
cognitive distortions, and the tendency to discount the future- which have received 
little discussion in this Article-probably play an important role in real-life decision-
making in this area: The future losses from weak bargaining power are speculative 
and painful to confront, but the current inadequacies of a marital candidate are vivid 
and immediately apparent. 
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partners to lower status men is a complex question that depends on 
the state of the marriage market, and on whether the far-reaching 
secondary costs to women of the bargaining squeeze- costs that 
wouid not be incurred in an egalitarian relationshio-are fullv 
' J 
taken into account by women in their selection of mates on the cur-
, I d 1 ?')3 T' £ h . 1 ' f rentiy unregu ate marKeV ne 1act t at, m t.1e aosence o en-
forceable bargains, the resources a man commands and his wife's 
leverage over these resources in bargaining would probably con-
tinue to bear an inverse relationship suggests that women may not 
gain much by marrying down. 
Cohen's suggestion avoids one flaw in JV!ahony's p lan: Because 
older men would probably be more than happy to marry much 
younger women, women's collective decision to choose much older 
men would not result in severe market mismatch of supply and 
demand. But, as with the decision to marry younger men, marrying 
much older ones would entail some loss in utility unless women 
could overcome their market preferences for only slightly older 
men (which may be no easier than adopting a desire for younger 
mates). Even though a husband's death (as opposed to divorce) 
leaves the surviving wife with an undivided claim on his assets, it is 
still not clear that the increased bargaining power a woman enjoys 
because of the reduced risk her husband will divorce her outweighs 
her projected losses due to the risk of his dying earlier in the mar-
riage. Finally, because intramarital bargains equilibrate with con-
ditions on the marriage market-and, in the absence of enforceable 
bargair.s, do so, at least in theory, with no gain in efficiency or in-
crease in the size of the pie294-Cohen's ploy may only introduce 
different tradeoffs rather than create absolute gains. Cohen tries 
to argue that women's tendency to choose somewhat older husbands 
already shows that "women realize that they have more reason to 
be concerned with divorce than widowhood. "295 It appears, how-
ever, that women have already balanced the risks of those unfortu-
nate states in favor of husbands only somewhat older than themselves. 
293 See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and D istribution , supra note 56, at 152-54 
(describing equilibration of marri age market cond itions and intramarita! bargaining 
possibilities when binding agreements are not feasible) . 
29" See infra Section Y.D. l. 
29; See Cohen, supra note 4, at 294. 
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Mahony's and Cohen 's suggestions have this in common: They 
implicitly recognize that, absent a change in the external rules de-
fining the marital regime, a more balanced marital bargain can be 
reliably secured only by choosing a man of the type that now has 
lesser currency on the marriage market. ' Nhat lies behind the 
lesser currency, however, is that these men offer fewer benefits to 
their mates. Even if age and status ceased to be attractive to women 
as a psychological matter, the sociological fact remains that those 
traits con-elate in men wi th the ability to bring tangible benefits to 
a marriage, and women continue to value those tangible benefits . 
For these monosals to work, women vvould have to decide they do 
" l -
not care about their husband's material wealth and earning power 
after all. 
T he prior discussion suggests that, in the absence of a massive 
transformation of taste , it is futile to attempt to change the intra-
marital balance of power without recourse to an independent, ex-
ternal mechanism for fixing the costs and benefits of marriage-a 
mechanism that does not depend on self-help by the person in the 
weaker bargaining position. That self-help is futile under current 
circumstances can be illustrated by considering another imaginary 
scenario that relies on changing the social norms surrounding the 
choice of mate. Suppose all women got together and decided to 
demand an egalitarian division as a condition of getting married in 
the first place or continuing in their current marriage. Suppose 
such an initial coordination were possible. (Clearly, such an ulti-
matum would have little effect if not issued-and fo llowed-by 
most women, since men would simply search for women who did 
not demand such a condition.) This cartel would initially lovver 
men's exit advantage by reducing the leeway for finding a better 
marital bargain in the division of marital contributions. But the 
removal from the market calculus of the availability of lopsided 
marital bargains would still not completely eliminate men's threat 
advantage: A husband would still be able to look for a younger and 
more attractive-albeit equally demanding-mate (and find one), 
whereas a wife could not. 
Women's awareness of men's greater ability to procure a re-
match would doom the cartel. The temptation to defect would be 
overwhelming, as individual women viewed bargaining concessions 
as a way to hold on to what they have (on the view that this is the 
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best they could ever get). That the ultimatum could be issued as a 
condition of agreeing to get married in the first place would not 
matter: Women could not take effective advantage of their re lat ive 
bargaining strength during their youthful period on the primary 
marriage market because any bargain they struck initially would be 
subject to endless renegotiation throughout an intramarital period 
of rapidly eroding leverage. The lack of any external mechanism 
for enforcing the collective norm of issuing an equality ultimatum 
is a pivotal defect. Once married, every woman would be on her own , 
and the temptati on to abandon the norm would prove irresisti ble . 
D. Private Ordering: Contracting for Marital Terms 
and Costs of Exit 
1. Antenuptial Agreements 
Comprehensive antenuptial contracts to regulate the conduct of 
the marriage face two formidable obstacles, one legal and one 
practical. First, as noted, the law will not enforce them during the 
life of the marriage. 296 Second, the very nature of marriage as a re-
lational contract means that such a fixed document cannot in real-
ity ever be produced; "unknown contingencies or the intricacy of 
the required responses may prevent the specification of precise 
performance standards."297 Thus, the complete, anticipatory regu-
lation of marital relations, without provision for revision or renego-
tia tion , is a chimera. 
Nevertheless, the subject of antenuptial contracting is provoca-
tive, at least from a theoretical point of view. Suppose we couid 
reverse a key structural feature of the current marital regime: the 
refusal to enforce contracts between spouses during the life of the 
marnage. Could privately negotiated antenuptial agreements cor-
~"' See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
~97 Goetz & Scott, supra note 66, at 1 092; see supra note 250; Scott & Scott, supra 
note 21 0 (describing marriage as a paradigmatic re lational contract); see also Co hen , 
supra note 4, a t 298 (noting that an e nforceable marital contract would have to take 
into account '' the stage in the marri age when the breach occurs, the circumstances of 
the parties at the time of marriage , and the circumstances at the tim e o f breach") ; 
O ii ve r E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance o f Contractual 
Re lations, 2 J .L. & Econ. 233, 238 (1979) (observing the replacement of neocl assical 
processes by "adj ustment processes of a more thoroughly transaction-specific, o ngo ing-
admin istra ti ve ki nd " ). 
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rect the problems posed by inequality of bargaining power within 
marriage? The short answer is no. Private bargaining cannot rec-
tify inequality of bargaining power. Rather, the bargains struck 
will simply reflect that inequality. The long answer is somewhat 
more complex. Although private antenuptial contracting cannot 
cure initi al disparities in bargaining power due to men's and 
women's somewhat different average demand for marriage, it 
could counter the progressive slide of women's bargaining position 
by cutting off the possibi lity for renegotiation during the course of 
the marriage. This should have the effect of reducing shirking, self-
insurance, and underinvestment in domesticity. To remedy the 
principal sources of bargaining power disparity, the contract would 
ideally specify disposition of value following marital dissolution (to 
modify exit threats). But it must also regulate intramarital behav-
ior and be enforceable during the marriage to keep husbands from 
capitalizing on their intramarital threat advantage. 298 
The first objection to the use of antenuptial contracts is that they 
present coordination and collective action problems: One bride's 
demand for an antenuptial promise is unlikely to be met with as-
sent when the default rule is no deal at all, and most women ask for 
nothing more. In the absence of a universal norm of premarital 
contracting, some men will simply search for women who will not 
demand contractual protection against deteriorating bargaining 
29l) power. 
298 An antenuptial contract might propose the incorporation of post-marital mone-
tary compensation for any imbalances in costs and benefits that resulted during the 
course of the marriage from one partner 's bargaining weakness. Even apart from 
posing practical difficulties of valuation, such a rule would only compensate for im-
balances in the event of divorce. It would not eliminate inequalities in the conduct of 
an ongoing marriage. Only a rule of redistribution or specific performance that oper-
ated intramaritally could be expected to accomplish that goal. 
"'Although courts will generally not enforce contracts intramaritally, antenuptial 
contracts that specify some intramarital and post-marital conditions will be enforced 
in many states upon dissolution. See Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 34; see also Laura P. 
Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Act and Modern Social Policy: The En-
forceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 1037 (1993) (detailing implications of approval of the Uniform Pre-
marital Agreement Act). The infrequency with which such contracts are drafted 
might reflect adverse selection problems. In the absence of a coordinated or uniform 
custom of prenuptial contracting, women who demand such contracts might be seen 
as untrustworthy or otherwise undesirable. This problem, and the reluctance of 
women to relinquish an advantage in competing for desirable spousal traits, which 
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Even if that objection could be overcome, any attempt to arrest 
the progressive decline in women's initial bargaining position by 
private contract will have side-effects on the marriage market. As 
noted, the marriage market is a complex process of "pairwise-
bargained allocation"3m that matches men and women depending 
on both the attributes they possess and the ones they are looking 
for. The marriage market is not perfec:tly competitive, because 
people are not perfect substitutes for one another. Two other im-
portant factors influence men's and -.,;,;omen 's currency and their 
choice of mates on the marriage market: hmv well men and ~~vom:;n 
do outside of marri2ge (determining hmv eager they are to marry), 
and hmv satisfactory a deal they can strike within marriage (a func-
tion of their bargaining position as the marriage progresses). 
As discussed above, men and women may not regard marriage as 
equally valuable, perhaps because men can obtain more of what 
they want outside of marriage (and can wait longer for what they 
want within marriage). T his relative value of marriage is reflected 
in the marriage market price of each person, which in turn deter-
mines how desirable a mate he or she can obtain under prevailing 
baseline conditions-that is, where there are no intramaritally en-
forceable prenuptial deals. Under these conditions, each person 
searches for the best mate he or she can get, and each can com-
mand a mate with certain qualities. The legal and practical obsta-
cles to binding antenuptial deals effectively allocate to women 
most of the risk of exploi tation through opportunistic renegotiation 
during marriage and of potential expropriation of quasi-rents 
through divorce. This allocation of risk is probably "priced into" 
the market in the form of extra compensation to women for bear-
ing that risk (and a lower "price" for men imposing it). In effect, a 
woman will demand more compensation up front (in the form of a 
higher quality husband) because the'risk of loss of her marital in-
vestment is so high. The man may be willing to pay more up front 
for the privilege of reserving the potential to exploit. Thus, a par-
ticular woman may be able to find a more desirable man, and a 
might have to be traded off against the security, certainty, and more fav ora ble terms 
of the marital bargain, combine to impede the development of a society-wide norm in 
favor of premarital contracting. Newlyweds' refusal to conte mplate divorce and 
women's dim awareness of the structural sources of their bargaining power disadvan-
tage may also lead women to unde restimate any benefits of such contracts. 
300 See Rochford , supra note 56. 
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man may be forced to settle (and will be willing to settle) for a some-
vvhat less desirable woman, in partial compensation for the gender-
based allocation of risks imposed by the current marital regime.301 
Nevertheless, reducing or eliminating those risks contractually 
by forcing parties to negotiate for binding terms on the semicom-
petitive primary marriage market should make for more efficient 
marital agreements. This might allow some women to come out 
ahe8.d. Eliminating the possibility of opportunistic renegotiation or 
defection should reduce expensive, inefficient self-protective be-
havior and underinvestment, wh ich ought to increase the overall 
. "' h . 1 ' . "'0' - . 1 } 1 1 l 1 s1ze o:. tLe manta "ple. · - PreciSely 10'-11/ tnat extra surp us wou.o 
be distributed, however, is unclear, because it depends on how a 
marriage market that has equilibrated in the absence of binding 
and enforceable contracts would adjust to their widespread adop-
tion. If women could capture some of the increased surplus (and 
they should be able to), much of the extra payoff would probably 
come in the form of reduced risk: Although the average woman might 
have a somewhat less desirable husband, she might be compen-
sated not only by her greater bargaining power but also by enjoy-
ing a marriage of greater predictability, stability, and permanence. 
Although antenuptial agreements face formidable practical and 
legal obstacles and might shift the marriage market, this discussion 
301 The interaction of the marriage market with the balance of power within mar-
riage suggests that a woman should seek to maximize her marital payoff, in the ab-
sence of a binding premarital contract, by finding a man of such high quality (e.g., 
rich enough, attractive enough) that she obtains sufficient up-front benefits to com-
pensate for the possibility of early defection and the threat of first performer losses. 
But the fact that a woman wants to find a man whose very desirability insures her 
against the actuarial r isk of early desertion does not mean that she can find one: Her 
currency on the market is determined by microeconomic forces that fix the "price" of 
what she is offering, largely determined by her attributes and attractiveness, as well 
as the market demand for those traits. On the marriage market, you cannot always 
get what you want. Thus, many women will in fact be underinsured against the bar-
gaining squeeze and undercom pensated for the risk of divorce. On the interaction of 
marriage markets and marita l bargaining generally, see Becker, supra note 37; Gary 
S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage (pt. 2), 82 J. Pol. Econ. Sll (1974); Bergstrom, su-
pra note 56, at 1929-30; Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 
56, at 152-54. 
302 See, e.g., Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 250, at 301 (describing the costs 
of opportunistic behavior); see aiso Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Di-
vorce, 45 Vand. L Rev. 397 (1992) (discussing premarital agreements as a hedge 
against marital opportunism). 
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suggests why they might still be a good idea. It is true that some 
women might have to lower their sights, but that adjustment might 
bring greater efficiency to marriage markets, with benefits to be 
shared by women. It is the current marriage market that is dis-
torted by its invitation to opportunism generally, and by the 
greater potential for opportunism by men. It could be argued that 
women now marry higher quality men than they rightly "deserve" 
precisely because they pay on the back end rather than the front . 
U nder the current marital regime, women assume a greater risk of 
a larger loss than they would if obligations could be fixe d ahead of 
time. As a result, the variance in payoffs is greater. In effect, the 
current marri age market is a high stakes game for women with big 
winners (those who manage to hold on to high quality husbands) 
and big losers (those left relatively destitute when their husbands 
abscond). To the extent that the remote risk of divorce is notori-
ously discounted by most people,303 the current regime seems like a 
good deal , but it may not be. 
2. Dowry and Bride Price 
Another variation on the theme of private contracts is the cus-
tom of dowry or bride price. 304 Dowry is money or property paid by 
the husband or his family to the family of the bride to be held in 
trust for her in the event of the husband's breach of the marriage 
contract. So long (but only as long) as the marriage endures, the 
money becomes part of the couple's estate. Dowry therefore func-
tions as a performance bond on the husband. It moves bargaining 
power towards parity by operating as a kind of tax on the hus-
band's defection, which lowers his effective exit threat advantage. 
303 See Baker & Emery, supra note 14, at 443 (noting th a t while marriage license 
applicants who were surveyed estimated correct ly that half of U.S. marriages would 
end in divorce , their median response was 0% when asked to assess the likelihood 
th at their own marriages would suffer this fate) . 
J()J See generally Cohen, supra no te 4, at 292-93 (discussing the role of bride price 
" to all eviate some of the problems of appropriable quasi rents" in marriage); Ivy 
Papps, The Role and Determinants of Bride-Price: The Case of a Palestinian Village, 
24 Current Anthropology 203 (1983) (applying eco nomic theory to the payment of 
bride price); Melford E. Spiro, Marriage Payments: A Paradigm from the Burmese 
Perspective, 31 J. Anthropological Res. 89 (1975) (giving an overview of the customs 
and economic rol e of dowry and bride price in southeast Asian communities). 
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A part from its inherent imprecision in estimating relative exit 
threats, dowry has limited usefulness under current social condi-
tions. First, earning power, not property, is the most important 
source of marital wealth for most couples, and most people do not 
have enough up-front resources to post an effective bond. (The 
alternative-permitting the husband to borrmv the money against 
future earnings-is in effect an alimony rule, which is discussed 
below.305 ) Second, as with all devices that regulate exit threats, the 
stability of the practice of dowry would depend on its adoption 
across the board. But its adoption cannot be imposed by fiat. As 
Lloyd Cohen states, dowry is "a cultural phenomenon that evolves 
over a period of centuries. " '06 Third, the custom would have to in-
corporate an understanding that even women who do not assume a 
traditional role and are not overtly financially dependent-and 
who thus appear to have little labor market opportunity cost of 
marriage-deserve a bond against the passive depreciation of their 
marital capital. This would require a revolution in thinking about 
marital relations. 307 
Finally, dowry shares the limitation of any mechanism that does 
not rely on intramarital enforcement: The marriage must end before 
the remedy for unequal bargaining power is triggered. Intramarital 
free rider strategies that push women to a point short of divorce 
would continue unabated. If conditions grew poor enough to in-
duce the wife to initiate exit, she could not claim the bond under 
traditional dowry principles. Moreover, a fault component would 
be needed to deal with the moral hazard of opportunistic exit by 
the wife. 308 But traditional concepts of fault are too broad-gauged 
to protect a wife from all possible efforts by the husband to destroy 
or appropriate marital capital. 
305 See infra Section V.E.2. 
30' Cohen, supra note 4, at 292. 
307 For a comparable discussion of new alimony rules, see infra notes 317-324 and 
accompanying text. 
308 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 292 (suggesting that dowry cannot work within a no-
fault system). 
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E. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: !Handated Payment or 
Transfer Rules 
Tbe foregoing sections suggest that, if the world is to be made 
safe for egalitarian marriage, the -way lies not in seif-help but in 
politics. \Vomen cannot get a better deal by choosing a worse hus-
band, and they cannot rely on other 'Nomen's voluntarily standing 
finn with them to insist on a better bargain. Likewise, private or-
dering cannot be a complete answer to inequality of bargaining 
power, because an egalitarian deal cannot be expected to result 
when men and women negoti ate from different premarital starting 
points and vvhen the negoti ated deai equilibrates with <:m unregu-
lated marriage market. 
\Vould external regulation work? There are a number of possi-
ble measures that could be adopted. 309 Perhaps the law should al ter 
or control the marriage contract by regulating intramarital rela-
tions or by fixing the terms of post-marital distribution. This Sec-
tion will consider both possibilities. 
1. Intramarital Payments or Transfers 
Detailed regulation to equalize the precise terms of marital rela-
tions would be impracticable for the same reasons that relational 
contracts for that purpose are infeasible. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment can selectively intervene to redistribute some forms of 
marital assets during the life of the marriage. Two proposals are 
the assignment of a family allowance to the mother or primary 
caretaker of a child310 and mandated income sharing within marriage.311 
309 Various mixed public-private schemes are not discussed here. One example of 
such a scheme would be taxing single men to try to equalize their premarital bar-
gaining position with unmarried women, and then allowing the parties to negotiate 
an enforceable prenuptiai deal privately. I owe the suggestion to tax single men to 
George Triantis . Interestingly , proposa ls for a "bachelor tax," or tax surcharge on 
singie marriageable men , were a staple of Swedish politics at the turn of the century. 
Their avowed purpose, however, was to stem the precipitous fall in the national 
birthrate by encouraging men to marry earlier, not to provide women greater marital 
leverage. See Allan Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics 16 (1990). 
310 For an extensive discussion of family allowances, :-;ee A lstott, supra note 6, at 
2042-55. 
·'11 See Okin, supra note 32, at 180-83 (proposing income sharing within marriage). 
a. Child A llmvcrnces 
Many European countries now pay a universal family or child 
allowance to families, prorated according to the number of chil-
dren. Most countries pay the allmvance ei ther to the mother or to 
a primary ca.retaker who is defined as the person providing most 
care for the child within the family. 312 Hmv might a "Noman's con-
trol over this subsidy affect intramarital bargaining po\ver? ·u nder 
the divorce threat model, the fact that the subsidy was assigned to a 
mother within an intact marriage would not rna arty difference 
because it viould not in itself impro\'e the terrns of her exit. 
1\, ·r 1 1 .., • 1 • t- • 1 1vloreover, some nusoands m1gnt contmue to ,t<:~ve tne 1everage to 
bargain away the benefits of a wife's control of excra income by 
taking control of other valuable resources. ()nly if single or di-
vorced mothers also received the subsidy-that is, only if the sub-
sidv continued outside of marriage-vvould a woman 's exit threat 
be "enhanced and her bargaining position improved.m But the in-
tramarital threat model does predict that intramarital assignment 
of the allowance to mothers would improve \vomen's bargaining 
power, because wives' and children's fallback position within a 
conflict-ridden marriage would improve. 314 The child allowance 
would be like income to the mother, \Vhich could be withheld from 
her spouse without directly hurting the recipient or her children. 
b. Intramarital Income Sharing 
It is not clear that legally enforced income sharing during mar-
riage would help to improve many women's position. Like a child 
allowance, income sharing would at best provide only a partial so-
lution to bargaining power inequality and could not be expected to 
312 See Alstott, supra note 6, at 2042. As Anne Alstott notes, a family allowance 
expressly earmarked for mothers might present constitutional difficulties within the 
United States. See id. at 2042 n.l71. 
mAs Anne Alstott suggests, the exit threat enhancement effect would result from 
"a system of family aUowances paid only to single mothers," regardless of whether 
married women were also paid. !d. at 2052. Note, however, that a system of exclu-
sively intramarita l payments would have some effect on the husband's exit threat, be-
cause he would lose the ability to share in the allowance if he leaves the family. See 
id. at 2052 n.213. 
31" See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56, at 149 
(noting that a separate spheres intramarital bargaining paradigm predicts enhance-
ment of women's bargaining power from a child allowance assigned to mothers). 
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tract and the duties spouses owe to one another. :; 18 Any rule that 
would govern alimony for the purpose of correcting an imbalance 
in bargaining power must take into account remarriage prospects. 
That would require a very different rule from one ever seriously 
proposed. For example, it would mandate sorne readjustment in 
favor of the woman-based on the actuarial chance of remar-
riage-regardless of whether she seemed to assume greater respon-
sibility at home or man aged to maintain earnings or career parity 
'vvith her husband.319 Under current alimony practice, in contrast, it 
would be rare for a woman 'Nith significant earning power and an 
uninterrupted work record to receive alimony on her own ac-
count. 320 But any rule designed to equalize bargaining povver -would 
need to focus as much on the role of passive depreciation in the mari-
tal balancing act as on active and measurable opportunity costs. 
Such a post-divorce transfer rule has its limitations in addition to 
difficulties in implementation.32 1 A stringent alimony rule, like pri-
vate prenuptial contracts, leaves the marriage market unregulated. 
The rule would have the predicted effects of any measure that 
takes power away from men and reduces the risk of exploitation 
for women. Some men's unwillingness to marry on those terms 
318 See, e.g., E llman, supra no te 63; Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 
j_ Legal Stud. 35 (1978); Parkman, supra no te 40; Symposium on D ivorce and Femi-
nist Legal Theory, supra note 4; Symposium on Family Law, 1991 BYU L. Re v. 1; 
Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 4. For a comprehensive revi ew of th e subject, see 
Estin, supra note 4, and Estin , supra note 36. Alimony 's possible purposes include 
holding couples to their long-te rm promises, promoting efficie nt in vestment , compen-
sating for loss of a re li a nce interest, or deterrence . The measure of alimony consis-
tent with each purpose will have different effects on bargaining powe r as we ll as 
other incide nts of marriage, including stability . 
319 The rule could be based on actuarial projections of remarriage prospects (broken 
down by parameters such as age, sex, income, and educatio n). Alternatively, income 
and assets could be di vided wi th an upward adjustment upon the re marriage of one 
spouse to compensate the unmarried spouse for the value of the marr ied spouse's 
new partner. Such a rule would greatly discourage re marriage and new fami ly forma-
tion by both me n and women. 
320 See Weitzman, supra note 12, a t 147-50 (describing the circumstances un der 
wh ich alimony is awarded und er the current no-fault system). 
32 ' Recognizing long-term pos t-marital claims by one spouse on the othe r's income, 
which would be required to make the rule work, would discourage labo r mark et par-
ticipation and hard work through a substitution effect, or wou ld d1ive workers into 
the und erground economy. See, e.g. , Burggraf, supra note 81 , at 133. The most pro-
nounced effects would be felt o n the low end of the income scal e, where labor market 
participation is tenuous . 
r 
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v;ould tend to produce a decline in marriage rates frorn current 
] 1 d ' 1 . l 0 • }?? -, • • 1eve_s an a Cie ay m t 1e age ot marnage. ··- Some women rrught 
have to settle for lower quality men. On the other hand, as with 
antenuptial contracts,323 a rule creating a more enforceable long-
term comract should lead to a deeper and more efficient level of 
intramarital investment ancl more stable and predictable marital 
relationships. l he diminution in the payoff from opportunistic de-
fection should create a larger "marital pie," shares of which com -
pensate the average woman for other marriage market e ffec ts. For 
persons of both sexes seeking stability and a reliable re turn on in-
vestment , this effect would increase the incentive to get marri ec1.J 24 
~ · .. l' ' h . ., . ., . J:-many, an a 1mony n.ue L at seeks to compensate 1or rntangwle 
losses through monetary transfers would function in a fashion that 
discriminated against the poor. Because people at the lower end of 
the income scale would be pushed below the subsistence level by 
any interspousal transfer of income, they will rarely initiate divorce 
under a rule that really takes into account all forms of prospective loss. 
Contrast the complete-internalization rule with a regime that has 
been proposed by some commentators: post-marital equal sharing 
of income.325 Income splitting has the virtue of simplicity. It does 
not require case by case evaluation and adjustment for the tangible 
or intangible components of relative contribution, sacrifice, bene-
fit, or opportunity cost during the marriage. But in its very sim-
plicity lies its weakness as an instrument for equalizing bargaining 
power. A pure division of partners' income is a very blunt instru-
ment for bringing about equalization of bargaining positions within 
322 For a discussion of marriage market effects of private contracts, see supra Sec-
tion V.D. 
"'For a discussion of the effici e ncy of antenuptial contracts, see supra Section 
Y.D.1. 
"' Jana Singer has suggested that a simple post-divorce income-sharing requirement 
might have the effect of "encourag[ing] husbands to increase their investment in 
famil y care , 'since the fina ncial consequences of such an investme nt strategy would 
not be so devastating in the event of a divorce, and the benefits of investing so le ly in 
one's own career would not be so complete."' Singer, Alimony a nd Efficiency, supra 
note 187, at 2455 (quoting Jana B. Si nger, Divorce Reform and Gender Just ice, 67 
N.C. L. Rev. 1103,1121 (1989) [herein after Singer, Divorce Reform]). 
325 See, e .g., Burggra f, supra note 81 , at 131-33, 254; Martha L. Fineman , Imple-
menting Equality: ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis . L. Rev. 789; 
O kin , supra note 32, at 180-83; Singe r, Alimony and Efficiency , supra note 187, a t 
2454-60; Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 324, at 1114-21. 
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marriage. It fails to take into account the individualized, intangible 
benefits and costs of a marriage and its alternatives-including av-
erage differences by sex. Although this lack of flexibility would 
help some women by raising their exit advantage to near parity or 
beyond, it would hurt others (by undercompensating them), and it 
would also unfairly hurt some men (by overtaxing them). 
Moreover, if a background of no-fa ult divorce is assumed, a rigid 
income-sharing rule would apply regardless of who initiated di-
vorce and would dictate the same allocation regardless of how 
much better or worse off each partner would be following divorce. 
As such, it would often fail to take into account "what , in many 
cases, may be the most significant loss associated with divorce: the 
loss of the marital status itself. "326 Such loss is somewhat greater 
for women and grows with age. The person who can remarry-
more often the man-will gain a share of a new marital surplus and 
perhaps a second income. The income-splitting rule provides no 
special compensation for this differential in threat advantage, and 
thus may often (as when earnings are similar) undercompensate 
the wife. In addition, because the income-splitting rule looks only 
to earnings disparity and not to the remarriage chances of divorced 
spouses, such a rule could severely penalize some higher-earning 
women, imposing even greater pressure on them to make marital 
concessions to forestall the loss of their husbands. 
Finally, adoption of a post-divorce redistribution rule that assigns 
one partner an enduring share in a former partner's future income 
regardless of any notion of breach or fault creates an opportunity 
for strategic behavior on the part of a nonearning or lower-earning 
spouse. If, for reasons unrelated to her husband's misfeasance or 
hard bargaining, a lower-earning wife feels she would be better off 
outside the marriage-perhaps because she has found a better pro-
spective husband-then she gains a windfall by initiating divorce. 
(This would, at the very least, create a disincentive for men to 
marry women without independent income or to consent to a 
wife's withdrawal from paid employment.) Alternatively, if the 
marriage remains marginally valuable to her absent income redis-
tribution, but is worth leaving if she can gain an equal share of her 
husband's post-divorce income, the income-sharing rule will induce 
326 Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 187, at 2448. 
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her to leave even if it would make her husband worse off. Put an-
other way, a rigid income-sharing rule creates a moral hazard by 
encouraging divorce in cases in which divorce is not Pareto supe-
rior to staying married and thus ends up imposing deadweight 
losses on one spouse. 327 That problem bears directly on bargaining 
power: The spouse in danger of bearing the costs of divorce will be 
at a bargaining disadvantage within the marriage.m 
The ideal complete-internalization rule suggested above, in con-
trast, does not present this particular danger. A spouse would not 
seek a divorce unless that partner would be so much better off out-
side the marriage that he or she could afford to transfer enough as-
sets to make the other partner better off as well. There would be 
no deadweight loss and no opportunism. Many couples would stay 
married rather than divorce when one partner wanted out, because 
the mandated transfer would make that partner worse off than he 
or she would be by remaining married. 
The complete-internalization rule has its own difficulties, how-
ever, which are characteristic of all alimony rules that are triggered 
" 7 As Michael Trebilcock and Rosemin Keshvani write: 
In constructing the hypothetical contract at the time of marriage, would the two 
parties agree that the wife should share in the husband's economic returns both 
where there is no marriage dissolution and where there is? ... [N]o insurer 
would write such a policy because the wife may well be rendered largely indif-
ferent to sustaining or terminating the marriage, given the assumption that her 
entitlements on divorce are not contingent on proof of absence of fault on her 
part for the marriage dissolution. 
Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 4, at 557; see also H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage 
and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 
437, 443-44 (1986) (discussing moral hazard in the context of marital relationships). 
m Jana Singer argues that the moral hazard endemic in post-divorce income split-
ting is overstated because "income sharing after divorce is not likely to improve a 
lower wage earner's financial position." Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 
187, at 2457. She explains that "given the added expense of maintaining two house-
holds, divorce is likely to result in a net decrease in both spouses' financial well-
being," id., and that "a lower wage earning spouse is likely to have invested dispro-
portionately in marriage-specific human capital, ... [thus] reduc[ing] a spouse's in-
centive to engage in opportunistic behavior during marriage." Id. at 2458. 
Although Singer's observations are va lid, her analysis suffers from a failure to con-
sider the full range of scenarios that could obtain if income sharing were available. A 
"predatory wife" might marry with an eye towards gaining a partial claim on a future 
husband's income. Or a fragile but "efficient" marriage might become worth more 
dead than alive to a lower earning spouse. By giving one spouse the chance to im-
prove her position at the expense of the other, the sharing rule might result in a de-
crease in total well-being overall. 
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by the desire to exit rather than by breach of a well-defined prom-
ise or fault :'29 The very scenario that creates the greatest difficulty 
for an inflexible income-sharing rule-t:hat of the lower-earning 
spouse who nevertheless would like to leave the marriage-also 
exposes the practical flaws inherent in the less rigid rule. Once 
again, the bedrock presumption of the internalization rule is that 
the party who seeks the divorce has judged that he or she will be 
better off outside the marriage, taking into account both tangible 
~ .... 
and intangible benefits, and regardless of ~my apparent decline in 
financia l well-being. Thus, if a lower-earning \Vife seeks a divorce 
and her husband resists, the presumption ·would apply, and the 
transfer rule will mandate that, if anything, assets wi ll flow from 
her to her husband to compensate him for his losses. In practice, 
the application of the pres umption gives rise to the objection al-
ready discussed, which stems from the monetization of marital 
value inherent in any rul e of compensation: It favors the party with 
money or the ability to generate it. A lower-earning wife who has 
invested primarily in marital capital and who has little labor mar-
ket value may be so miserable that she feels she is better off with-
out her husband, but she may lack the means to pay for the privi-
lege of exit. 330 This wouid mean that, as a practical matter, higher-
earning spouses (mostly men) would be able to buy their way out 
of loveless or irksome marriages more often than traditional wives. 
The complete-internalization rule is also not free of the potential 
to elicit strategic behavior. Although it neutralizes the predatory 
wife problem posed by the income-sharing rule (by barring trans-
fers to the one initiating divorce), it fails to deal adequately with a 
disturbing alternative scenario: the miserable wife married to the 
bad or exploitative husband. If the husband makes the marriage 
undesirable or worthless to the wife through infidelity, misfea-
sance, or noncooperation-if he uses his superior intramarital 
threat advantage to destroy or appropriate a large share of marital 
assets, even to the point of pushing the wife below a reservation 
price already made quite low by poor extramarital prospects, large 
marriage-specific investments, and the burden of children-then 
the husband could effectively sidestep the obligation to pay ali-
'"See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 4, at 6-9, 49-53, 74-81. 
330 See Zelder, supra note 270, at 506 (pointing out that many o f the assets of mar-
riage are tied up in children, who are neither liquid nor divisible). 
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mony through his own misdeeds.311 In effect, he could use his other 
sources of bargaining power advantage to torment his wife so much 
that divorce would ent ai l a net utility gain for her, thus relieving 
him of the obligation to provide her with any compensation upon 
exit. A rule that ignores the husband's capacity to engage in this 
loss-making strategy cannot hope to accomplish a comprehensive 
equalization of mari ta i bargaining power. T his is just another way 
of saying that the alimony rule fu nctions poorly if it allows pay-
ment to a spouse despite "fau lt. " A fault conception, however, 
would only work well if it v.ras sufficiently sensitive to take into ac-
count the full range of strategies, from annoying to egregious, for 
inducing the other spouse to initiate divorce. 
The prime strategy for driving the other to initiate divorce is to 
take advantage of intramarital threat potential. Thus, adjusting 
exit threats through monetary allocations would not suffice: The 
rule would have to be combined with some form of direct intra-
marital intervention or redistribution to neutralize shortfalls from 
differences in intramarital threat potential and chronic negotiating 
weakness.332 But, as we have seen, direct intramarital regulation-
whether by contract or by rule--would be infeasible and transform 
the nature of the institution beyond recognition. 
One way to mitigate- if not entirely negate-the perversities of 
the wealth effect and the potential for strategic appropriation of 
marital capital would be to suppiement an alimony rule based on 
complete internalization wi th a requirement like the one proposed 
33 1 See the discussion of parallel pro bl e ms \vith the rule req uiring bilateral consent 
fo r divorce, supra Section V.A . The most extreme example would be physical abuse 
or the threat of abuse, which is not uncommon . See, e.g., Demie Kurz, For Richer, 
For Poorer: Mothers Confron t Di vorce 52-56, 64-75 (1995) (describing the role of 
physical violence for a sample of divorcing couples). The rule could be written to 
make a n exception for thi s type of beh:1vior, but that would leave untouched the con-
siderable portion of me n's in tramarital threat advantage that does not stem from or 
require resort to physical violence. 
332 An alimony rule, like an antenuptial bargaining term , could be designed to in-
clud e pos t-marital mon etary compensa tion for any imbalances in costs and benefits 
that resulted from intramarital bargain ing weakness. As with the antenuptial term , 
such a rule would oniy compensa te for imbalance in th e event of divorce, but would 
have little effect on the conduct of an ongoing marriage. See supra note 298; cf. Ell -
man, supra note 4 (rejecting on feas ibility grounds any a limony rule that attempts to 
adjust for inequities during th e life of the marriage) ; E llman , supra note 63, at 280 
(arguing aga inst adopting an al imony rule that provides "a remedy for unfair ex-
changes during the marri age"). 
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by Ira Ellman, which seeks to compensate the spouse who has in-
vested disproportionately in marriage-specific capital. Ellman 
proposes that alimony reflect such a spouse's opportunity cost in 
the form of forgone investment in market human capital or other 
tangible or clearly quantifiable sources of potential financial gain. 333 
In the event an unhappy low-earning wife initiates a divorce that is 
not mutually agreeable, that supplemental principle would usually 
have the effect of converting her indeterminate debit into a credit , 
at least insofar as she could demonstrate that her greater invest-
ment in domestic pursuits entailed a personal financial sacrifice. 
Even a wife with considerable earning pmver might be able to ar-
gue for forgone opportunity and escape having to pay for the 
privilege of divorce if she could demonstrate a greater in-kind con-
tribution to the maintenance of the household. 
3. Welfare payments 
An alternative way to increase women's well-being outside of 
marriage, and thus reduce men's marital threat advantage within 
marriage, is for the government to make payments to ex-wives or 
custodial mothers directly. Until recently the United States had 
AFDC, a means-tested federal family-allowance program. 334 Be-
fore the repeal of the program, AFDC paid benefits not just to ex-
wives but also to never-married single mothers. Persons qualifying 
for AFDC often received supplemental benefits such as Medicaid 
or Food Stamps. These benefits might have had the effect of 
making some women with low earnings capacity virtually indiffer-
ent as between marriage and non-marriage. Because the package 
of aid was sometimes as or more valuable than full-time wages at 
the bottom of the income scale,335 federal poverty programs set 
women up as the equivalent of non-working wives to phantom 
husbands. To be sure, some real-life husbands supply extras in the 
m See Ellman , supra note 4, at 49-53. 
334 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1994). The program was repealed in 1996 and replaced 
with a block grant program known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"). 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105,2112 (1996). Under TANF, however, some states 
have continued benefits programs similar to those in place under AFDC. 
335 See, e.g. , Michael Tanner, Stephen Moore & David Hartman, Cato Institute, The 
Work vs. Welfare Trade-Off: An Analysis of th e Total Level of Welfare Benefits by 
State, Sept. 19, 1995; Michael Tanner & Naomi Lopez, Cato Institute, The Value of 
Welfare , Jun e 12,1996. 
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form of emotional support and partial sharing of household respon-
sibilities, but other husbands may impose net costs that partially 
offset the income they provide. AFDC may be more attractive 
than these husbands by supplying the income without the costs. 
These poverty programs would tend to put poor women in a 
powerful bargaining position with respect to low-earning husbands. 
But such programs would also probably destabilize existing mar-
riages among eligible populations or deter marriage altogether. 
Marital instability and low rates of marri age among the most poorly 
educated and least employable groups are consistent with these 
predicted effects, although they clearly have other causes as well.m 
F. Informal Social Norms R evisited 
As the previous discussion suggests, there are two important pa-
rameters that must be considered when trying to correct bargaining 
imbalance between husbands and wives: intramarital threats and 
divorce exit threats. There are in turn two important elements to 
be considered in any attempt to adjust men's and women's divorce 
exit threats: each spouse's relative value of leaving the marriage 
compared to the other's and the absolute value of the exit threat 
for each spouse. The latter affects the incentive to marry and stay 
married. If exit threat is to be set equal as between the sexes, there 
are three possible permutations: raise one spouse's threat point so 
both are high, lower the other 's so both are low, or establish some 
point between the extremes. Federal poverty programs may have 
had the effect of raising some women's well-being outside of mar-
riage to a level virtually equivalent to, or perhaps greater than, 
their well-being within most marriages they potentially could make. 
Because women could have children out of wedlock without losing 
welfare benefits, the expected costs to a welfare-eligible woman of 
remaining or becoming single was brought within the range of the 
costs to a man, with costs being rather low for both. In effect, the 
threat advantage for both potential partners was rendered quite high, 
with a predictable destabilizing effect. A complete-internalization 
336 See, e.g., Daniel T. Lichter, The Retreat from Marriage and the Rise in Nonmari-
tal Fertility, in Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Report to Congress on Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing 137, 138 (1995) (discussing ev idence that recent declines in 
marriage have been greatest among least-educated women). 
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alimony rule would, in contrast, adjust one spouse's exit threat up-
ward (the payee) and the other's downward (the payor). T he hope 
is that the adjustment would, at worst , have a negligible effect on 
marital stability, and at best would decrease instability by forcing 
the would-be defector to internalize some of the losses imposed on 
the spouse who would be abandoned. 
Perhaps the most pro-marriage rule of all , however, is one that 
insures tha t both spouses' exit prospects are similarlv un <:rttr8.C ti',.re . 
~ -· ..; 
Before about 1960, divorce carried a stigma in American society 
that had real reputational and economic consequences. Those in-
cluded difficulties in remarrying, ineligibility for higher political of-
fice , and possible derailment of promising professional or business 
careers-all consequences ·with potentially greater impact on men. 
T he informality of the stigma allowed for gradations in response 
depending on circumstance and perceived fault. 337 To be sure, all 
divorced persons were suspect, and women who abandoned their 
fam ilies or were otherwise thought to have contributed to their 
own difficulties were judged harshly. But because it was under-
stood that dependent wives had more to lose from divorce than 
men , a man's defection invited special opprobrium. 
The insights of bargaining theory reveal that remarkable wisdom 
informed the informal customs that made the post-divorce state 
unpleasant for all concerned. Other defunct social norms that 
made the unmarried state unattractive for men, such as the taboo 
against casual premarital sex and the expectation of marriage fol-
iowing out-of-wedlock pregnancy ("shotgun marriage") , also 
helped even the playing field between men and women within mar-
riage. 338 But those norms, although supplemented by religious 
337 See, e.g., Joseph Ade!son , Splitting Up, Commentary, Sept. 1996, at 63; F rank F. 
Furstenberg, Jr. , History and Current Status of Divorce in the United States, 4 Futme 
of Children, Spring 1994, at 29; Richard Epstein, Enforcing Norms: Whe n the Law 
Gets in the Way, Responsive Community, Fall 1997, at 1, 7 ("When divorce was re-
garded as socially unacceptable, divorcees found it difficult to ge t jobs, join cl ubs, or 
run for public office. "). See generally Jonathan Rauch, Live and Let Lie, New Re-
public, Sept. 22, 1997, at 24 (describing bygone in forma l social controls surrounding 
marriage, adultery, and divorce). 
33' See, e.g., Burggraf, supra note 81, at 112; David Popenoe, Modem Marriage : Re-
vising the 0Jltural Script, in Promises to Keep: Decl ine and Renewal of Marriage in 
America 261 (David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blan kenhorn eds., 
1996) (" Under the old system .. . if a man wanted regular sex (other than with prosti-
tutes) he had to marry. " ); see also Akerlof, Yellen & Katz, supra no te 281, at 284 
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scruples, have ultimately proved highly unstable. Greater mobility, 
women's increasing financial independence, and changing attitudes 
about the role of sex, relationships, and marriage have contributed 
tbl.II (not ing decline in shotgun weddings from 1965 to 1984) Bargaining theory 
pre clicts th a t the srigm 2. att ache d to pre marital sex would strengthe n women 's hand 
within marriage by ma king sex harder to obtain. The shotgun marriage practice 
would also kr.d to have this effect, since it imposed severe pe na lties on me n who 
alx~ndoned or refused to marry a pregna nt girlfriend. 
According to Akeriof and his co-authors, shotgun marri ages occurred because 
women customarily e licited a promise of marriage in the event of pregnancy in ex-
change for agree ing to engage in prentarital sex, and men ro utin e ly !nade good on 
thilt pro rnisc tc avoid the soc ial and reputationa l costs of re:; eg ing. ld . at 297 -304. 
With the ad vent of the bi rth control piil and lega lized abort io n, the marke t was 
flooded with wome n who -...-vere wiiling to take contraceptives or abort , and thus these 
women had less of an ince ntive to extract a promise of marriage as the price of en-
gaging in premarital sex . This devel opment destabili zed the "promise" norm by put-
ting women who insisted on a provisional promise of commitment at a compe titive 
disadvantage in attracting young men. Id. at 307-10. 
According to the authors, the increased availability of sex without a promise of 
marriage led to an increase in the out-of-wedlock birth rate. Id. Some women (mostly 
those in the lower socioeconomic classes) who found themselves pregnant-and who 
previously would have been good candidates for shotgun brides-decided to go 
ahead with their pregnancies even if the fathers refused to marry the m. If one of the 
important reasons men marry is to have their own children, then the reported in-
creased wi llingness of some women to bear children o ut-of-wed lock would be pre-
dicted to increase their prospective mates' well-being outside of marriage as well. 
This would not only decrease these men's willingness to marry, but might also in-
crease men 's leverage within those marriages that are contracted . 
The dramatic recent increase in the age of first marriage for both men and women. 
see supra note 1, is consistent with the contemporaneous increase in the availability 
of premarita l sex in all social classes. The ease of obtaining sex outside of marriage 
decreases the costs of delayed marriage for both sexes, but especially for men, who 
are always faced with greater scarcity of sexual opportunities. See Akerlo f, Ye llen & 
Katz, supra note 281, a t 309 (noting the erosion over the past three decades of the 
taboo against premar ital sex except as a prelude to marriage). But the lifetime mar-
riage ra tes among higher socioeconomic classes has not dropped nearly as much as 
among th e less ed ucated. See Lichter, supra note 336, at 138-39. T his pattern may be 
due partly to the practical unavailability to higher status men of having their own 
children outside marriage . In contrast, out-of-wedlock birthrates have exploded 
among the relatively poor and less well-educated: More men in those groups can now 
obtain bo th sex and ch ildre n outside the marital union. See Wax, supra note 266, a t 
493 n.6 (citing statistics on rates of extramarital chi ldbearing, which indicate that 
rates decline steep ly among white women as education and income rise). Interest-
ingly, single motherhood through artificial insemination or adoption does not have 
the effect of giving identifiable men their own children. To the extent that well-off 
white women favor ihose methods, o ut-of wedlock chi ldbearing (which occurs infre-
quently in this group anyway) will make little contribution to men 's ex tramarital wei-
fare or their disincentive to marry. 
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to the erosion of the informal social sanctions.339 The steep rise in 
the divorce rate to a near-majority phenomenon has made it more 
difficult to treat divorced persons as deviant and socially marginal 
or to impose meaningful reputational costs.3-l() As a result, the so-
cial sti gma that once attached to divorce has all but disappeared in 
most quarters. Finally, informal sanctions against divorce carried a 
social price. By imposing additional and onerous transaction costs 
on divorce , the fear of social disapproval held some people in oth-
erwise negative-sum unions. In addition, spouses were locked in to 
inefficient relationships in which one spouse had more to gain from 
divorce than the other had to lose-a problem better solved wi th 
post-divorce red istributi on . O n the other hand, the social stigma of 
divorce was particularly effective in protecting the well-being of 
third parties-most notably, children-whose interests in the con-
tinuation of an unhappy marriage did not precisely coincide with 
their parents ' . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While not solving the puzzle entirely, this account of marital 
bargaining provides an important missing piece in the search for 
explanations of why women occupy a lower social status and 
perform the lion's share of less valued work. More specifically, 
it helps to explain why married women-still the majority of 
women-appear on average to work harder and longer and for 
fewer rewards than their husbands. The standard account says that 
women are doing what they want to do: They like it this way, and 
would not change it if they could. A lternatively, women just ap-
pear to do worse. There are hidden compensations and consola-
tions that make them just as well off as men. When different pref-
erences and utilities are factored in, equality reigns. 
339 See, e.g., Barbara D afoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture (1997) (documenting 
the recent des tigmatiza ti on of divorce); see also Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, 
and American Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1916 (1991) (discussing forces o f 
modernity, mobility, and anonymity that contribute to the erosion o f social norms). 
340 See D ani ei Patrick Moynihan, Definin g Deviancy Down, 62 Am. Scholar 17 
(1993) (discussing general difficulty of maintaining socia l stigma against behaviors as 
they become more common); Sunste in, Social Norms, supra note 32, at 929-30 
(discussing the costs of policing social norms); Wax, supra note 266, at 508-25 , 533-37 
(discussing erosion of norms stigmatizing illegitimacy) . 
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Although bargaining theory cannot definitively refute this ac-
count, it shows why there is no reason to credit these stories and 
good reason not to. Women probably do not like it that way and 
would change it if they could. But they cannot, because they lack 
the leverage to do so. The reasons behind this dilemma lie deep 
within the structure of marriage itself. The bilateral and monopo-
listic institutional framework-in which each woman is forced to 
bargain with one man with little outside help or intervention-is an 
effective mechanism for turning women's differences to women's 
disadvantage. To be sure, the scope for "private" bargaining within 
the marital relationship is affected by baseline rules of domestic 
law (supplemented by custom), which in turn determine the rights 
and obligations that spouses have towards each other. These fac-
tors can strengthen or weaken women's hand. But domestic law 
has been increasingly deregulated and privatized.341 By imposing 
fewer and fewer specific obligations on spouses and leaving more 
matters to be worked out between the parties, recent changes have 
forced women to rely on the not-so-tender mercies of a bargaining 
game undertaken from a baseline of unequal starting points and 
bargaining strength. The key structural features of our current 
marital regime-exclusivity, minimal and sex-blind barriers to exit, 
no intramarital enforcement of promises or contracts, and little 
post-marital redistribution of resources-insure that the institution 
operates very much in men's favor. But even though some of these 
features represent fairly recent innovations and reforms that could 
be abandoned, there are limits to what law or custom can do to 
strengthen women's bargaining position, given marriage's funda-
mental nature. Conflict and power cannot be wished out of mar-
riage. Nor can the disparity between men's and women's positions. 
That disparity is not just a contingency of the institution, a superfi-
cial cultural gloss that can be discarded in some times and at some 
places. Rather, it is of the essence: a consequence that springs 
from the deep and defining nature of marriage as a monopolistic 
institution marked by the expectation of exclusivity, fidelity, and 
cooperation for living. :Marriage has always been a two-person 
bargain at its core, insofar as many key matters between husband 
and wife, including divisions of labor and reward, have always been 
341 See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 89, at 952-58; Singer, supra note 277. 
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regarded as "something to be sorted out privately rather than made 
a subj ect of public inte z- ';ention. ":"'z To the extent the spouses must 
work out the most important terrns of their life together and then 
rely largely on self-help to make those terms stick, marri age must 
continue to be an institution in which " the balance between free-
dom of action and security . . . [remains] dependent on shrewdness, 
negot iating skill , and the preexisting distribution of wealth, power, 
and legal entitlements . " 3~3 
T b h r ' · 1 1 · h" · 1 o e sure, t .e struct ure or tne rnanta1 re at10ns .lp IS not tne 
only culpri t responsible fo r women's disadvantage. Such diverse 
factors as the rigidities of the labor market;'4" the pro-breadwinner 
bias in the tax code ,3~; the cultttral eo uation o.f manliness with oc-
cupational success,3" 6 the eroticizatio'n of men's domin ance over 
women/"' the stigma of male domesticity,3"'': the "iron law of child-
care, " 3~9 and the residue of job discrimination and sexual harass-
ment all are important. \Nomen's own outlook and aspirations also 
play a role. Such putative traits as women's greater concern for 
children, for compromise over cont1ict, and for caring rather than 
ruling would put them at a competitive disadvantage in the wider 
world even if marriage could somehow be radically transformed or 
even extinguished as a social norm. vv'omen's preferences still 
might lead to systematic specialization even within a marital insti-
tution structured to achieve a more egalitarian balance; in turn, 
women might hold fewer positions of worldly power, and women's 
interests might be slighted. There is no simple solution to this 
problem, and the abolition of all traces of sexual caste would 
)"2 Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, U . Chi. Legal F. 1989, at 191, 200. 
" 3 Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of f airness in the Law of En terprise Liability, 95 
Mich . L. Rev 1266, 1302 (1 997); see a lso Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 
110 Harv. L. Rev . 1657, 1674 (1 997) (discussing the idea that women 's relative lack of 
power in private relationships-as opposed to the public sphere-is a significant 
source of women's inequality). 
""See McCaffery, supra note 186; Wi lliams, supra note 3. 
}.1; See Edward J. McCaffery Taxing Women (1997). 
:;.:6 See Williams, supra note 3, at 2238-39. 
3" ' See, e.g. , Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 127-214 (1 987) . 
).IS See Will iams, supra note 3, at 2243; Case, supra note 159. 
)"'See Fuchs, supra note 7, at 137 (noting tha t the labor intensiveness of childcare 
enta ils either that most women cannot afford trustvvorthy care, or th at childcare 
workers will be poorly paid). 
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clearly require :radical and far-re2.c:hing ch<lnges (which in turn 
would entail some very re al costs). 
Nonetheless, marriage as cv.rrently structured remains a critical 
and important component of 'Nomen's inequality. There is a dis-
parity between the promise of equal partnership that marriage rep-
resents and the means to enforce that promise. Neither legalistic 
measures nor private contracts provide the complete solution to 
the problem of bargaining irni::;c:dance within marriage. Nevertheless , 
marriage generaily performs its ~-ocial functions best when enduring 
as a long-term contr2ct in which p articipants honor their reciprocal 
1 1" . T T - • j' . • - 1 ]" • , _ • 1 oo11gatiOns. un!ortunately, rew man tal oo_Igatwns are e1tect1ve.y 
enforced either formally or informally. A deliberate decision has 
been made to give divorcing couples a clean break. Thus, the final 
accounting ord ained by current law and custom does li ttle to make 
good on the types of long-term promises that are the source of 
most of the institution's unique social benefits. The failure to en-
force the promises implicit in the marital relationship, although 
certainly not the exclusive source of men's and women's inequality 
within marriage, contributes to it by opening the way for rampant 
opportunism that disproportionately harms women and children. 
Proposals that attempt to make marital promises stick-such as the 
revival of alimony , fault, and consent requirements-have some 
potential to strengthen women's hand within marriage. But the 
sex-neutral form that these proposals most often take undermines 
that potential by strengrhening men's position as well. 
There is no panacea for women's age-old dilemma in marriage. 
It is difficult to redistribute power in relationships that depend, in 
important part, on voluntary choices and voluntary contributions 
between unequals, and it is difficult to transform a vital social insti-
tution that, in its transformation, would be destroyed. The relative 
powerlessness of women within marriage that is described in this 
Article-and the sense of being overpowered in a relationship cen-
tral to human existence and happiness-marks out an important 
but pooriy understood locus of dejection at the heart of feminine 
experience. The resignation that characterizes \Vomen's outlook 
on relationships with men and the persistence of the "woman ques-
tion" in general can be traced in large part to the basic intransi-
gence of the problem of marriage as a relationship that aspires to 
be between equals, but is not. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
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gulf between aspiration and reality (or between aspiration and 
structure) is a source of frustration for both sexes, since men must 
also learn to live within an institution rigged to their own advan-
tage but not of their own making. 
Finally, the built-in structural inequalities of marriage, which 
may once have been thought to be a source of strength for the in-
stitution, may now have come to represent a fatal weakness. The 
evidence would suggest that women are increasingly dissatisfied 
with marriage as it currently exists. More and more women are turn-
ing their backs on their marriage, oft en seemingly at great cost to 
themselves and their children . O ne possible explanation for this 
otherwise puzzling behavior is that 'vVomen, as weak bargainers , are 
losing out in the marital give and take to the point where they per-
ceive themselves as better off outside marriage than within it. Or 
perhaps they are repelled by the imbalance in their "positive-sum" 
bargain and have come to see that imbalance as fundamentally un-
fair. Can women's sense of injustice and the desire for a fair deal 
be suppressed forever, even for their own and their children's 
sake? Must the chronic imbalance in such a key relationship-one 
so central to social life and to the fate of individuals-inevitably 
generate rebellion?350 Women's growing distaste for marital ine-
quality-coupled with men's unsurprising desire to maintain it-
may represent the most potent and ominous threat to the institution 
of marriage so far. 
' 50 See, e.g. , Joshua Cohen , The Arc of the Moral Universe, 26 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 91 
(1997) (suggesting that human moral and emotion a l makeup is such th a t a group 's 
chronic experience of relative powerlessness within a basic social institutio n-such as 
slavery-must inevitably lead to a recognition of injustice and a rebellion against injustice). 
.. . 
